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the Commissioner with special responsibility for 
competition policy 
European competition policy in 1995 was marked by 
a sharp increase in the number of cases submitted to 
the Commission and in the number of decisions 
taken. Looking at the whole range of areas covered 
(restrictive agreements and concerted practices, 
mergers and State aid), the number of new cases 
submitted to the Commission was more than one 
third higher than the previous year. 
A large part of this increase is due to the fact that 
three new member countries joined the European 
Union on 1 January 1995. However, the figures also 
show that businesses are increasingly aware that 
their playing field is Europe as a whole. In addition, 
the pressure of competition gives firms an incentive 
to cooperate or merge so as to remain competitive. 
Competition policy plays a key role in creating an 
environment that is favourable to businesses, this 
being crucial to lasting growth in the European 
economy and to job creation. 
Another crucial competition policy objective is con-
sumer protection. The single market must first and 
foremost serve people. It must be ensured, through 
strict application of the competition rules, that con-
sumers have freedom of choice between quality 
products at competitive prices. 
Let me illustrate Commission efforts in pursuit of 
these two competition policy objectives in 1995 by 
highlighting a few of the most significant examples. 
The Commission took action against business prac-
tices blocking parallel imports and preventing con-
sumers from taking advantage of price differences 
between Member States. With the same end in view, 
the new Regulation on motor vehicle distribution in 
Europe, while allowing structured networks that 
provide after-sales service, ensures that individual 
consumers are free to carry out parallel imports. The 
Commission is similarly on its guard against firms 
that restrict market access for new competitors. 
The application of the competition rules to the infor-
mation society has continued to be a priority. Major 
progress has been achieved on legislative provisions 
liberalizing telecommunication services: such liber-
alization has applied to mobile telephones since 
1995 and will apply to alternative networks on 1 July 
1996 and to voice telephony on 1 January 1998. In 
several Member States (Belgium, Ireland and Italy), 
new entrants to the mobile-telephone market are 
treated on an equal footing with the established oper-
ator. 
However, the Commission's role does not stop there: 
operators must be prevented from concluding agree-
ments or engaging in practices which have the same 
foreclosure effect as the statutory protection that 
existed previously. For this reason, strategic al-
liances, which are an increasingly frequent phenom-
enon, can be authorized only if they do not shut off 
national markets. 
The Commission also prohibited two operations in 
the audiovisual sector, which is a sensitive and 
rapidly developing sector, so as to safeguard the 
scope for competition. 
Let me emphasize that the policy of liberalization 
takes full account of the needs of the public services, 
whose performance it aims to improve while main-
taining quality and prices that consumers can afford. 
The same consideration applies to the competition 
rules as a whole, including those governing State 
aid. The Commission accordingly agreed that a tax 
measure in support of the French Post Office should 
not be deemed to be aid, since it merely counter-
balanced certain public-service constraints imposed 
upon the Post Office. On the State aid front, the 
Commission endeavoured to pursue a strict policy, 
authorizing aid only on the basis of precise and uni-
form rules for priority objectives (for example, 
research and development). One of the most impor-
tant and most widely remarked decisions, that on Crédit Lyonnais, shows how this concern for strict 
enforcement of the rules is combined with aware-
ness of the specific features of individual sectors. 
Γ am aware that it is crucial for firms to have com-
petition policy cases dealt with within the tightest 
possible deadlines. Most mergers are cleared by the 
Commission, on a one-stop-shop basis, within one 
month of notification. This represents a considerable 
advantage for firms. I would also like to speed up 
procedures in other types of cases, particularly those 
involving joint ventures. 
It is my intention that European competition policy 
should continue to adjust to the needs and priorities of 
individuals and of the European economy. Discus-
sions will accordingly be entered into or pursued with 
all those concerned on the following subjects: coop-
eration with the national competition authorities, 
fines to be imposed on cartels, the Green Paper on 
mergers, the Green Paper on vertical restrictions in 
distribution, and changes to the de minimis rule, the 
aim being to reduce as far as possible the constraints 
imposed on enterprises while at the same time focus-
ing Commission action on essentials. XXVth Report 
on competition policy 
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10 INTRODUCTION 
1. A competitive environment as a pre-
requisite for competitiveness 
1. It is widely recognized that competition pol-
icy has a key role to play in ensuring that EU 
industry remains competitive. 
Competition policy serves as an instrument to 
achieve the optimal allocation of resources, 
technical progress and the flexibility to adjust to 
a changing environment. In that respect, compe-
tition and competitiveness belong together. 
Experience shows that only those companies 
which are used to strong competition and per-
form well in open and dynamic markets will be 
able to function effectively on a wider scale be 
it in other geographic areas or in a more global 
economy in general. 
Competition policy and competitiveness policy 
are thus not contradictory but rather serve the 
same goals of creating the essential conditions 
for the development and maintenance of an effi-
cient and competitive Community industry, 
bringing better products and services to Euro-
pean citizens, and providing a stable economic 
environment. 
2. Internal market and competition 
policy 
2. The complementarity between those two 
policies is also clearly shown by the Communi-
ty's objective of creating an internal market. On 
the one hand, the internal market is an essential 
condition for the development of an efficient 
and competitive industry. On the other hand, 
competition policy is an important tool for 
achieving the goal of, and maintaining, an inter-
nal market, in particular via the enforcement of 
rules ensuring that the regulatory barriers to 
trade which have been removed are not replaced 
by private or other public restrictions having the 
same effect. 
2.1. Factors affecting competition in the 
internal market 
3. While the legislative steps spelt out in the 
1985 Commission White Paper on the internal 
market have almost all been adopted and trans-
posed at national level, preliminary evidence 
suggests that some product and service markets 
remain fragmented.' 
Internal market integration, in tandem with the 
progressive globalization of markets, is ex-
pected to widen geographic markets (not necess-
arily to Community level — relevant geograph-
ic markets may contain a distinct set of region-
al or national areas). It may therefore redefine 
the structural parameters of the market within 
which the implications of actions of public or 
private-sector operators for competition must be 
judged. No definitive judgment can be made at 
this early stage as to whether the pro-competi-
tive impact of the internal market has manifest-
ed itself. In some markets, there is tentative evi-
dence that competition is increasingly defined 
at a supranational level, while in others there is 
reason to believe that markets remain segmen-
ted along national lines. The latter can be 
explained by reference to a range of factors 
which must be taken into account when assess-
ing the consequences of internal market integra-
tion in terms of the geographical expansion of 
'relevant markets'. 
4. A first factor relates to the effectiveness of 
legislative action (and ancillary measures such 
as European standardization) in dismantling 
legal and administrative barriers to cross-border 
transactions. Where the legislative framework is 
incomplete or inadequate, the Commission 
intends to press for its reinforcement. There 
may also be situations where there are no entry 
barriers but where discrepancies in national 
arrangements result in differences in economic 
conditions that are capable of distorting trade 
and competition (e.g. pharmaceutical pricing, 
taxation, monetary fluctuations). Where these 
factors result in differences in economic con-
ditions between national markets, leading opera-
tors to distinguish between them, this may need 
to be taken into account in defining the relevant 
market for competition. 'Natural barriers' such 
as language, taste and habits, or structural 
characteristics which reduce the tradability of 
products or services, may also require that 
national markets be regarded as separate enti-
ties. These issues have arisen in the context of 
the Commission's investigation of mergers in 
TV broadcasting and the media sector, where 
linguistic and cultural factors require that the 
EU market be regarded as consisting of a series 
During 1996, the Commission intends to present the findings of 
an overall analysis of the impact and effectiveness of the inter-
nal market programme pursuant to Council Resolution 92/1218 
of 7 December 1992.  11 of distinct national markets. This cultural diver-
sity contributes to the richness of our shared 
European heritage and must be taken into 
account in the analysis of cases by the Commis-
sion, even if cases of dominance are more fre-
quently encountered as a result (Nordic Satel-
lite; RTL/Veronica/Endemol). 
fore pursued its efforts to open up these markets 
to competition and intra-Community trade 
while ensuring that the measures proposed or 
adopted are compatible with the performance 
by public services of tasks of general economic 
interest, such as the provision of a universal ser-
vice to all citizens at affordable prices. 
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2.2. Role of competition policy 
5. While internal market integration shapes the 
economic context within which Community 
competition policy must be applied, it is also the 
case that the application of Community compe-
tition policy will help to reinforce the function-
ing of a single market. Three main areas of 
activity can be identified: anti-competitive 
agreements and practices, the regulated or 
monopolized sectors and State aid. It is an 
essential consideration here that the Com-
mission has at its disposal a set of interdepen-
dent competition policy instruments. The anti-
trust rules, merger control, the policing of State 
aid and the rules on liberalization all serve the 
same objective of ensuring that competition in 
the internal market is not distorted. 
-
6. The Commission is vigilant in applying 
Community competition rules where firms 
attempt to stifle the pro-competitive effects 
emanating from internal market integration 
through anti-competitive behavior designed to 
sustain market segmentation. Examples of 
behaviour which give rise to such concern are 
restrictions on parallel trade, certain types of 
vertical agreements and/or distribution systems 
and unjustified refusal to provide (non-discrim-
inatory) access to facilities which third parties 
require in order to compete. 
7. The liberalization of traditionally monopo-
lized markets, such as utilities, is an essential 
step in the establishment of an internal market. 
It is strongly believed that, without a stronger 
and more competitive base in the fields of en-
ergy, public transport and telecommunications, 
the European economy, including consumers 
and medium-sized enterprises, will be at a dis-
advantage.' The Madrid European Council in 
December 1995 concluded that it was essential 
to introduce increased competition in different 
sectors in order to enhance competitiveness and 
so create new jobs. The ommission has there-
8. Telecommunications is a strategic area of 
considerable interest for the European Union.' 
Ongoing liberalization of this sector has forced 
telecom operators to launch new services and to 
reduce prices. Both industry and consumers 
benefit from the opening-up of telecom mar-
kets. The introduction of competition in this 
sector is also vital to facilitate the transition to 
the information society and thus for our ability 
to survive in an increasingly competitive and 
global market. In this context, cultural diversity 
and equal access to the new services are essen-
tial objectives that need to be addressed. 
Much of the legislation at Community level has 
either been adopted or is well under way for 
complete liberalization by 1998. This must of 
course be transposed into national legislation 
and effectively applied in order to ensure the 
introduction of real competition. The role of the 
Commission will not be reduced once the legis-
lative acts are in place. On the contrary, the 
Commission must ensure that, once removed, 
the legal barriers will not be replaced by agree-
ments or practices of a similar nature, such as 
anti-competitive mergers, market-sharing 
agreements, abusive behaviour of the incum-
bents against newcomers — for example, by 
denying non-discriminatory access to essential 
facilities — or by illegal State aid. Where ex-
clusive rights are maintained in reserved areas, 
cross-subsidization of the operator's non-
reserved areas should be avoided. 
In the meantime, industry moves on to antici-
pate new emerging markets. New alliances hav-
ing global implications have been submitted to 
Competitiveness Advisory Group, 'Enhancing European compet-
itiveness' second report to the President of the European Com-
mission, the Prime Ministersand Heads of State, December 1995 
('Ciampi Report'). In the same context, it is argued that 'what 
matters most is not so much that the ownership — and manage-
ment — of public utilities moves from the State to the private 
sector, as that competition is introduced and extended wherever 
possible'. 
Green Paper on the liberalization of telecommunications infra-
structure and cable television networks: Part One (COM(94) 440, 
25.10.1994) and Part Two (COM(94) 682, 25.01.1995). INTRODUCTION 
the Commission for scrutiny. The Commission's 
assessment of these cases demonstrates how the 
existing competition rules, when applied 
realistically, are capable of grasping the dynam-
ics of innovation and globalization. But newly 
emerging markets is not a password for 
approval. While alliances should be allowed, or 
even encouraged when pro-competitive, they 
cannot be accepted where they thwart or threat-
en the demonopolization process. Where big 
players join forces, the Commission should aim 
to prevent market foreclosure. 
9. To an even greater degree than the télécoms 
sector, the air transport sector, where full liber-
alization will be completed by the end of 1997, 
demonstrates that legislation is necessary but 
not sufficient to achieve a fully competitive 
environment. In this sector, where airlines fight 
to secure or retain a sufficient share of a mod-
estly growing and competitive market, there is 
an ever-present danger that the incumbents 
might use unfair methods to protect their 
interests. Strict application of competition rules, 
mainly in the field of State aid and control of 
abusive behaviour, is absolutely necessary. In 
particular, State aid is seen as a counter-pro-
ductive measure which tends to protect the inef-
ficient against the efficient, simply delaying the 
necessary restructuring. State aid might even be 
used to fight new competitors by means of 
predatory pricing and other measures. While 
restructuring is necessary to achieve efficiency 
gains and competitiveness in a growing market, 
the Commission has to make sure that a high 
degree of concentration does not foreclose 
routes and slots, thereby re-erecting legally 
removed barriers. 
10. Energy is another key factor for industry 
and was mentioned as such in the Ciampi 
Report. However, this year has not produced 
any real progress in the liberalization of this 
sector. 
//. According to the fourth survey on State aid 
in the European Union, published in 1995, the 
total amount of national aid in the period 1990-
92 has decreased, but — at around ECU 94 bil-
lion on average per year for the Community as 
a whole — is still too high for the Commission's 
objectives to be attained, notably with respect to 
the richer Member States. Vast amounts of State 
aid are not the way to achieve competitiveness. 
They delay necessary restructuring, distort 
competition between the companies and regions 
and are a burden on public budgets. 
However, it would be unrealistic to suggest that 
all State aid be simply eliminated and this has 
never been envisaged by the authors of the 
Treaty or by the Commission. Market forces 
alone, in a market which is not perfect, do not 
allow the attainment of certain fundamental 
objectives of the Member States and the Euro-
pean Union, such as economic and social cohe-
sion, a sufficient degree of R&D and environ-
mental protection, the development of SMEs 
and the necessity of allowing time for structural 
adjustment, in particular for social reasons. For 
the Commission, it is essential to ensure that, 
where State aid is allowed by derogation, the 
negative effects on competition and trade 
between Member States are limited to what is 
strictly necessary and that they are offset by the 
realization of objectives of general Community 
interest. 
3. International cooperation 
12. The increasing globalization of the world 
economy and the changing pattern of modern 
trade makes international cooperation between 
competition authorities inevitable. 
First, companies operating worldwide must be 
aware of, and must comply with, differing compe-
tition laws and practices in different jurisdictions. 
This necessarily entails a cost for the companies 
concerned. Moreover, when transactions fall with-
in the jurisdiction of multiple competition auth-
orities, there is an increased risk of conflicting 
measures being imposed. Competition authorities, 
for their part, may have difficulties in gaining 
access to information evidencing an anti-trust vio-
lation located outside their jurisdiction. Alterna-
tively, competition rules aimed at preserving 
effective competition on the home market may be 
less effective in dealing with anti-competitive con-
duct at the global level. Finally, it is widely recog-
nized that greater application of competition rules 
must accompany trade liberalization if it is to be 
effective; private barriers must not replace dis-
mantled public barriers. 
For all these reasons, greater cooperation at inter-
national level is clearly in the interests of industry 
and consumers.  13 13. On a bilateral level, the agreement with the 
United States (confirmed in April 1995 by the 
Council) already offers scope for cooperation 
and its provisions on coordination of enforce-
ment activities to some extent allow the parties 
to work together to tackle anti-competitive 
situations affecting the EU and US markets. 
In a report on competition policy in the new 
trade order drafted at the request of Mr Van 
Miert, an independent group of experts recom-
mends as a 'priority' the deepening of the cur-
rent EC/US agreement. It also formulates re-
commendations in relation to plurilateral coop-
eration as it believes that bilateral agreements 
cannot of themselves adequately address all the 
problems which could arise at international 
level. 
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4. Role of the Commission in applying 
the competition rules 
14. It is fair to say that the development phase 
of Community competition policy is completed. 
Policy and law are now well established 
through the Commission's administrative prac-
tice and the principles developed by the Euro-
pean Courts. On the other hand, the Commis-
sion has at its disposal limited resources to deal 
with an ever-increasing number of cases. In 
1995 in particular, the number of new cases, es-
pecially State aid and Articles 85 and 86 cases, 
increased significantly as a result of the acces-
sion of three new Member States. 
15. Accordingly, the Commission has been 
considering how to focus on those arrangements 
which have a significant effect on competition 
and are likely to affect trade between Member 
States appreciably. For this purpose, several 
instruments and concepts have already been 
developed. Preparatory work is under way to 
broaden and refine them further. Particularly 
relevant in this respect are the application of the 
de minimis principle (in the fields of both anti-
trust and State aid), group exemptions (which 
allow firms to make agreements without notify-
ing them to the Commission so as to obtain 
legal certainty) and the notion of Community 
interest in the case of complaints. 
16. Where the Commission must deal as a pri-
ority with cases having an appreciable effect on 
intra-Community competition, the role of 
national authorities and courts in competition 
cases becomes more important. The decentral-
ized application of the competition rules is often 
a quicker and more efficient way to bring 
infringements to an end. More frequent applica-
tion by national courts and authorities reminds 
the Community citizen that these rules are part 
of the 'living law' of each Member State and are 
aimed at protecting their rights. 
17. The Commission therefore continued to 
encourage the decentralized application of 
Community competition rules, in particular as 
far as cases falling within the scope of Articles 
85 and 86 are concerned. Its aim is to establish 
effective cooperation between the national 
courts, competition authorities and itself. In this 
respect, the preparatory work for a new notice 
on cooperation between the Commission and 
national competition authorities is well 
advanced and will complement the existing 
notice on cooperation with the national courts. 
This policy of decentralization should however 
be implemented gradually and with care. The 
actual decentralization process goes hand in 
hand with a continuing effort on the part of the 
Commission to clarify and simplify the rules of 
substance in order to enable the Member States 
to use the same concepts when applying the 
Community competition rules. 
18. The principle of subsidiarity dictates that 
the most appropriate authority should take 
action. Therefore, certain cases which fall with-
in the jurisdiction of several national authorities 
should be handled by the Commission. Thus, in 
the case of mergers, it is preferable for firms to 
have their proposed mergers examined by the 
Commission alone rather than having to submit 
them to a number of national authorities. In 
1995, the Commission embarked on a new 
review of the Merger Regulation, inter alia to 
consider whether the turnover-based criterion 
for determining those cases which must be sub-
mitted to the Commission and those which fall 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member 
States is still appropriate. 
19. In the field of State aid, the subsidiarity 
principle dictates that the Community must 
have exclusive competence because Member 
States cannot be asked to control their own 
State aid expenditures in a fair way vis-à-vis INTRODUCTION 
their neighbours. However, one aspect can be 
handled at national level: national courts may 
act upon complaints by the competitors of the 
firm receiving State aid, and in particular it may 
control whether the necessary notification and 
approval procedures have been followed by the 
Member State. The Commission has published 
a new notice in this area which has a threefold 
purpose: to strengthen and decentralize enforce-
ment of State aid rules, to clarify the legal posi-
tion for the benefit of all interested parties and 
to offer assistance to judges. 
5. Transparency 
20. Competition rules are often complex 
because the economic, legal and political con-
text in which they operate is complicated and 
constantly evolving. This does not mean that 
there is no room left for more transparency and 
simplification. The Commission has indeed 
found several ways to increase information 
about its policy and to simplify the legal 
framework. They include: the newly adopted 
group exemption for technology transfer 
agreements, which will replace the two regula-
tions concerning know-how and patent licens-
ing; the use of notices and communications to 
provide guidelines on the application of the 
competition rules in certain sectors (cross-
border credit transfers; postal services); the 
use of Green Papers for the purpose of public 
consultation (i.e. the planned Green Papers on 
vertical restraints and merger review to be 
published in 1996); and the publication of 
explanatory brochures (new car distribution 
regulation). In the field of State aid, the obli-
gation to notify, which is laid down in the 
Treaty, is central to ensuring transparency. The 
Commission has indicated in a communication 
that it intends to utilize all the powers which 
the Treaty confers on it to ensure that Member 
States respect this obligation. It has also start-
ed working on a revised and consolidated 
regional aid framework and has adopted a new 
framework for aid for research and develop-
ment. Lastly, it pursued its active campaign to 
inform the public of competition policy mat-
ters: press releases and conferences, DG IV's 
Information Service, publications, the Compe-
tition Policy Newsletter and, last but not least, 
the Annual Report on Competition Policy, all 
of which serve the same purpose, namely to 
enhance transparency, legal certainty and pre-
dictability. 
6. Democratic accountability 
27. Competition policy cannot simply be a 
technocratic or administrative exercise but has 
everything to gain by bringing about a wide 
democratic consensus. The Commission 
accordingly attaches great importance to a fruit-
ful dialogue with the other institutions of the 
European Union on all aspects of its competi-
tion policy. 
22. The Annual Report on Competition Policy 
serves as a basic instrument of communication 
and information to the other institutions of the 
European Union, in particular the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Economic and 
Social Committee. The fruitful exchanges of 
view and discussions concerning the previous 
report were clearly of help to the Commission 
in implementing its tasks and contributed to bet-
ter information on, and comprehension of, 
European competition policy. Moreover, where 
appropriate, the Commission takes the initiative 
of consulting the other institutions on newly 
proposed provisions or on other policy docu-
ments. In particular, in the context of the adop-
tion of Article 90 liberalization directives, it has 
carefully considered the observations made by 
the European Parliament, the Council, the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, and the Commit-
tee of the Regions. 
23. The Commission has also collaborated 
closely with the Council on various aspects of 
its policy, in particular as regards the relation-
ship between competition policy and compe-
titiveness. 
24. Member States are closely involved in the 
Commission's decision-making process through 
the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Prac-
tices and Dominant Positions, the Advisory 
Committee on Concentrations and the Confer-
ence of national government experts. Moreover, 
Commission officials have regular and con-
structive informal contacts with their colleagues 
at national level. 
25. On 3 and 4 April, the Commission organ-
ized the first European Competition Forum in 
15 Brussels on the issue of vertical restraints.' 
More than 260 participants, including competi-
tion authorities and judges from 35 European 
countries, attended. The purpose of such a 
forum is to promote exchanges of experience 
and discussions among Community and Mem-
ber State officials whose responsibility is to 
enforce competition law and to encourage 
decentralized application of competition law. A 
second Forum is planned in 1996. 
26. The Commission's XXVth Annual Report 
on Competition Policy (1995) differs in presen-
tation from the previous annual reports. 
27. In recent years, the Commission's competi-
tion report has increased steadily in size to 
reach more than 600 pages in 1994. Since the 
Commission's separate brochure 'European 
Community competition policy — 1994', 
which summarizes the Commission's policy and 
decisions in a 'user-friendly' format, has been 
well received, the Commission has been asked, 
in particular by the Economic and Social 
Committee, to present a shorter and more read-
able document. 
The Commission therefore decided to produce a 
shorter report than in the past, focusing on the 
main policy developments in the field of com-
petition, which are illustrated, where applicable, 
by the Commission's major decisions and new 
legislative measures. 
■ 
In addition to the present Annual Report, the 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV) 
of the European Commission prepared a 
'Report on the application of the competition 
rules in the European Union — 1995', which 
describes the important individual cases decid-
ed by the Commission. It also contains lists of 
references to the new legislative provisions and 
notices, the Commission decisions and press 
releases and decisions by the Court of Justice 
and the Court of First Instance. It furthermore 
gives a description of the application of compe-
tition rules in the Member States. 
7. Statistics 
28. There has been a large increase in the over-
all number of new cases registered. The total 
number of new cases (anti-trust, mergers, State 
aid) rose from 1 081 in 1994 to 1 472 in 1995 — 
an increase of 36%. New Articles 85 and 86 cas-
es increased by more than 42%, merger notifi-
cations rose by nearly 16% and the number of 
new State aid cases grew by 35%. A significant 
part of this increase, in particular in the field of 
anti-trust and State aid, is due to the accession 
of three new Member States to the European 
Union on 1 January 1995. 
29. The total number of cases closed in 1995 
remained almost at the same level as in 1994: 
1210 cases compared with 1 200. 
. 
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A — Ensuring the benefits of the 
internal market 
30. An essential aim of European competition 
policy is to ensure that the completion of the 
internal market brings consumers and the Euro-
pean economy as a whole all the benefits of a 
Community-wide market. 
Competition policy must create the appropriate 
framework allowing companies to adjust to the 
new possibilities opened up by the elimination 
of national barriers. However, where companies 
try to slow down the process of market integra-
tion or even obstruct cross-border trade by anti-
competitive practices, it is necessary to pursue a 
vigilant policy, including the imposition of 
severe sanctions in cases of hard-core infringe-
ments of the competition rules. 
Vertical arrangements between suppliers and 
distributors are a core element of European 
competition policy in this field. Some of these 
arrangements may be necessary to penetrate 
new markets, launch new products or promote 
efficient distribution networks and might there-
by benefit consumers. Problems may, however, 
arise where there is not enough competition 
between producers or between distributors in 
the same markets or where the arrangements are 
used for anti-competitive purposes, i.e. for mar-
ket-partitioning or for restricting access to the 
market by new entrants. 
1. Car distribution 
31. Because motor vehicles are consumer 
durables which require expert maintenance and 
repair, manufacturers cooperate with selected 
dealers and repairers in order to provide special-
ized distribution and servicing for the product. 
Such arrangements are likely to enhance effi-
cient distribution of the products concerned and 
the exclusive and/or selective nature of the dis-
tribution system can be regarded as indispens-
able for attaining rationalization and efficiency 
in the motor vehicle industry. 
This was and still is the basic motivation for 
allowing restrictive distribution and servicing 
agreements in the car sector. However, the new 
group exemption relating to the distribution and 
servicing of motor vehicles,' which the Com-
mission adopted on 28 June 1995 to replace the 
existing Regulation (EEC) No 123/85,
2 contains 
several adjustments aimed at intensifying com-
petition in the markets for cars and spare parts 
and improving the position of consumers by 
guaranteeing them the full benefits of the inter-
nal market. 
32. In particular, the new regulation secures 
greater independence for dealers vis-à-vis car 
manufacturers. Most importantly, dealers are 
allowed to sell cars of other manufacturers pro-
vided that this is done on separate sales prem-
ises, under separate management, in the form of 
a distinct legal entity and in a manner which 
avoids confusion between brands. To ensure 
effective competition on the maintenance and 
repair markets, car manufacturers or suppliers 
are not allowed to impede access by independent 
spare part producers and distributors to the mar-
kets or to restrict the dealer's right to procure 
spare parts of equivalent quality from firms of 
his choice outside the network. Furthermore, car 
manufacturers must provide repairers outside 
the network with the technical information they 
need to enable them to repair and maintain cars 
produced by them, provided that the information 
is not covered by an intellectual property right. 
33. Multi-dealerships, opening-up of the market 
in spare parts and greater competition in the field 
of repairs all serve the aim of increasing con-
sumers' choice in accordance with the principles 
of the single market. The same objective 
requires that consumers are able to buy a car and 
to have it maintained or repaired wherever in the 
European Union prices or terms are most 
favourable. 
This is all the more important in the car sector, 
where price differences between Member States 
are significant. In its latest six-monthly survey 
of car prices, published in July, the Commission 
noticed that price differentials had risen dramati-
cally since November 1994.' Since the begin-
ning of 1995, it has received an increasing num-
ber of complaints from individuals in the Euro-
pean Union, mostly from Austria, Germany and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on 
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories 
of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements (OJ L 
145, 29.6.1995, p. 25). 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 
(OJ L 15, 18.1.1985). 
Commission press releases IP/95/50 of 19.1.1995 and IP/95/768 
of 24.7.1995.  17 France, who have been prevented from purchas-
ing a car in Italy and Spain, where, following 
currency devaluations, prices were relatively 
low.' 
The new Regulation expressly bans any prac-
tices designed to prevent parallel trade.
2 Dealers 
must be allowed to meet demand from outside 
their allotted sales area and may in future under-
take certain means of advertising outside their 
territory. 
34. The Commission departments published on 
26 September 1995 in all Community languages 
a brochure which explains the new regulatory 
framework for manufacturers, dealers, spare 
part producers and independent repairers. It also 
provides consumers with information on their 
freedom to buy a car anywhere in the Commu-
nity.
3 
2. Restrictions on parallel trade 
35. It is one of the most well-established prin-
ciples of Community competition law that pro-
ducers are forbidden to divide the internal mar-
ket by private agreements and to maintain price 
differences by arranging anti-competitive 
absolute territorial protection. However, such 
behaviour continues to occur on the market and, 
where it comes to light, one can expect severe 
action by the Commission. 
BASF/Accinauto 
18 
36. In a decision of 12 July 1995,
4 the Com-
mission imposed a fine of ECU 2.7 million on 
the German car refinish paint producer BASF 
Lacke + Farben, a subsidiary of the BASF 
group, and a fine of ECU 10 000 on BASF's 
exclusive distributor in Belgium and Luxem-
bourg, Accinauto S.A. The case originated with 
a complaint by two English parallel importers 
of Glasurit car refinish paint products. They 
alleged that Accinauto, from whom they bought 
the Glasurit products, had ceased deliveries to 
them in the summer of 1990 on the instructions 
of BASF. The Commission carried out investi-
gations on the premises of BASF and Accin-
auto and found out that Accinauto was bound by 
a contractual obligation to transfer to BASF all 
orders from customers from outside its exclu-
sive distribution territory. The Commission con-
cluded that this obligation constitutes an unac-
ceptable restriction of competition as it hinders 
the export by Accinauto of the relevant products 
from Belgium to the United Kingdom. In fact, 
as a result of this obligation, BASF itself, and 
not the exclusive distributor, decides on and 
controls supplies to parallel importers from 
other Member States. 
Pharmaceutical products: Organon 
37. Prices for pharmaceutical products differ 
significantly between Member States. This is 
usually explained by the differences in national 
price control and health care systems. On sev-
eral occasions, the Court of Justice has ruled 
that parallel imports should not be blocked, irre-
spective of the factors that determine price dif-
ferences. Hence, in the pharmaceutical sector, 
the Commission has consistently applied the 
competition rules to agreements or conduct 
which restrict parallel trade in drugs. It is 
believed that the unrestricted operation of mar-
ket forces in this way is likely to act as a cata-
lyst for the gradual convergence not only of 
prices but also of price control mechanisms. 
Prices in the high-cost countries should fall, 
while those in the low-price countries should, if 
they fail to offer pharmaceutical companies a 
reasonable return on investment, ultimately 
increase in reaction to the real threat of product 
withdrawal. Some Member States with high 
drug prices even stimulate parallel imports in 
order to bring about a reduction in their coun-
try's overall drug bill. 
38. Organon is a British subsidiary of Akzo 
(Netherlands) which specializes in the manu-
facture and marketing of contraceptive pills. 
On 4 May 1994, Organon changed the price 
regime applicable to its contraceptive pills Mer-
cilon and Marvelon, the latter holding substan-
tial market shares throughout the Community. 
The impact of currency fluctuations on the internal market', 
communication from the Commission to the European Council, 
31.10.1995. point 25. 
See also judgments of the Court of Justice of 24 October 1995 in 
Cases C-70/93 Bayerische Molorenwerke AG and ALD Auro-
Leasing D GmbH and C-266/93 Bundeskartellamt and Volks-
wagen AG. VAG Leasing GmbH (not yet published). 
'Distribution of motor vehicles'. Explanatory brochure. Euro-
pean Commission. DG IV. IV/9509/95. More than 7 000 copies 
of this brochure have already been distributed. 
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Before that date, Organon applied a discount of 
12.5% on all products supplied to its customers, 
irrespective of their final destination. The new 
price regime differentiated between those pills 
to be sold in the UK and those intended for 
export. Only the former qualified for the 12.5% 
discount rate. 
Following several complaints and Organon's 
notification of the new pricing system, the 
Commission initiated proceedings against 
Organon and issued a statement of objections 
aimed at withdrawing the immunity from fines 
brought about by notification. For the Commis-
sion, the new price regime, which forms part of 
continuous business relations between Organon 
and its wholesalers and therefore constitutes an 
agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1),' 
constituted a serious infringement of the com-
petition rules in that it gave rise to discrimina-
tion in the prices of the products according to 
their geographical destination. As a result, con-
sumers could no longer enjoy the benefits of 
parallel trade. In the Netherlands in particular, 
where the Marvelon pill of Dutch origin is not 
fully reimbursed by the social security scheme, 
whereas the price of the British pill allows it to 
be offered at a price equal to the Dutch social 
security reimbursement level, consumers were 
no longer able to opt for the UK-produced Mar-
velon and thus to benefit from not having to pay 
an amount over and above the reimbursement 
price. 
Organon, however, decided to abandon the new 
pricing regime, which the Commission had 
opposed, and reintroduced the previous price 
conditions. The status quo having been 
restored, the Commission suspended its pro-
ceedings and reserved the right to examine the 
forthcoming pricing system which Organon 
intends to bring in. 
3. Restrictions on access to the market 
by new entrants 
39. A truly competitive internal market also 
implies that companies are free to enter the mar-
ket to compete with existing market players. 
The Commission is therefore particularly keen 
to keep open markets and has in fact intervened 
where companies, be it through restrictive 
agreements or by unilateral action, have im-
peded access to the market by new entrants. 
40. New competitors can be prevented from 
entering the market by vertical arrangements 
between existing suppliers and distributors. 
This is in particular the case where a large num-
ber of retailers on the market are tied by an 
obligation to sell only the products of the manu-
facturer with which they have a contract or 
arrangements having a similar exclusionary 
effect on third parties. The cases concerning the 
impulse ice cream market (Unilever/Mars) are 
examples of such arrangements. 
In other cases, access by third parties to the 
market is impeded through a horizontal agree-
ment or concerted practice between actual or 
potential competitors. This is what happened on 
the Dutch crane-hire market (Van Marwijk/ 
FNK-SCK). 
Access to the market can also be blocked 
through abuse by a monopoly or dominant 
provider of essential facilities or services. This 
is a problem of increasing importance in various 
sectors. Where a dominant company owns or 
controls a facility access to which is essential to 
enable its competitors to carry on business, it 
may not deny them access and it must grant 
access on a non-discriminatory basis. Be it in 
the transport sector, in particular air transport, in 
banking or in the telecommunications sector, 
the Commission applies this general principle 
of EU competition law
2 in order to foster new 
competition. The case concerning access to the 
port of Roscoff in France (ICG/CC1 Morlaix) 
raises the same issue. 
Unilever/Mars 
41. Unilever is market leader in most EU Mem-
ber States in 'impulse' ice cream products (i.e. 
single wrapped items of industrially manufac-
tured ice cream sold for immediate consumption 
in places like newsagents, petrol stations, etc.). 
In Ireland, it is by far the largest ice cream pro-
ducer. Unilever's distribution system consisted 
In its judgment of 24 October 1995 in Cases C-70/93 and 
C-266/93 (see footnote 2 on p. 18), the Court confirmed its 
prior jurisprudence that a call by a company to its dealers does 
not constitute an unilateral act which falls outside the scope of 
Article 85(1) but is an agreement within the meaning ofthat pro-
vision if it formed part of a set of continuous business relations 
governed by a general agreement drawn up in advance. 
This general principle has found support in the judgment of the 
Court of Justice of 6 April 1995 in Cases C-241/91 Ρ and C-
242/91 Ρ Radio Telefts Eireann (RTE) and Indépendant Televi-
sion Publications Ltd ν Commission (Magill) ¡1995] ECR1-743.  19 in providing freezer cabinets to retailers subject 
to a condition of exclusivity whereby only 
Unilever products could be stored in the cabinets 
('freezer exclusivity'). Moreover, the cost of 
cabinet provision was included in the price of 
the ice cream charged to all retailers, irrespective 
of whether they had a Unilever freezer cabinet. 
On a complaint from Mars, the Commission 
examined the distribution arrangements operat-
ed by Unilever in Ireland. It found that, where a 
retailer has only one or more Unilever freezer 
cabinets in his outlet, that outlet is in practice 
tied exclusively to the sale of Unilever ice 
cream as a result; the majority of all outlets 
offering impulse ice cream in Ireland fall into 
this category. Such outlet exclusivity has 
already been condemned by the Commission in 
1992 with regard to the German impulse ice 
cream market.' The Unilever agreements had 
the cumulative effect of appreciably restricting 
competition by preventing third competitors' 
access to the market. The arrangements were 
also found to be an abuse of Unilever's domi-
nant position on the market. 
Unilever, however, agreed to alter its practices 
with the aim of freeing up the market, in partic-
ular by giving wider choice to retailers. The 
Commission has accordingly announced that 
the new arrangements appear to meet the condi-




42. In its decision of 29 November 1995,' the 
Commission imposed fines
4 on FNK and SCK 
for infringements of Article 85(1) on the Dutch 
crane-hire market. 
Apart from FNK's recommended prices for the 
hiring-out of cranes and the concerted prices 
applied between members of FNK, the Com-
mission attacked the ban on SCK certificate-
holders hiring cranes from firms not affiliated to 
SCK. It considered that the SCK hiring ban was 
caught by the prohibition of Article 85(1) as the 
SCK certification system did not fulfil the con-
ditions of openness and acceptance of other 
equivalent quality guarantee systems. It con-
cluded that the ban not only restricted the free-
dom of action of the affiliated firms but also 
considerably impeded access by third parties to 
the Dutch market. 
In its decision, the Commission indicated that, 
while its policy on certification allows scope for 
private-law certification systems designed to 
provide supplementary monitoring of com-
pliance with statutory provisions, such systems 
should be in accordance with the competition 
rules. 
ICG/CCI Morlaix 
43. Irish Continental Group (ICG) applied to 
the Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de 
Morlaix (CCI Morlaix) for access to the port of 
Roscoff (Brittany) for the purpose of commenc-
ing a ferry service between Ireland and Brittany 
in the summer of 1995. Brittany Ferries was at 
that time the only ferry company operating 
between Ireland and Brittany. Initially, an 
agreement in principle was reached between the 
parties following which ICG started to market 
and take bookings for its new ferry service. 
Negotiations were however suspended in Janu-
ary 1995 and no final agreement could be 
reached between CCI Morlaix and ICG after 
20 
FNK (Federatie van Nederlandse Kraan-
verhuurbedrijven) is an association of Dutch 
firms which hire out mobile cranes. SCK 
(Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf) 
was set up on the initiative of FNK in order to 
guarantee, through a certification system, the 
quality of cranes and equipment used in the 
crane-hire business. Most of the firms which 
participate in SCK are also members of FNK. 
They account for between 50 and 80% of the 
Dutch market. Crane-hirers themselves hire 
cranes from other crane-hirers on a large scale. 
In 1992, the Commission took a negative decision against I..mu-
ñese (Unilever) and Schöller, who are in a duopolistic position 
on the German impulse ice cream market. In that case, the Com-
mission acted against 'sales outlet exclusivity' arrangements 
under which a retailer undertakes to sell only the products of the 
manufacturer with whom he has a contract. The Commission 
decided that the cumulative effect of the agreements in question 
amounted to an appreciable restriction of competition by Lang-
nese and Schöller. This finding was appealed against by the par-
ties but was upheld by the Court of First Instance in its judg-
ments of 8 June 1995 in Case T-7/93 Langnese-lglo GmbH ν 
Commission ¡19951 ECR 11-1533 and in Case T-9/93 Scholier 
Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG ν Commission [19951 ECR II-
1611. 
OJC211, 15.08.1995, p.4. 
OJ L 312. 23.12.1995, p.79. 
The immunity from fines resulting from the notifications by 
FNK and SCK in early 1992 was withdrawn under Article 15(6) 
of Regulation No 17 by Commission Decision of 13 April 1994 
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ICG had complained to the Commission and 
further negotiations had taken place. 
The Commission found that CCI Morlaix, being 
the operator of the port of Roscoff, which was 
the only port capable of providing adequate port 
facilities in France for ferry services between 
Brittany and Ireland, was prima facie in a dom-
inant position. It also found that, by its unjusti-
fied refusal to give ICG access to the port facil-
ities of Roscoff, CCI Morlaix had prima facie 
abused its dominant position. The Commission 
could therefore order interim measures on 16 
May 1995 obliging CCI Morlaix to take the 
necessary steps to allow ICG access to the port 
of Roscoff until the end of the summer season. 
After the Commission's intervention, the parties 
concluded a five-year contract for the use of the 
Roscoff port facilities by ICG; this was not only 
to their mutual benefit but, more importantly, to 
the benefit of travellers, who now have a wider 
choice of transport services and activities in the 
Roscoff area. 
franchising in 1999. These renewals need to be 
prepared. 
The review will take the form of a Green Paper 
which will set out different alternatives for 
future policy. The intention is to submit this 
option paper next year to a wide and in-depth 
public consultation of all interested political and 
socio-economic partners (the European Parlia-
ment, Member States, producers, distributors 
and consumers). 
5. Cross-border credit transfers 
45. The banking sector is still not characterized 
by a properly functioning internal market. Pay-
ments for financial transactions are an impor-
tant cost factor for companies and may act as a 
significant impediment to the smooth operation 
of the internal market. 
46. In September, the Commission adopted a 
notice on the application of the EC competition 
rules to cross-border credit transfers.' 
4. Green Paper on vertical restraints 
44. Vertical arrangements between suppliers 
and distributors in the various Member States 
have always received particular attention under 
Community law in view of the goal of market 
integration. It has been a core element of Com-
munity policy to keep channels for parallel 
trade open and free from restrictions by private 
business. Even though competition policy 
towards vertical restraints has served the Com-
munity well to date, it is felt necessary to under-
take a review in order to ascertain whether 
Community policy in this field is still adapted to 
the distribution and consumer needs of the 
future. 
For example, the application of information 
technology and just-in-time methods is chang-
ing not only production methods but also the 
form and systems of distribution. The implica-
tions of this must be fully reflected in policy so 
as not to stifle the highly innovative and rapid-
ly changing distribution techniques. 
Moreover, the main block exemptions in the 
field of vertical restraints come up for renewal 
soon: exclusive selling and buying in 1997 and 
The notice is part of a package of measures 
adopted by the Commission, including a pro-
posal for a directive, with a view to improving 
the cross-border credit transfer services offered 
by banks.
2 
These systems are used by banks to transfer 
money on behalf of customers between differ-
ent countries in the Union. 
47. The notice updates and replaces competi-
tion principles published in 1992. It states that 
the Commission's general approach will be to 
view positively cooperation agreements 
between banks that in particular enable them to 
meet the requirements of the directive. This 
cooperation should not, however, go so far as to 
eliminate competition between banks. The 
notice therefore provides guidelines for banks 
as to how they can set up cooperation arrange-
ments to handle cross-border credit transfers 
more efficiently without falling foul of the com-
petition rules. It may therefore contribute to the 
development of payment systems which are 
more favourable to European citizens. 
OJ C 251, 27.9.1995, p. 3. 
Commission communication 'EU funds transfers: transparency, 
performance and stability', COM(94) 436, 19 October 1994; 
Bull. EU 9-1995, point 1.3.12.  21 22 
48. The notice addresses two issues of particu-
lar importance: market entry and price competi-
tion. 
As to market entry, the Commission wishes to 
ensure that smaller banks are not unfairly 
excluded from systems to which they must 
belong if they are, in practice, to be able to offer 
cross-border credit transfers to their customers. 
The conditions for access to such systems 
should be objectively justified and applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. Conversely, the 
exclusion of newcomers from a system which is 
not an essential facility, e.g. a smaller system 
developed by groups of banks, will not nor-
mally give rise to competition concerns. 
As far as price competition is concerned, the 
notice distinguishes between bank-customer 
pricing agreements and inter-bank pricing 
agreements. 
Banks must not conclude agreements among 
themselves that determine the level of customer 
fees or the way in which they are to charge such 
fees. 
The key issue concerning inter-bank pricing 
agreements is the assessment of multilaterally 
agreed interchange fees, i.e. collectively agreed 
transaction fees paid by one bank (typically the 
sender's bank or its correspondent bank) to 
another bank (the beneficiary's bank). The 
Commission takes the view that a multilaterally 
agreed interchange fee is a restriction of com-
petition falling within the prohibition of price 
agreements contained in Article 85(1). Such a 
fee can, however, be exempted under Article 
85(3) where the conditions for exemption are 
met. In the case of OUR cross-border credit 
transfers (i.e. where the sender has asked to bear 
the costs), a beneficiary's bank cannot charge 
the beneficiary an additional fee for handling a 
cross-border credit transfer. In such a case, 
banks may agree that the beneficiary's bank 
receive a multilaterally agreed interchange fee 
if that fee covers the costs actually and neces-
sarily incurred by the bank when it handles 
cross-border credit transfers. The agreed fee 
should not exceed the average real costs 
incurred by the beneficiary's bank when it 
handles cross-border credit transfers. Further-
more, it should be expressed as a default fee, 
allowing bilateral agreements on amounts 
above or below the default. 
6. Leniency programme 
49. The Commission continued its active pur-
suit of secret cartels, involving price fixing or 
market sharing, which still appear to exist in 
major industries. 
Fact-finding is accounting for an increasing 
share of the Commission's administrative 
resources for competition law enforcement. In 
1995, the Commission undertook some 91 on-
the-spot investigations, including 87 surprise 
inspections. 
50. Cartels are typically operated in secrecy 
and considerable efforts are devoted by partici-
pants to avoid detection by the authorities, 
including the use of information technology. 
In certain cases, the benefit which may accrue 
to consumers from the detection and prohibition 
of secret cartels outweighs the interest the Com-
munity may have in fining companies which 
cooperate with the Commission, thereby 
enabling or helping it to detect and prohibit a 
cartel. For this reason, the Commission is con-
sidering granting lenient treatment to compa-
nies which cooperate in the preliminary investi-
gation or proceedings in respect of an infringe-
ment.' It published a draft notice which speci-
fies the conditions under which firms cooperat-
ing with the Commission can receive immunity 
from fines or significant reductions in the fine 
which would otherwise have been imposed 
upon them. Before it adopts the notice, the 
Commission has invited all interested persons 
to submit their observations on its draft notice.
2 
7. Access to the file 
57. The European Community's anti-trust 
enforcement procedures must not be arbitrary or 
unfair. The Commission is required to observe 
procedural safeguards aimed at protecting the 
interests of firms affected by its decisions. Take, 
for instance, preservation of the rights of 
defence, in particular the right to a fair hearing. 
On 10 August 1993, the US Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division issued its corporate leniency policy. This was followed 
by a leniency policy for individuals that was issued on 10 August 
1994. 
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Addressees of formal decisions and interested 
parties also have the ultimate safeguard of the 
right of appeal to the European Courts. 
52. The Court of First Instance annulled a 
series of Commission decisions of 19 December 
1990' sanctioning infringements of the compe­
tition rules on the market in soda ash. One of the 
decisions related to a concerted practice by 
which Solvay and ICI divided the European 
market between them. In addition, the Commis­
sion found that both Solvay and ICI abused 
their dominant positions in western Europe, in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland respectively.
2 
The decision, which was based on Article 85, 
has been annulled on the ground that the Com­
mission did not respect the parties' rights of 
defence. The Court found that the Commission 
should have given Solvay access, in the context 
of the Article 85 procedure, to certain docu­
ments contained in the Commission's file for the 
Article 86 case against ICI.
3 Conversely, the 
Court, acting on the same basis, decided in 
favour of ICI.
4 
The Commission is examining the exact impact 
of these decisions on its current practice, also in 
view of the new mandate of the Hearing Officer, 
which provides that, if a company believes that 
the Commission has not provided it with all the 
documents necessary for its defence, the Hear­
ing Officer should examine any such claim and 
decide on the merits.
5 
OJL 152, 15.6.1991. 
XXth Report on Competition Policy (1990), points 92 and 113. 
Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 29 June 1995 in Case 
T-30/91 Solvay ν Commission [1995] ECR 11-1775. 
Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 29 June 1995 in Case 
T-36/91 Imperial Chemical Industries pic ν Commission [1995] 
ECR 11-1847. 
Commission Decision of 12 December 1994 on the terms of ref­
erence of hearing officers in competition procedures before the 
Commission (OJ L 330, 21.12.1994, p.67).  23 Β — Cooperation and competition 
in a rapidly changing 
and increasingly global 
economic environment 
24 
53. Today's economic environment is charac-
terized by a sharp increase in competitive pres-
sures. Several factors have contributed to this: 
the continuing shortening of product life-cycles; 
the growing globalization of industries and mar-
kets; the completion of the legislative pro-
gramme for the achievement of the internal 
market. These economic realities must be taken 
into account in applying the competition rules. 
As a result, economic market analysis is becom-
ing increasingly important in competition cases. 
The Commission has to take account of the spe-
cific economic features of a particular market in 
placing the relevant case in its proper context. 
In an economic environment characterized by 
dynamic markets, innovation and globalization, 
cooperation between firms is often vital to 
enable them to remain competitive on the mar-
ket by improving their R&D efforts, reducing 
costs and developing new products. None the 
less, such cooperation must not lead to anti-
competitive situations which are incompatible 
with the competition rules of the Treaty. 
1. The application of Articles 85 and 86 
in the telecommunications sector 
7.7. Strategic alliances 
54. The ongoing liberalization of the telecom-
munications sector, together with the increasing 
convergence of telecommunications, informa-
tion technologies and media, are spurring sub-
stantial commercial activity in the core sectors 
of the information market. Market players are 
now positioning themselves to take advantage 
of the new opportunities. This has resulted in a 
wave of new alliances and partnerships being 
announced or implemented.' 
Strategic alliances between incumbent telecom-
munications operators (TOs) moving into glob-
al markets are one type of such alliances 
(BT/MCI; Atlas-Phoenix). Other alliances (con-
glomerate alliances) are set up either between 
companies with no prior presence in the 
telecommunications market but which benefit 
from synergies through market entry — such as 
electricity utilities or banks that have substantial 
internal networks as well as financial means and 
know-how — or between the latter and TOs 
(Cable & Wireless and Veba; BT-Viag; BT-
BNL, Albacom). Large consortia are also being 
formed to offer mobile satellite telecommunica-
tions services on a worldwide basis (Inmarsat-P, 
Iridium, Globalstar and Odyssey). 
55. The application of the basic competition 
rules to these alliances has become one of the 
major challenges for EU competition policy in 
recent years. The Commission must ensure that 
the current restructuring process will lead to 
competitive and growth-oriented market struc-
tures. The Community's policy aimed at liberal-
izing telecommunications is generating new 
services and products at competitive prices for 
consumers, reducing costs for the industry and 
creating new jobs. However, these efforts would 
serve little purpose if new restrictive agree-
ments, practices or market structures were 
allowed to develop which prevented competi-
tion from emerging on liberalized markets or if 
TOs could engage in abusive behaviour aimed 
at preserving their position. This shows that 
there is a close inter-relationship between dif-
ferent Community policy areas and that all 
competition instruments must be applied 
together in a coherent way. 
56. The concert joint venture between British 
Telecommunications and the US MCI Corpora-
tion was the first major télécoms strategic 
alliance which the Commission dealt with, and 
it was granted an exemption under Article 
85(3).
2 
Alliances intending to offer new global ser-
vices, with features sought in particular by large 
corporations (e.g. seamlessness, end-to-end, 
one-stop-shopping and billing, etc.), will in gen-
eral improve the quality and the availability of 
advanced telecommunications services and will 
also contribute to the creation of trans-European 
networks, which is one of the objectives of the 
EC Treaty (Article 129b). Consumers, including 
large multinational companies but also innova-
tive small and medium-sized enterprises, can 
A comprehensive overview of case decisions and publications in 
this field is given in 'Community competition policy in the 
telecommunications sector'. European Commission, official 
documents, update July 1995 (IV/18571/95). 
Decision of 27 July 1994 (OJ L 223, 27.8.1994, p. 36); XXIVth 
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benefit from more advanced global services and 
efficiency gains, thereby improving their com-
petitive position both globally and within the 
European Union. 
However, to the extent that alliances offer 
domestic as well as international services, the 
indispensability required under Article 85(3) 
and the possible elimination of competition at 
the national level are important elements in the 
Commission's analysis. Important elements in 
the Commission's favourable attitude to the cre-
ation of concert were the genuinely global 
nature of the services concerned and the fact 
that the markets of both parent companies are 
open to competition. 
Atlas/Phoenix 
57. The Atlas agreement, which the Commis-
sion investigated during 1995, differs from the 
BT-MCI alliance in two important respects: 
firstly, the domestic component of the services 
offered is much stronger than the global ele-
ments planned and, secondly, the home markets 
of the parties (France and Germany) are less lib-
eralized than the home markets of BT and MCI 
(UK and US). 
The Atlas transaction brings about a joint ven-
ture between the French and German public 
telecommunications operators, France Telecom 
(FT) and Deutsche Telekom (DT). Atlas is also 
the instrument of DT's and FT's participation in 
the second transaction, named Phoenix, with the 
US company Sprint Corporation. 
Atlas targets two separate product markets for 
value-added telecommunications services, 
namely the market for advanced corporate 
telecommunications services and the market for 
standardized low-level packet-switched data 
communications services. The broader Phoenix 
alliance will address the same markets for 
value-added telecommunications network ser-
vices and also the market for traveller services 
and the market for so-called carrier's carrier ser-
vices. 
The Atlas and Phoenix arrangements raised a 
number of concerns from a competition point of 
view, in particular with respect to the home 
markets of the EU partners to the transactions, 
where FT and DT hold legal and defacto dom-
inant positions with respect to a number of 
telecommunications services and the provision 
of infrastructure. It was argued therefore that 
competition could be eliminated and the posi-
tive effects of future full liberalization endan-
gered. In response to this, the parties to the 
alliances as well as the French and German 
Governments have undertaken certain amend-
ments and commitments to address these con-
cerns. They relate to the non-integration into 
Atlas of the domestic French and German pub-
lic switched data networks, the non-discrimina-
tory access to these networks, and the avoidance 
of cross-subsidization. However, the main com-
mitment made by the governments was that the 
use of alternative telecommunications infra-
structure for the provision of liberalized 
telecommunications services (i.e. not basic 
voice telephony) will be liberalized as of 1 July 
1996. Without such liberalization, competition 
in the area of data communications would also 
be endangered or eliminated in other Member 
States by the alliance between the Union's 
largest telecommunications organizations. Full 
liberalization, i.e. including basic voice tele-
phony and infrastructure, will be achieved by 1 
January 1998. 
On this basis, the Commission has indicated 
that it is ready, subject to observations from 
third parties, to take a favourable view of the 
Atlas-Phoenix agreements.' 
58. Other strategic alliances of the same type 
which the Commission has begun to investigate 
are Unisource and its Uniworld alliance with 
AT&T. 
Global Mobile Satellite Systems 
59. The Commission has launched an in-depth 
and comprehensive examination of the newly 
emerging strategic alliances which are being 
formed to offer mobile satellite telecommunica-
tions services on a worldwide basis. 
In this sector, which has only a few global 
market players, it is essential that competition is 
safeguarded in the downstream markets 
Notices pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17 (OJ C 
337, 15.12.1995, pp. 2 and 13).  25 26 
involved, namely local service provision, distri-
bution and equipment supply. 
One of the systems examined, Inmarsat-P, has 
already been favourably viewed by the Com-
mission.' 
1.2. Access and interconnection 
agreements 
60. An important problem for the application of 
EU competition law to the sector, and in gen-
eral for the regulatory environment of the future 
telecommunications market, is the issue of 
access and interconnection agreements.
2 In fact, 
the post-monopoly and future multimedia en-
vironment is likely to be characterized by situ-
ations where firms singly or jointly control fa-
cilities — such as networks, conditional access 
systems or critical software interfaces — which 
may provide an essential route to customers. 
Access and interconnection agreements may, in 
principle, be seen as pro-competitive because 
they are aimed at extending the range of ser-
vices available to customers. However, they 
may also generate substantial collusive behav-
iour and market foreclosure, as well as abuse of 
dominant positions.
3 The non-discriminatory 
access to essential facilities on reasonable terms 
is of central importance in this context. The 
Commission therefore intends to present in 
1996 a draft communication on the implemen-
tation of the competition rules in this area. 
2. Globalization of markets 
ATR/BAe 
61. The market for regional aircraft is an exam-
ple of a sector with a worldwide dimension. The 
main manufacturers operate in all continents. 
62. On 18 August, the Commission authorized, 
by means of a comfort letter, the regional air-
craft joint venture between Aérospatiale and 
Alenia, already integrated in ATR, and British 
Aerospace. The ultimate objective of the project 
is to merge the parties' regional aircraft activi-
ties. The first stage of cooperation mainly con-
cerns services direct to customers and the joint 
carrying-out of feasibility studies for new air-
craft in this sector. 
The Commission's authorization is valid for 
only a limited period ending on 6 June 2000; 
this leaves it the option of reviewing the situa-
tion if, following the feasibility studies, the par-
ties decide not to develop, produce or launch the 
programmes for new aircraft but to nonetheless 
maintain their cooperation in the areas of sales 
and after-sales service. 
3. Transfer of technology 
63. One of the priority tasks of the Commission 
with a view to developing the large internal 
market is to encourage innovation and the dis-
semination of new technology in European 
industry. The prime role played by technology 
transfer in the development of technological 
innovation in the economy of the European 
Union and in strengthening the competitiveness 
of enterprises operating in this area was high-
lighted in the Commission White Paper on 
growth, competitiveness and employment. 
64. The Regulation on the block exemption of 
categories of technology transfer agreements,
4 
proposed in 1994 and substantially amended in 
1995 following third party hearings and the sec-
ond meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, is 
intended to promote economic growth and 
enhance competitiveness by simplifying the 
content of the two existing regulations on 
licensing agreements
5 and combining them in a 
single regulation. 
65. The Regulation thus reduces the disparities 
between the Regulation on patent licensing and 
the Regulation on know-how licensing and 
removes several clauses preventing block 
exemption or transfers them to the so-called 
Opposition' procedure. It also provides for new, 
lawful clauses which give greater contractual 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17 (OJ C 304, 
15.11.1995, p. 6). 
G7 conclusions and telecommunications infrastructure Green 
Paper. 
Coudert Bros, 'Competition aspects of interconnection agree-
ments in the telecommunications sector', report to the European 
Commission, June 1995. 
The Regulation was adopted by the Commission on 31 January 
1996. 
Regulations (EEC) Nos 2349/84 of 23 July 1994 and 556/89 of 
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freedom to the parties. This relaxation of the sive licences to monopolize the market for a 
rules, which will benefit most operators in the product and prevent third parties from gaining 
Community is, however, accompanied by a access to new technologies. When assessing 
clear warning to enterprises with strong market such cases, the Commission will pay particular 
positions: the benefit of the block exemption attention to situations in which the market share 
can be withdrawn if enterprises use their exclu- of the licensee exceeds a threshold of 40%. 
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C — Transport 
1. Maritime transport 
66. The European Union is the largest trading 
bloc in the world. The bulk of its trade with the 
rest of the world (and a significant part of intra-
Union trade) is carried out by means of mar-
itime transport. Liner shipping, i.e. scheduled 
maritime transport services, is of major import-
ance in this respect. 
It is therefore essential for the European Union 
to have the best possible maritime transport ser-
vice at the lowest possible cost. Competition 
policy is a tool well-adapted to help achieve this 
objective. 
67. It should also be noted that, in the United 
States, a proposal to deregulate liner shipping 
and make it subject to a more competitive statu-
tory regime was recently adopted by the House 
of Representatives and is currently before the 
Senate. If the proposal, the Ocean Shipping 
Reform Act, is passed, the US regime will more 
closely match the European rules. 
7.7. Liner shipping consortia 
68. The new Regulation granting block exemp-
tion to liner shipping consortia' is an important 
instrument for this purpose, as it will encourage 
shipowners to improve and rationalize their 
operations, thereby reducing costs and freight 
rates while at the same time allowing them to 
offer a better quality service along with greater 
frequency. This is the second block exemption 
that has been adopted in the liner shipping sec-
tor. Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86, which lays 
down rules for the application of Articles 85 and 
86 to maritime transport, already contains a 
block exemption for liner conferences.
2 
69. The new block exemption entered into 
force on 22 April 1995 and applies for a period 
of five years. Liner shipping consortia are 
agreements between two or more shipping com-
panies relating to the joint operation of liner 
transport services through cooperation in the 
technical, operational and/or commercial field, 
with the exception of price fixing. It applies 
only to international liner shipping services to 
or from one or more Community ports intended 
exclusively for the carriage of cargo, chiefly by 
container. It also covers both consortia oper-
ating within a liner conference and consortia 
operating outside such conferences, except that 
it does not cover the joint fixing of freight rates. 
Consortium members which wish to fix rates 
jointly and do not satisfy the conditions of 
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 must apply for 
individual exemption. 
The block exemption covers the following 
activities: the coordination and/or joint fixing of 
sailing timetables and the determination of ports 
of call; the exchange, sale or cross-chartering of 
space or slots on vessels; the pooling of vessels 
and/or port installations; the use of one or more 
joint operations offices; the provision of con-
tainers, chassis and other equipment and/or 
rental, leasing or purchase contracts for such 
equipment; the use of a computerized data 
exchange system and/or joint documentation 
system; temporary capacity adjustments;' the 
joint operation or use of port terminals and 
related services; the participation in tonnage, 
revenue or net revenue pools; the joint exercise 
of voting rights in liner conferences; a joint 
marketing structure and/or joint bill of lading; 
and any other activity ancillary to any of these 
and necessary for its implementation. 
70. The Commission considers that consortia 
generally help to improve the productivity and 
quality of available liner shipping services by 
reason of the rationalization they bring to the 
activities of member companies and through the 
economies of scale they allow in the operation 
of vessels and utilization of port facilities. 
Transport users generally obtain a fair share of 
the benefits resulting from consortia if there is 
sufficient competition in the trades in which the 
consortia operate. 
In order to benefit from the block exemption, a 
consortium must possess, in respect of the 
ranges of ports it serves, a share of direct trade 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 870/95 of 20 April 1995 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner 
shipping companies (consortia) pursuant to Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 479/92 (OJ L89, 21.4.1995, p. 7). 
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 (OJ L 378. 
31.12.1986. p. 4). 
This does not include arrangements concerning the non-utiliza-
tion of existing capacity, whereby shipping line members of the 
consortium refrain from using a certain percentage of the capac-
ity of vessels operated within the framework of the consortium; 
See Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 870/95 and Commission 
Decision of 19 October 1994 concerning the Trans-Atlantic 
Agreement, in which the Commission prohibited an agreement 
for the non-utilization of capacity (OJ L 376. 1.12.1994. p. I ). — ANTI-TRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
of under 30% when it operates within a confer­
ence and of under 35% when it operates outside 
a conference. A simplified opposition procedure 
applies to consortia whose share of the trade 
exceeds the above limit but does not exceed 
50% of the direct trade. 
1.2. Inland rate fixing by ship liner confer­
ences 
71. On 8 June 1994, the Commission adopted a 
report' on how it intends to apply the competi­
tion rules to liner shipping which it presented to 
the Transport Council. The report focuses on an 
analysis of the legal position with regard to 
price-fixing agreements concluded by ship­
owner members of liner conferences concerning 
the land section of multimodal transport ser­
vices provided by them in the Community. It 
concluded that this practice was contrary to the 
Community competition rules and could not 
qualify for exemption as it stood. It suggested, 
however, that a new approach be established 
that was compatible with the competition rules 
and allowed inland container transport to be 
organized more efficiently and more to the 
advantage of shippers. 
72. At the Council meeting in November 1994, 
Mr Van Miert, Competition Commissioner, 
agreed to report to the Council on the imple­
mentation of the guidelines, on the basis of the 
work of a wise men's committee. This commit­
tee, known as the Multimodal Group, was set up 
in July 1995 and would be submitting an in­
terim report to him at the beginning of 1996 
which would be presented to the Council in the 
first half of 1996. 
« 
73. In 1994, the Commission took two deci­
sions prohibiting inland price fixing agree­
ments: the TAA (Trans-Atlantic Agreement) 
decision
2 and the FEFC (Far Eastern Freight 
Conference) decision.
1 On 10 March 1995, the 
Court of First Instance ordered the suspension 
of the TAA decision in so far as it prohibited 
joint price fixing in respect of the inland por­
tions within the Community of through-inter-
modal transport services.
4 That order was con­
firmed on appeal by the Court of Justice on 19 
July 1995.' 
In the meantime, a modified version of the 
TAA, the Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement 
(TACA), was notified to the Commission. The 
Commission sent the parties to the TACA a 
statement of objections setting out the reasons 
why it had formed the preliminary view that it 
was appropriate to withdraw any immunity 
from fines in respect of inland price fixing 
which may have been brought about by the new 
TACA notification.
6 An application for interim 
measures preventing the Commission's antici­
pated decision to withdraw immunity from fines 
was dismissed by the Court of First Instance.
7 
2. Air transport 
2.1. IATA tariff consultations 
74. Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 of 25 June 
1993
s states that Article 85(3) is applicable in 
particular to the holding of consultations on 
tariffs for the carriage of passengers and freight 
on scheduled air services between Community 
airports. The exemption is, however, subject to 
the conditions set out in Article 4 of the Regu­
lation, notably that the exemption is applicable 
only if the consultations give rise to interlining. 
75. According to the preliminary information 
obtained by the Commission in 1995, it would 
seem that, as a general rule, there are not many, 
if indeed any, interlining agreements on the car­
riage of goods. It is also clear that tariffs estab­
lished through consultation by airlines are 
appreciably higher than normal market prices 
and therefore encourage airlines to increase 
their tariffs beyond the level normally set by 
competition. 
The Commission therefore considers it desir­
able to amend the abovementioned Regulation 
in order to exclude from its scope tariff consul­
tations relating to the carriage of freight. The 
Commission has published a notice'' giving the 
airlines and other interested parties the oppor-
SEC(94) 933. 
Decision of 19 October 1994 (OJ L 376, 31.12.1994, p. 1). 
Decision of21 December 1994 (OJ L378, 31.12.1994, p. 17). 
Case T-395/94 R Atlantic Container Line and Others ν Commis­
sion [1995] ECR 11-595. 
Case C-149/95 P(R) Commission ν Atlantic Container Line and 
Others [1995] ECR 1-2165. 
Commission press release IP/95/646, 21.6.1995. 
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 22 
November 1995, Case T-395/94 R II Atlantic Container Line 
and others ν Commission (not yet published). 
0JL155, 26.6.1993, p. 18. 
OJC322, 2.12.1995, p. 15.  29 tunity to make known their views in advance. It 
will decide on further action in 1996. 
2.2. Cooperation between airlines 
76. Cooperation between airlines can facilitate 
the healthy restructuring of air transport in 
Europe and lead to an improvement in the qual-
ity of consumer services and better cost control. 
While the ommission does not intend to impede 
the restructuring of European air transport, it is 
monitoring operations to ensure they do not 
lead to restrictions of competition that are not 
indispensable and do not rule out opportunities 
for real competition from new operators on the 
main routes. 
The conditions proposed by Swissair/Sabena 
which the Commission agreed when it approved 
the merger of the two airlines, and the condi-
tions imposed by the Commission when it 
exempted the cooperation between Lufthansa 
and SAS, satisfy that objective. 
Lufthansa/SAS 
77. The general cooperation agreement 
between Lufthansa and SAS provides for the 
setting-up of an integrated air transport system 
between the two airlines, based on long-term 
relationships in the commercial and operational 
fields. Commercial cooperation will be particu-
larly close on the routes between Scandinavia 
and Germany where the parties are considering 
setting up a joint venture. 
78. The Commission stated' that, although the 
agreement appreciably restricted competition 
on the markets in question, especially on the 
routes between Scandinavia and Germany, it 
could qualify for exemption provided that cer-
tain conditions were met, allowing existing and 
potential competition to be maintained. 
These conditions related chiefly to: a frequency 
freeze on certain routes operated by the two 
companies; the opening of frequent flyer pro-
grammes to airlines not operating such 
schemes; the obligation on Lufthansa and SAS 
to conclude, subject to certain conditions, inter-
lining agreements with new entrants; termin-
ation of certain cooperation agreements with 
other airlines; transfer to new market entrants of 
slots in certain crowded airports. 
The Commission adopted a decision granting 
exemption on 16 January 1996. 
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D — Trans-European networks and 
competition rules 
79. In 1995, the Commission examined the 
question of the relationship between the private 
financing of trans-European networks and the 
application of the competition rules. Its conclu-
sions were incorporated in the general report on 
trans-European networks, given a warm recep-
tion by the Madrid European Council on 15 and 
16 December. In the report, the Commission set 
out the following guidelines on the handling of 
competition questions and announced that it 
would set up a 'one-stop help-desk' (fax: (32) 
2 295 65 04) to provide project managers with 
additional information on the guidelines. 
80. The Commission proposes to apply the fol-
lowing principal criteria when processing cases 
submitted to it: (i) where the infrastructure 
operator wishes to give enterprises the opportu-
nity to reserve capacity as soon as a project is 
launched, the opportunity should be offered to 
all Community enterprises likely to be interest-
ed; (ii) capacity reserved by an enterprise must 
be proportional to the direct or indirect financial 
commitments entered into by the enterprise and 
correspond to planned operational requirements 
covering a reasonable period; (iii) new infra-
structure is generally not congested when it first 
enters into service. Therefore, an undertaking or 
group of undertakings within the meaning of 
Article 3 of Directive 91/440/EEC should not 
reserve all available capacity. Some of the 
capacity should remain available to enable 
other firms to operate competing services; (iv) 
enterprises holding operating rights may not 
object to the loss of such rights if they are not 
used; (v) the duration of agreements reserving 
capacity must be reasonable and adapted to 
each case. 
which will be defined in the light of the specific 
characteristics of each project. 
81. The Commission will endeavour to deal 
rapidly with the notifications of agreements 
relating to the financing of trans-European net-
works. In particular, it is considering adopting a 
final decision in not more than six months' time, 
provided the parties have contacted the Com-
mission before finalizing the agreements. 
Gas interconnector 
82. In its White Paper on growth, competitive-
ness and employment, the Commission high-
lighted the importance of new European infra-
structure networks that could help overcome the 
fragmentation of certain markets in Europe. 
On 17 May 1995, the Commission issued a 
comfort letter clearing a joint venture arrange-
ment between nine leading European gas com-
panies for the construction and operation of a 
UK-Belgium underwater gas interconnection, 
in particular a high pressure gas pipeline which 
will be the first connection between the United 
Kingdom and continental gas markets. 
Given the possibility for third parties to acquire, 
on freely negotiated terms, access to transport 
capacity through the interconnector, and in view 
of the fact that this project will create oppor-
tunities for competition between markets which 
so far are quite isolated, the Commission found 
that the pro-competitive effects of the joint ven-
ture clearly outweigh the restrictions of compe-
tition. In its comfort letter, the Commission also 
ensured that the agreements will operate in 
practice in such a way as to effectively meet 
demand for any reverse flow capacity which 
may arise. 
This list of criteria is not exhaustive and does 
not prejudge the Commission's final position, 
31 E — Competition 
and environment 
83. In 1995, the Commission once again made 
clear how it intended to apply competition pol-
icy to environmental matters, especially volun-
tary agreements.' 
84. Community environmental policy favours 
the 'polluter pays' principle. The effectiveness 
of this principle depends, in particular, on the 
functioning of the pricing mechanism; this must 
reflect, in terms of costs, the negative effects of 
an economic activity on the environment. For 
the mechanism to act correctly as an indicator, 
enterprises must internalize the costs of envi-
ronmental protection. The 'polluter pays' prin-
ciple does not preclude State aid for environ-
mental protection, under certain conditions (see 
below). 
Distributing resources in ways which respect 
the environment can take the form of direct 
public regulation, taxation, 'voluntary' agree-
ments and self-regulation. Voluntary agree-
ments are contracts between industry and public 
administrations which include a number of 
environmental objectives to be achieved by the 
industry in question according to a timetable. 
Voluntary agreements may relate both to objec-
tives and to the means of achieving them. 
The use of voluntary agreements is growing in 
most OECD countries in parallel with a trend 
towards deregulation and less intervention by 
the State. 
Voluntary agreements and self-regulation are 
often regarded as a less bureaucratic and more 
flexible solution than more traditional 
approaches. Voluntary agreements or self-regu-
lation, however, may contain restrictions of 
competition under Article 85(1) of the Treaty. 
The Commission is in fact currently examining 
several complaints on this matter. 
85. When the Commission examines individual 
cases, it weighs up the restrictions of competi-
tion arising out of an agreement against the 
environmental objectives of the agreement and 
applies the principle of proportionality in accor-
dance with Article 85(3). In particular, improv-
ing the environment is regarded as a factor 
which contributes to improving production or 
distribution or to promoting economic or tech-
nical progress. 
The Commission intends, however, to remain 
very firm with regard to the principle of non-
closure of national markets to foreign operators. 
It will also be very vigilant about problems of 
access by third parties to a system and about 
agreements which could result in a product 
being squeezed out of the market. 
The Commission also takes a negative view of 
multilateral tariff or price fixing resulting from 
an agreement on the environment; its assess-
ment will, however, be on a case-by-case basis 
and will look at whether any such agreement is 
indispensable. The aim of environmental pro-
tection is not necessarily sufficient in itself to 
warrant an agreement on prices being regarded 
as indispensable. 
32 
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F — Secondary product markets 
86. Several complaints which the Commission 
received concern the alleged abuse of a domi-
nant position in secondary product markets such 
as spare parts, consumables or maintenance ser-
vices. These products are used in conjunction 
with a primary product and have to be techni-
cally compatible with it (e.g. software or hard-
ware peripheral equipment for a computer). 
Thus, for these secondary products there may be 
no or few substitutes other than parts or services 
supplied by the primary product supplier. This 
prompts the question whether a non-dominant 
manufacturer of primary products can be domi-
nant with respect to a rather small secondary 
product market, i.e. secondary products com-
patible with a certain type of that manufacturer's 
primary products. 
The question raises many complex issues. Pro-
ducers of primary equipment argue that there 
cannot be dominance in secondary products if 
there is lack of dominance in the primary prod-
uct market because potential buyers would sim-
ply stop buying the primary products if the 
prices for parts or services were raised. This 
theory implies a timely reaction on the primary 
product market due to consumers' ability to cal-
culate the overall life-time costs of the primary 
product including all spare parts, consumables, 
upgrades, services, etc. It furthermore implies 
that price dicrimination is not possible between 
potentially new customers and 'old' captive 
customers or that switching costs for the latter 
are low. On the other hand, complainants who 
produce consumables or maintenance services 
assume dominance in the secondary product 
market if market shares are high in this market, 
i.e. this approach focuses only on the secondary 
products without analysing possible effects 
emanating from the primary product market. 
In the Commission's view, neither of these 
approaches reflects reality sufficiently. Domi-
nance has always been defined by the Commis-
sion as the ability to act to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors and consumers. 
Therefore, an in-depth fact-finding exercise and 
analysis on a case-by-case basis are required. In 
order to assess dominance in this context the 
Commission will take into account all important 
factors such as the price and life-time of the pri-
mary product, transparency of prices of sec-
ondary products, prices of secondary products 
as a proportion of the primary product value, 
information costs and other issues partly men-
tioned above. A similar approach was taken by 
the US Supreme Court in its 1992 Kodak deci-
sion. 
Pelikan/Kyocera 
87. The Commission took this approach when 
it rejected in 1995 the complaint of Pelikan, a 
German manufacturer of toner cartridges for 
printers, against Kyocera, a Japanese manufac-
turer of computer printers including toner car-
tridges for those printers. Pelikan's complaint 
alleged a number of practices by Kyocera to 
drive Pelikan out of the toner market and 
accused Kyocera, among others, of abusing its 
dominant position in the secondary market 
although Kyocera was clearly not dominant in 
the primary market. Apart from the fact that 
there was no evidence of behaviour that could 
be considered abusive, neither did the Commis-
sion find that Kyocera enjoyed a dominant posi-
tion in the market for consumables. This was 
due to the particular features of the primary and 
secondary markets. Thus, purchasers were well 
informed about the price charged for consum-
ables and appeared to take this into account in 
their decision to buy a printer. 'Total cost per 
page' was one of the criteria most commonly 
used by customers when choosing a printer. 
This was due to the fact that life-cycle costs of 
consumables (mainly toner cartridges) repre-
sented a very high proportion of the value of a 
printer. Therefore, if the prices of consumables 
of a particular brand were raised, consumers 
would have a strong incentive to buy another 
printer brand. In addition, there was no evi-
dence of possibilities for price discrimination 
between 'old'/captive and new customers. 
33 G — Liberal professions 
88. The free movement of liberal professions in 
the Community means that certain restrictive 
practices in this field are increasingly likely to 
affect trade between Member States. One can 
expect a growing number of cases in this area. 
On several occasions, the European Parliament 
has called on the Commission to apply the com-
petition rules to the liberal professions.' 
Coapi 
89. On 30 January, the Commission took a 
decision under Article 85 applying the competi-
tion rules in this field. 
The Colegio Oficial de Agentes de la Propiedad 
Industrial (Coapi) is the professional associa-
tion of industrial property agents in Spain. All 
agents practising in Spain are members. Indus-
trial property agents give advice to the general 
public and assist or represent clients in proceed-
ings involving industry property rights. 
The Commission found that the fixing by the 
general meeting of Coapi of compulsory mini-
mum scales of charges for the cross-border ser-
vices provided by its members constitutes an 
infringement of Article 85(1). 
In conformity with existing Community law, the 
Commission confirmed that the national legal 
framework within which such agreements or 
decisions by liberal professions are made, is not 
relevant to the application of Article 85. Even if 
public authorities encourage such behaviour or 
delegate to an association of undertakings the 
power to fix the prices to be applied by its mem-
bers, the association's exercise of that power 
does not fall outside the scope of Article 85 of 
the Treaty. 
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(iii), and Resolution on the XXth Report on Compétition Policy, 
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H — Subsidiarity 
and decentralization 
90. In his address to the European Parliament 
on the occasion of the investiture debate of the 
new Commission, the President of the European 
Commission insisted on the necessity to make a 
constant effort to concentrate on essentials: 
'Less action, but better action'. 
As far as cases falling within the scope of Arti­
cles 85 and 86 are concerned, this principle is 
applied by the Commission in limiting its action 
to those arrangements which have a significant 
effect on competition and which are likely to 
affect trade between Member States appreci­
ably. Moreover, in view of the responsibilities 
incumbent on the Commission, which has the 
sole power to authorize certain agreements, the 
Commission is encouraging decentralization, in 
particular in cases which may lead to a prohib­
ition decision. 
1. De minimis agreements 
91. Agreements whose effects on trade 
between Member States or on competition are 
negligible are not caught by the ban on restric­
tive agreements contained in Article 85(1). Only 
those agreements are prohibited which have an 
appreciable impact on market conditions. For 
this reason, it is essential for the Commission to 
make a proper analysis of the market in which 
those agreements operate. 
The Commission's notice on agreements of 
minor importance sets quantitative criteria to 
give guidance as to the concrete meaning of the 
concept of 'appreciability'. Despite the recent 
increases in thresholds,
1 it is believed that a fur­
ther review of the de minimis concept may be 
justified. The Commission has therefore started 
internal deliberations on this issue with a view 
to presenting new proposals for consultation 
during the course of 1996. 
2. Decentralization 
92. In its attempt to deal as a matter of priority 
with cases having a significant Community 
dimension, the Commission is also encouraging 
national enforcement of Community competi­
tion law. It considers that there is not normally 
a sufficient Community interest in examining a 
complaint when the plaintiff is able to secure 
adequate protection of his rights before national 
courts.
2 In its SACEM judgments of 24 January 
1995, the Court of First Instance further speci­
fied the conditions under which the Commis­
sion has the right to reject a complaint on the 
ground that it lacks a significant Community 
interest.' In 1995, several cases were closed on 
this basis. 
93. An important step forward in the decentral­
ization effort is the Commission's notice on 
cooperation between national courts and the 
Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86.
4 In 
1995, several national courts in Spain, France, 
Germany and Belgium have relied upon the 
cooperation mechanism laid down in this notice 
to obtain information from the Commission on 
competition issues. 
In its preliminary ruling of 12 December 1995,
5 
the Court of Justice found that the same princi­
ples of cooperation between the Commission 
and national courts apply in the field of agricul­
ture, where Regulation No 26 determines the 
extent to which the Community competition 
rules apply. It is worthwhile noting that, accord­
ing to the Court's judgment, the national court 
can, in its assessment, take into consideration 
the criteria established by the case-law of the 
Court, as well as the practice of the Commis­
sion, which practice is evidenced not only by 
the decisions adopted by the Commission but 
also from other sources, including in particular 
Commission notice concerning the updating of the 1986 com­
munication on agreements of minor importance (OJ C 368, 
23.12.1994). 
The Court of First Instance endorsed this practice for the first 
time in its judgment of 17 September 1992 in Case T-24/90 
Automec ν Commission [1992] ECR 11-2223, paragraphs 91 to 
94. 
Case T-114/92 BENIM ν Commission [1995] ECR 11-147 and 
Case T-5/93 Tremblay ν Commission [1995] ECR II-185. The 
Court of First Instance, referring to the Automec II judgment, 
indicated that, in order to assess the Community interest, the 
Commission must balance the significance of the alleged 
infringement as regards the functioning of the common market, 
the probability of its being able to establish the existence of the 
infringement and the extent of the investigative measures 
required to enforce the competition rules. The fact that a 
national court or national competition authority is already deal­
ing with a case concerning the compatibility of an agreement or 
practice with Article 85 or 86 is a factor which the Commission 
may take into account. 
OJC39, 13.2.1993, p. 6. 
Joined cases C-319/93, C-40/94 and C-224/94 Dijkstra/Frico 
Domo, van Roessel/Campina Melkunie, de Bie/Campma Melku­
nie (not yet published).  35 its reports on competition policy and its com-
munications. 
will follow on the basis of a draft notice which 
the Commission intends to publish in 1996. 
94. It is not only national courts, but also 
national competition authorities, that have an 
important role to play in raising the level of 
enforcement of Community competition law 
and, generally speaking, in ensuring unrestric-
ted and fair competition in the Union. In cases 
where an appreciable economic effect is felt 
mainly in one Member State, national author-
ities are closer to the market and may thus be 
better placed to handle the case. 
The Commission has pressed ahead with its 
preparation of a notice on cooperation between 
the Commission and national competition 
authorities,
1 pursuant to which the Commission 
will inform and consult the national authorities 
when the latter apply Article 85(1) or 86 or 
national competition law in cases with a Com-
munity dimension. A draft has already been sub-
mitted to the Member States for consultation. 
Further consultation of interested third parties 
95. Decentralized enforcement should not, 
however, lead to differing application of com-
petition law in the European Union. The Com-
mission is therefore also pursuing uniformity in 
the substance and application of national com-
petition laws. This is done not through any for-
mal act of harmonization but through a continu-
ation of, and improvement in, communication 
and cooperation between Community and 
national enforcement officials. 
At present, nine Member States have competi-
tion laws with respect to restrictive agreements 
and abuses of a dominant position which sub-
stantially resemble those of the Community. 
Most of the others are considering amendments 
to national law aimed at bringing them into line 
with Community law. This process of 'soft har-
monization' is a natural consequence of the inte-
gration process, which creates pressure for a 
level-playing field throughout the Community. 
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96. During the year, the Commission registered 
559 new cases, including 368 notifications, 145 
complaints and 46 cases opened on the Com-
mission's own initiative. This represents an 
increase of more than 42% compared with 1994 
and exceeds the average number of incoming 
cases over the last eight years by more than 
32%. 
Almost half of the increase in new cases (78 
cases) is attributable to the transfer of cases 
pending by the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
following the accession of Sweden, Finland and 
Austria to the Union. 
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97. During the year, the Commission closed administrative closure of the file' and 14 by 
433 cases in total, of which 419 through an formal decision. In 1995, the number of cases 
informal procedure (including comfort letter, closed fell by 23.4% compared with 1994. 
discomfort letter, rejection of complaint and 
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Cases closed because agreements are no longer in force, because 
the impact was too slight to warrant further investigation, 
because complaints had become moot or had been withdrawn or 
because investigations had not revealed any anti-competitive 
practice. I — ANTI-TRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
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98. The overall net result of input and output in 
1995 leads to an increase of the stook of cases 
remaining open at the end of the year for the 
first time since 1988. This increase is however 
rather modest; more specifically, it is less than 
12% and, if the number of additional files of the 
new Member States are not taken into consider-
ation, less than 5%. The actual stock of cases is 
still considerably lower than the more than 
3 000 cases pending at the end of the 1980s and 
corresponds roughly to the number of cases 
being actively dealt with. 
The Commission is nonetheless aiming at a 
further reduction in the existing stock of cases, 
to be achieved in particular by further improv-
ing the efficiency of its proceedings and by 
encouraging the decentralized application of the 
competition rules where appropriate. 
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A — Introduction 
1. Services of general economic 
interest at the heart of the 
Commission's liberalization policy 
99. The Commission has pursued its policy of 
liberalizing and opening up to competition cer-
tain sectors traditionally subject to monopoly 
such as telecommunications, energy, postal ser-
vices or transport. As these sectors are essential 
to individual consumers, competitiveness, 
growth and job creation in the European econ-
omy as a whole, the gains in efficiency resulting 
from the introduction of some competition will 
have generally positive results for the citizens 
of Europe. Otherwise, we will not have a true 
internal market while these essential sectors 
continue to be organized on a purely national 
and monopolistic basis. 
Because of the importance of these sectors to 
our society and because of their specific charac-
teristics, e.g. their network structure, Member 
States have in the past granted exclusive or spe-
cial rights to public or private operators or 
allowed other restrictions of competition in 
exchange for the operation of services of gen-
eral economic interest such as the supply of a 
universal service to all citizens on specific 
terms and at affordable prices. 
The Commission has always acknowledged that 
these general economic interest objectives are 
legitimate but considers that the means tradi-
tionally used to provide them are no longer 
always justified, particularly in view of techno-
logical developments and the new needs of con-
sumers and also in view of European integration 
itself. This is particularly true for the informa-
tion society, a source of growth, new services 
and new jobs in the years ahead. 
A thorough review is therefore needed, in the 
light of these new realities, of the instruments 
most likely to provide the public with the qual-
ity services it requires. The Commission con-
siders that the introduction of competition can, 
in many cases, improve service quality, allow 
innovation and the creation of employment and 
help to cut consumer prices. The removal of 
obstacles to free competition is, however, only 
one aspect of the Commission's liberalization 
policy. On the one hand, the adoption of a new 
regulatory framework will frequently be neces-
sary to ensure that universal service is provided 
in a competitive environment. On the other 
hand, where certain restrictions of competition 
prove essential in maintaining a universal ser-
vice, the Commission recognizes the legitimacy 
of these restrictions under Community law (as 
in the case of State aid). 
The Commission therefore considers that the 
development of competition policy is fully 
compatible with public service. It should also be 
noted that the liberalization of a sector is differ-
ent from the privatization of public enterprises 
operating in the sector. While the introduction 
of competition can, in certain cases, stem from 
Community rules, the latter are neutral as 
regards the public or private nature of enter-
prises. 
2. Article 90(3) Directives 
700. In order to achieve the objective of intro-
ducing competition, Article 90(3) gives the 
Commission the power to adopt decisions or 
directives that are binding on the Member 
States. This latter possibility is occasionally 
objected to by certain parties. 
In practice, even if Article 90(3) allows the 
Commission to adopt directives, the Court of 
Justice has stipulated that the provision em-
powers it only to establish general rules defin-
ing the obligations already imposed on Member 
States by the Treaty with regard to public under-
takings or undertakings granted special or 
exclusive rights, or to take the necessary pre-
ventive measures to allow it to carry out its 
monitoring function. 
The limited power conferred on the Commis-
sion by Article 90(3) is thus different from and 
more specific than the power of the European 
Parliament or the Council to adopt directives. 
The Commission may not impose new obliga-
tions on Member States; it may only determine, 
with regard to all the Member States, the spe-
cific obligations imposed on them by the Treaty. 
The extent of the Commission's duties and 
powers consequently depends on the scope of 
the rules that are to be complied with. 
The Commission has always used this instru-
ment with caution. Directives under Article  41 • 
90(3) have been used only in situations where 
the existence of many infringements of the 
fundamental rules of the EC Treaty made them 
necessary to avoid a multiplicity of infringe-
ment proceedings and to give operators a mini-
mum amount of legal certainty.' These initia-
tives have generally been taken in response to 
concerns expressed by the Council or Parlia-
ment. The Commission has always attached the 
greatest importance to the need for this instru-
ment to be used as part of a transparent proce-
dure involving the broadest possible dialogue 
with the other Union institutions, Member 
States and interested parties. 
by careful scrutiny of comments received, espe-
cially any comments from the European Parlia-
ment, the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions. 
The discussions held during the year on the 
Directives on cable television networks, mobile 
communications and the full liberalization of 
telecommunications are good illustrations of 
this approach. 
3. Other instruments available to the 
Commission 
This is the approach normally adopted in the 
initial assessment stages, through the publica-
tion by the Commission of Green Papers or 
discussion papers intended to stimulate debate 
at the public consultation stage. On the basis of 
the results of the consultations, studies by 
experts and information obtained by it, the 
Commission adopts a draft directive which is 
presented for comments to Parliament, the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, the Committee of 
the Regions and the Member States. The draft 
text is also published in the Official Journal of 
the European Communities to enable other 
interested parties to submit their comments. 
The adoption by the Commission of the final 
Article 90(3) Directive is in any event preceded 
101. Article 90(3) also enables the Commis-
sion to adopt individual decisions, where Com-
munity law is applied to specific cases; the deci-
sions are very similar in substance to Commis-
sion decisions in other fields (aid) and their 
legality is also monitored by the Court of 
Justice. 
In certain cases, the Commission may find it 
necessary, in order to enhance legal certainty 
and transparency, to explain the criteria it 
intends to follow in monitoring compliance of 
Community law by Member States and opera-
tors in a specific sector. The draft communica-
tion on the application of the Treaty rules to the 
postal service published in 1995 is an example 
of this sort of initiative. 
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Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the 
transparency of financial relations between Member States and 
public undertakings (OJ L 195, 29.7.1980. p. 35), as amended by 
Commission Directive 85/413/EEC of 24 July 1985 (OJ L 229. 
28.8.1988, p. 20) and Commission Directive 93/84/EEC of 30 
September 1993 (OJ L 254. 12.10.1993, p. 16); Commission 
Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competition in the 
markets in telecommunications terminal equipment (OJ L 131, 
27.5.1988, p. 73); Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 
1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications ser-
vices (OJ L 192, 24.7.1990, p. 10), as amended by Commission 
Directives 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994 on satellite communi-
cations (OJ L 268, 19.10.1994, p. 15) and 95/51/EC of 18 Octo-
ber 1995 on the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable 
television networks for the provision of already liberalized 
telecommunications services (OJ L256, 26.10.1995, p. 49). STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
ARTICLES 37 AND 90 
Β — Telecommunications 
1. General measures 
102. The Commission continued, with the sup-
port of the Council and the European Parlia-
ment, to promote liberalization in the field of 
telecommunications. 
On 25 January, it adopted the second part of the 
Green Paper on the liberalization of telecom-
munications infrastructures. The Green Paper 
examined the regulatory conditions required to 
ensure full competition in the telecommunica-
tions sector within the time-frame agreed by the 
Council.' After wide-ranging consultations on 
the Green Paper, the Commission adopted on 3 
May a communication on the consultations
2
 
summing up the results and listing the measures 
necessary to complete the moves towards full 
liberalization and establishment of a clear regu-
latory framework. This includes: 
(i) setting the date of 1 January 1998 for the 
discontinuation of all remaining exclusive 
and special rights for both public voice 
telephony and network competition by 
way of Article 90 Directives under EU 
competition law; 
(ii) ensuring the financing of a universal ser-
vice and clarifying the interconnection of 
access conditions, via further development 
of the legislative framework ensuring open 
network provision; 
(iii) further development of the regulatory 
framework at national and European level, 
including discussion of future interaction 
of national and EU regulation in this 
sector. 
Three Commission proposals for directives 
drafted in this connection under Article 90(3) 
were discussed and/or adopted during the year. 
2. Cable TV liberalization Directive 
103. On 18 October, the Commission adopted a 
Directive allowing cable TV infrastructure to be 
used to provide already liberalized telecommu-
nications services.' The draft had been issued 
for public consultation on 21 December 1994.
4
 
Although not bound by specific Treaty require-
ments, the Commission has sought to establish 
a transparent and open procedure for the adop-
tion of Article 90(3) Directives. The more than 
40 written comments received expressed their 
broad support for the Commission draft. 
The Directive provides for the abolition of 
restrictions on the use of transmission capacity 
on cable TV networks for all télécoms services, 
apart from public voice telephony from 1 
January 1996, and ensures that cable TV net-
works are allowed (i) to interconnect with the 
national public télécoms network, and (ii) to 
interconnect with each other directly. It also 
calls on the Member States to impose account-
ing transparency and the separation of financial 
accounts between the two business activities as 
soon as a turnover of ECU 50 million is reached 
in the market for telecommunications. 
This Directive is only a first step towards the 
objective of liberalizing the infrastructures, 
which will be achieved in the full competition 
Directive. It will also facilitate from 1 January 
1996, the effective provision of already liberal-
ized services. 
3. Mobile telephony liberalization 
Directive 
104. The second Directive concerns the liberal-
ization of mobile and personal communications. 
A draft was published for public consultation by 
the Commission on 1 August 1995/ with a 
period of two months being allowed for com-
ments. It was transmitted to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Comments were broadly in favour of the word-
ing of the draft. 
At its meeting on 20 December 1995, the Com-
mission agreed the Article 90(3) Directive in 
principle. The Directive was formally adopted 
Council Resolution of 22 December 1994 on the principles and 
timetable for the liberalization of telecommunications infra-
structures (OJ C 379, 31.12.1994, p. 4). 
COM(95) 158. 
Commission Directive 95/51/EC of 18 October 1995 amending 
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restric-
tions on the use of cable television networks for the provision of 
already liberalized telecommunications services (OJ L 256, 
26.10.1995. p.49). 
XXIVth Report on competition policy (1994), point 220. 
Draft Commission Directive amending Directive 90/388 EEC 
with regard to mobile and personal communications (OJ C 197, 
1.8.1995, p. 5).  43 44 
by the Commission on 16 January 1996.' The 
Commission's aim is to ensure fair competition 
as regards both the granting of licences to oper-
ators and the management of mobile telephony 
networks in the European Union. This should 
help new entrants to gain access to the market 
and facilitate the interconnection of national 
networks. 
The Directive seeks to achieve this by requiring 
Member States to abolish all exclusive or 
reserved rights in the field of mobile communi-
cations and to put in place, if the Member States 
have not already done so, authorization proce-
dures for the granting of licences. It also calls 
on the Member States to allow new entrants on 
the market in mobile telecommunications ser-
vices to offer their services via their own infra-
structures or via so-called alternative infra-
structures. This is indispensable if competition 
is to be fostered since, as the Commission 
noted in its communication on the 1992 review 
of the telecommunications sector,
2 high tariffs 
for and lack of availability of the basic infra-
structure over which liberalized services are 
operated or provided to third parties have 
delayed the widespread development of such 
services. 
However, the Member States who have less 
well-developed networks (Spain, Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal) may benefit, if they 
wish, from a five-year derogation period. 
Luxembourg, because of the small size of its 
network, may extend the deadline by two years. 
The legal reasoning for the removal of the 
special or exclusive rights under this Directive 
is that they constitute a restriction on the free-
dom to provide services under Article 59. In 
addition, however, the Directive is based on 
Article 86, with recital 10 reading as follows: 
The exclusive rights that currently exist in the 
mobile communications field were generally 
granted to organizations which already enjoyed 
a dominant position in creating the terrestrial 
networks, or to one of their subsidiaries. In 
such a situation, these rights have the effect of 
extending the dominant position enjoyed by 
those organizations and therefore strengthening 
that position, which, according to the case-law 
of the Court of Justice, constitutes an abuse of a 
dominant position contrary to Article 90.' 
4. Full competition Directive 
105. In its Resolution of 22 December 1994, 
the Council of Ministers reaffirmed that 1 Janu-
ary 1998 should be the date for the liberaliza-
tion of telecommunications infrastructures and 
public voice telephony services, subject to tran-
sitional arrangements for certain Member States 
(i.e. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland: up to five 
years; Luxembourg: up to two years). The Com-
mission responded to this by proposing a pack-
age of two measures: an Article 90(3) Commis-
sion Directive concerning the introduction of 
full competition into the telecommunications 
markets and a proposal for a Council and Par-
liament directive based on Article 100a of the 
EC Treaty with a view to harmonizing the rules 
for interconnection. The package thus demon-
strates the need for competition policy to de-
velop in close cooperation with the more gener-
al aspects of Community telecommunications 
policy. 
106. As regards the Article 90(3) Directive, this 
was published for comments on 10 October 
1995 and envisages the liberalization of all 
telecommunications services including voice 
telephony by 1 January 1998, with transitional 
periods for certain Member States. Restrictions 
on the use of alternative infrastructures must be 
lifted by 1996 (except for public voice tele-
phony, which is to be liberalized in 1998), and 
the conditions and rules for the authorization of 
interconnection must be established by 1997. 
The Directive also lays down the fundamental 
principles governing authorization of new 
entrants on the markets for voice telephony and 
telecommunications infrastructures. These prin-
ciples guarantee the introduction of competition 
into these sectors and list the measures neces-
sary to safeguard universal service in the Mem-
ber States. The Directive also provides that 
Member States must publish the authorization 
conditions and procedures, as well as the terms 
and conditions for interconnection. 
In addition, Member States with underdevel-
oped or small networks can benefit from dero-
gations of five and two years respectively. 
1 Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending 
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and personal com-
munications. OJ L 20. 26.1.1996, p. 59. 
Communication of 21 October 1992 on the 1992 review of the 
situation in the telecommunications service sector (SEC(92) 
1048). STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
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707. In parallel with its action to establish the 
abovementioned regulatory framework, the 
Commission pursued its efforts to ensure full 
implementation of the existing directives in the 
telecommunications sector and in particular the 
Services Directive.' On 4 April, the Commis-
sion issued a communication
2 on the status and 
implementation of this Directive, which 
affirmed the Commission's intention to ensure 
that the problems and gaps in implementation 
identified in the communication are resolved. 
required from Telecom Italia and without com-
pensation for Omnitel in the form of an easing 
of the regulatory environment. The decision 
provided that the Italian Government must 
either require that Telecom Italia Mobile make 
an identical payment or adopt, after receiving 
the agreement of the Commission, corrective 
measures equivalent in economic terms. In 
addition, the measures definitively adopted 
must not undermine the competition introduced 
by the authorization of the second GSM oper-
ator. 
5. Infringement proceedings under 
Article 90(3) 
108. As well as directives of general applica-
tion, the Commission is also authorized under 
Article 90(3) to take decisions against Member 
States in individual cases. It signalled its inten-
tions to do this as regards possible discrimina-
tion against second mobile phone operators in 
several Member States. State operators already 
enjoy significant advantages over new entrants 
— such as the universal phone network, a dom-
inant position on the market and an established 
mobile user base (often with permission to offer 
mobile services having been granted without 
any requirement of a selection process). The 
Commission has therefore taken care to ensure 
that second operators receive fair treatment 
from Member States. In particular, it was con-
cerned about the auction procedure which a 
number of Member States included in the selec-
tion criteria for the second operator. Such an 
auction, critically analysed in the 1994 Green 
Paper on mobile and personal communications,
3 
results in the award of second licences not only 
on the basis of a comparison of intrinsic quali-
tative elements but also on the basis of a finan-
cial bid above a certain set threshold. 
GSM Radiotelephony services in other 
Member States 
770. The Commission has also been taking 
action against a number of other countries 
(including Belgium, Spain and Ireland) with a 
view to establishing a level playing-field for the 
second GSM operator. For example, only after 
discussions with the Commission did Belgium 
give an undertaking to charge Belgacom (the 
State operator) a similar fee for its existing 
GSM licence as was to be paid by the second 
GSM provider, Mobistar. The Commission is 
continuing to monitor the operating conditions 
for second operators in the Member States. 
Vebacom 
777. The Commission has also taken action 
under Article 90 in other areas of telecommuni-
cations. In April, it received a complaint under 
Article 90 from Vebacom, the telecommunica-
tions subsidiary of VEBA AG, a German utili-
ties holding company. Vebacom had made 
several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a li-
cence for a broadband telecommunications net-
work based on SDH (synchronous hierarchy) 
Omnitel Pronto Italia 
709. On 4 October, the Commission took a for-
mal decision under Article 90(3)
4 in the case of 
Italy for discriminating against Omnitel Pronto 
Italia and in favour of Telecom Italia Mobile 
(the State operator). The discrimination which 
strengthened the dominant position of Telecom 
Italia Mobile took the form of a requirement 
that Omnitel Pronto Italia pay an entry fee for a 
GSM licence without a similar payment being 
1 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the mar-
kets for telecommunications services (OJ L 192, 24.7.1990, p. 
10). The Services Directive provided for the removal of special 
and exclusive rights granted by Member States for the supply of 
all telecommunications services other than voice telephony; it 
came to be recognized as a cornerstone of the EU framework for 
liberalizing the European telecommunications market. 
Commission communication of 4 April 1995 to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the status and implementation of 
Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services (OJ C 275, 20.10.1995, p. 2). 
Towards the personal communications environment — Green 
Paper on a common approach in the field of mobile and per-
sonal communications in the European Community 
(COM(94) 145). 
' OJL280.23.il. 1995, pp. 49-57.  45 technology which would allow the transfer of by Deutsche Telekom AG, the holder of the 
data between 36 different sites of the German infrastructure monopoly in Germany. After 
public television broadcaster ARD. The Com- informal discussions with the Commission, the 
mission formed the preliminary view that the German Ministry of Post and Telecommunica-
complaint was justified, in particular since tions agreed to grant a licence for the establish-
Vebacom intends to offer a service based on a ment and operation of an alternative telecom-
new technology (SDH) which was not offered munications network. 
■ 
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■ — STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
ARTICLES 37 AND 90 
C — Energy 
772. The Council continued its in-depth exam-
ination of the amended proposals for Directives 
concerning common rules for the internal mar-
ket in electricity and gas presented by the Com-
mission on 7 December 1993. 
113. However, it has been impossible in 1995 
to make any substantial progress with the liber-
alization of the Community's electricity and nat-
ural gas markets, which, with a few exceptions, 
are still dominated by exclusive rights or 
monopolies. The Council of Ministers, at its 
meeting on 20 December, was not in a position 
to agree on a common position with regard to 
the draft Directive concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity, although 
the Spanish Presidency could conclude that 
negotiations had reached the final stage and that 
it should be possible to take a decision early in 
1996. 
774. Early in the year and at the request of the 
Council, the Commission examined the possi-
bilities for coexistence between the Commis-
sion's negotiated access approach (consumers 
and producers negotiate access to the grid with 
its operator) and the so-called single buyer con-
cept (one single entity within a system respon-
sible for all buying and selling and for public 
services). In its working paper on the organiza-
tion of the internal electricity market,' the Com-
mission concluded that the original single 
buyer model was incompatible with the Treaty 
and would not provide equivalent economic 
results or reciprocity between the two systems. 
It also suggested a number of modalities for the 
single buyer model which would permit coexis-
tence of the two systems. These modalities cov-
ered the degree of consumer choice for all eligi-
ble consumers, the possibility of imports and 
exports under objective conditions, measures to 
ensure transparency and to avoid any distortions 
of competition, guarantees for fair competition 
in generation and also its opening up to inde-
pendent producers and the possibility of estab-
lishing direct lines. The Council at its meeting 
in June accepted the Commission's position in 
principle by concluding that coexistence of the 
two systems could take place only on the basis 
of modifications to the single buyer model. 
However, little agreement was forthcoming on 
the list of modalities proposed by the Commis-
sion. 
775. The Spanish Presidency presented a com-
promise text in July which incorporated all the 
political agreements already reached in pre-
vious Council conclusions, including the con-
clusions of the Commission's March working 
paper, and attempted to come up with solutions 
to problems not yet solved. It accepted the coex-
istence of the negotiated access and single buy-
er systems, but modified the latter to take into 
account a number of the required changes. This 
compromise text was intensively discussed 
throughout the second half of the year. 
776. The two central issues outstanding con-
cern the degree of market opening via the defi-
nition of eligible customers and especially the 
question whether distributors should be among 
the eligible customers that would be free to con-
tract with the most efficient producers. Further-
more, some Member States fear that the pro-
posed solution for public-service obligations 
may be abused in a manner that unduly restricts 
competition. 
117. The Commission deplores the fact that it 
has not been possible to reach agreement on the 
proposed Directive, especially in view of the 
importance of the subject. As stated in the 
Ciampi report,
2 the failure to liberalize the 
energy sector is having a very detrimental effect 
on the competitiveness of the European econ-
omy. 
SEC(95) 464 of 22.3.1995. 
See footnote 1, p. 12 above.  47 D — Postal services 
77& On 26 July, the Commission adopted a 
package of measures consisting of a proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Direc-
tive establishing common rules for the develop-
ment of postal services and a draft Commission 
communication on the application of the com-
petition rules to the postal sector. The aim of the 
measures is to guarantee the provision of uni-
versal service and at the same time to open up 
the postal market to greater competition. 
The proposal,' based on Article 100a of the EC 
Treaty, provides for mandatory universal ser-
vices to be provided throughout the Community 
to all citizens at affordable prices, with a high 
degree of quality, including in remote areas and 
peripheral regions of the Community. In order 
to ensure the financial viability of the universal 
service, the proposal defines harmonized crite-
ria for the services which may be reserved for 
the universal service providers. Thus, domestic 
mail in the Member States weighing not more 
than 350 g where the tariff is less than five times 
the rate for a standard letter (up to 20 g), direct 
mail and incoming cross-border mail may con-
tinue to be reserved until 31 December 2000 
(subject to review of the direct mail sector by 30 
June 1999). The proposal also requires the 
Member States to set, in particular, universal 
service tariffs at affordable prices fixed in rela-
tion to the costs and to define quality standards 
applicable to national services which are con-
sistent with the Community measures. 
The draft communication,
2 which will be the 
subject of a public consultation procedure, com-
plements the proposal for a Directive. The 
Commission sets out the principles governing 
how it intends to apply the competition rules in 
the Treaty to the postal sector, in order to facil-
itate gradual, controlled liberalization of the 
postal market. It describes the approach it 
intends to adopt to analysing State measures 
restricting the freedom to provide services or to 
compete on the postal markets in relation to the 
Treaty provisions. The Commission particularly 
raises questions of non-discrimination in access 
to the postal network, identifying cross-subsi-
dies and defining the mandatory safeguards 
necessary to ensure fair competition. 
48 
Proposal for European Parliament and Council Directive on 
common rules for the development of Community postal ser-
vices and improved quality of service (OJ C 322, 2.12.1995, p. 
22). 
Draft Commission communication on the application of the 
rules of competition to the postal sector and in particular on the 
assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services 
(OJC322. 2.12.1995, p. 3). STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
ARTICLES 37 AND 90 
E — Transport 
1. Airports 
119. The Commission is pursuing its efforts to 
ensure that the liberalization of air transport in 
the European Union is not jeopardized by anti­
competitive practices at airports. It continued its 
investigation of several complaints and took 
decisions aimed at improving competition at 
certain major airports of the European Union. 
1.1. Landing fees 
Brussels-National Airport 
720. The Commission adopted a decision 
under Article 90(3)' concerning the system of 
discounts on landing fees charged at Brussels-
National Airport under the Royal Decree of 22 
December 1989. British Midland, the airline 
which lodged the complaint, considered that the 
system enabled the airline Sabena, its main 
competitor on the Brussels-London route, to 
benefit from a discount of 18% on its landing 
fees although no other airlines qualified for a 
reduction. 
After examining the complaint, the Commis­
sion concluded that the system constituted a 
State measure within the meaning of Article 
90(1), read in conjunction with Article 86, as it 
had the effect of applying to the airlines dissim­
ilar conditions for equivalent transactions con­
nected with landing and take-off and hence 
introducing distortions of competition. The 
Commission considered that such a system 
could be justified solely by economics of scale 
achieved by the airport operator. 
This did not apply in the case in question. The 
Commission therefore requested the Belgian 
authorities to put an end to the system. 
1.2. Ground handling 
121. The Commission also continued its inves­
tigation of anti-competitive practices in ground 
handling (ramp, terminal and/or cargo hand­
ling). Positive results were achieved during the 
year, the Commission's approaches to the 
authorities of Member States having resulted 
either in a gradual opening-up of the market 
(e.g. in Ireland, where the ground handling mar­
ket has been open to a second operator since 1 
January 1995), or specific commitments to this 
end (e.g. in Greece and Spain, whose authorities 
notified the Commission of their plans to 
improve efficiency in this sector, as well as a 
liberalization timetable). 
The Commission also continued its examination 
of the complaints lodged under Article 86 of the 
Treaty against two private airport companies 
responsible for operating two of the largest air­
ports in the Union: Frankfurt and Milan. 
722. A fresh development in this area was the 
agreement in principle, reached on 8 December, 
by the Transport Council, on the Directive relat­
ing to the liberalization of ground handling ser­
vices in Community airports. The proposal, 
based on Article 84 of the Treaty, had been pre­
sented by the Commission in December 1994 
and followed the Council Resolution of 24 
October 1994
2 on the situation in European 
civil aviation and the Commission communica­
tion on 'The way forward for civil aviation in 
Europe'. 
Ground handling is an activity related to air 
transport without which carriers would be 
unable to carry on their business. Its liberaliza­
tion forms part of the completion of the single 
market in air transport and follows the adoption 
of the Community rules on slot allocation and 
the operation of computerized reservation sys­
tems. It is also intended to help European air­
lines to improve control of their operating costs 
and better match their services to customer 
requirements. 
The proposal also provides for a transitional 
market adjustment period, fixing different dead­
lines for entry into force based on certain refer­
ence thresholds. Full liberalization should take 
place, depending on the sector and the case at 
issue, between 1998 and 2003. 
2. Ports 
725. Following the judgment of the Court of 
Justice in Port of Genoa,
3 Italy initiated a reform 
OJL216, 12.9.1995, p. 8. 
OJC309, 5.11.1994, p. 2. 
Judgment of 10 December 1991, in Case C-179/90 Porto di 
Genova ν Siderurgica Gabrielli, [1991] ECR 1-5889.  49 of its port system which led to the adoption in within 10 days to the firm that had been unlaw-
1994 of Law No 84. fully denied that right by the local port author-
ity. 
In principle, the law provides for the opening-
up to competition of the market for port hand- On 11 July, the Italian authorities informed the 
ling operations (loading and unloading). In Commission that the licence had been issued 
practice, however, this has not proved the case within the period stipulated. The licence opened 
as in some Italian ports, the local authorities up the port operations sector in the Port of 
have systematically refused to grant the neces- Genoa to other service providers. The measure 
sary operating licences to potential competitors will benefit port users, a number of local enter-
of the long-established dockers companies. As prises, chiefly small and medium-sized firms, 
this situation was contrary to its policy of com- and generally increase the dynamism of the port 
petition in ports, the Commission decided that with regard to international competition, 
action was necessary. The port of Genoa was 
selected in view of its importance to the Union 124. The Commission is also pursuing its dif-
as a whole and its position as the leading Italian ferent infringement proceedings instituted 
port. against Italy concerning aspects of port work 
which continue to pose problems with regard to 
On 21 June, the Commission warned the Italian Community law. 
Government to issue an operating licence 
. 
50 STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
ARTICLES 37 AND 90 
F — Other State monopolies of a 
commercial character 
725. The adjustment of national monopolies of 
a commercial character in the new Member 
States was the subject of extensive discussions 
between the Commission and the governments 
concerned. The aim was to adjust the laws gov-
erning the monopolies to Community legislation 
and to Article 37 of the Treaty in particular. 
1. Swedish and Finnish alcohol monop-
olies 
726. The adjustment of the alcohol monopolies 
in Sweden and Finland was discussed by the 
Commission and the two new Member States 
with a view to adjusting the monopolies to 
Community law. In the light of these objectives, 
the two Member States agreed to abolish the 
exclusive rights to import, export, produce and 
sell wholesale, including wholesale sales to 
cafés and restaurants. The Commission was 
able to ensure that these exclusive rights, which 
should already have been abolished when the 
EEA Agreement entered into force, were finally 
abolished by the new laws on alcohol adopted 
by Sweden and Finland at the end of 1995.' 
The Commission considers that the exclusive 
rights to retail alcohol may, without prejudice to 
future developments in the case-law of the 
Court of Justice, be justified under existing 
Community legislation, in particular in view of 
legitimate national concerns about alcoholism, 
provided that there is no discrimination between 
national products and products imported from 
other Member States. To ensure that retail 
monopolies conformed to these requirements, 
the Commission considered it necessary to be 
closely involved in detailed and regular moni-
toring of their operation. 
2. Austrian alcohol monopoly 
tioned requirements being applicable. The 
exclusive rights should therefore have been 
abolished by l January 1995. As this had not 
been carried out, the Commission was com-
pelled to initiate the infringement procedure 
provided for in Article 169 of the EC Treaty 
against Austria. 
3. Austrian salt monopoly 
72¿?. With regard to the national monopoly of a 
commercial character in the salt sector, Austria, 
following action taken by the Commission, 
finally agreed to abolish the exclusive rights to 
import and sell products from other Member 
States wholesale; the rights should have been 
abolished by the start of 1995.-
4. Austrian manufactured tobacco 
monopoly 
729. The Austrian monopoly of manufactured 
tobacco, characterized by exclusive import and 
marketing rights, is subject to the requirements 
of Article 71 ( 1 ) to (3) of the Act of Accession of 
Austria.' Under that Article, Austria is required 
gradually to adjust its monopoly of manufac-
tured tobacco by the progressive opening, as 
from the date of accession, of quotas for the 
import of products from Member States so that, 
by 31 December 1997 at the latest, no discrimi-
nation regarding the conditions under which 
goods are procured and marketed exists 
between nationals of Member States. Compli-
ance with this obligation entails the abolition of 
exclusive import rights and exclusive wholesale 
rights. As regards retail sale of products im-
ported under quotas, distribution of such prod-
ucts to consumers must be carried out in a non-
discriminatory manner. 
Finding that Austria had not taken the necessary 
measures to comply with these provisions, in 
particular as regards the opening of quotas as 
727. Austria holds a national monopoly of a 
commercial character in pure alcohol and cer-
tain alcoholic beverages which involves exclu-
sive import and wholesale rights but which, 
unlike the exclusive retailing rights, are consid-
ered to be clearly incompatible with Article 37 
of the EC Treaty without any of the abovemen-
Regarding Sweden, see the Alcohol Act (1994:1738) promul-
gated 16.12.1994 and entered into force 1.1.1995. For Suomi-
Finland, see new Alcohol Act (1143/94) adopted on 8.12.1994 
and entered into force on 1.1.1995. 
Bundesgesetzblatt (Austrian Official Journal) No 518/1995, 
4.8.1995. 
OJ C 241, 29.8.1994, p. 35.  51 required, the Commission was obliged to initi- instance, the Commission must ascertain that 
ate the infringement procedure provided for in licensing and distribution agreements between 
Article 169 of the EC Treaty. Austria Tabakwerke and other European oper-
ators are not liable to jeopardize the effective-
The Commission also checks that the retail sale ness of adjusting the Austrian manufactured 
of products imported under quotas is carried out tobacco monopoly and are compatible with the 
in a non-discriminatory manner. Thus, for Treaty competition rules. 
■ 
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52 Ill — MERGER CONTROL 
A— Introduction 
730. Concentrations falling under the Merger 
Regulation were even more numerous than in 
1994. The Commission received 114 notifica-
tions (1994: 100) and took 109 final decisions 
(1994: 90). Activity in 1995 was over 24% 
higher than the previous year, which itself had 
been about 50% higher than in the three years 
1991 to 1993. A total of seven second-phase 
investigations were begun compared with six a 
year earlier and two operations were prohibited 
compared with one in 1994. 
This year marked the fifth anniversary of the 
entry into force of the Merger Regulation.' In 
those five years, the Commission took 382 final 
decisions, an average of about one decision 
every three and a half working days or more 
than 70 decisions per year. The sectoral break-
down of cases indicated a continuing significant 
number of notifications in telecommunications, 
financial services, the media and pharmaceuti-
cals. 
The revised Implementing Regulation
2 came 
into force on 1 March 1995. In addition, four 
interpretative notices which were published at 
the end of 1994 were applied for the first time in 
1995.
1 They concern the distinction between 
concentrative and cooperative joint ventures, 
the notion of a concentration, the notion of 
undertakings concerned and the calculation of 
turnover. 
These changes in the operation of the Merger 
Regulation were adopted by the Commission as 
a result of its 1993 review exercise. A new 
review exercise was launched during the year. 
The Commission carried out a wide-ranging 
consultation exercise on the issue of lowering 
the thresholds contained in the Merger Regula-
tion as well as on other aspects of the Regula-
tion which might need to be revised. Among 
those consulted were the Member States, other 
Community institutions, individual businesses, 
trade associations and legal advisers. A Green 
Paper on the operation of the Merger Regulation 
was published early in 1996
4 with a view to full 
public consultations on the issues involved. 
Legislative proposals are likely to be made later 
in the year. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 395, 
30.12.1989, p. I). 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 3384/94 of 21 December 1994 
on the notifications, time limits and hearings provided for in 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings (OJ L 377, 31.12.1994); 
XXIVth Report on Competition Policy (1994), points 234-235. 
XXIVth Report on Competition Policy (1994), points 237-260. 
COM(96)19.  53 Β — In-depth investigations 
757. A total of seven in-depth (phase two) 
investigations were completed under the Mer­
ger Regulation. As a result, two operations were 
prohibited which were both in the media sector 
— the Nordic Satellite Distribution (NSD) joint 
venture in the Nordic area and the RTL/Veroni-
ca/Endemol (Holland Media Groep-HMG) 
transaction in the Netherlands. The remaining 
five operations were all cleared, two uncondi­
tionally and three with conditions which 
removed the competition problems identified by 
the Commission during its investigation. 
1. Media cases 
132. The Commission has received an increas­
ing number of notifications in the media sector 
which reflect the changing patterns of owner­
ship and the convergence of previously separate 
technologies, e.g. telecommunications and 
media. The majority of these cases have pre­
sented no competition problems and have been 
approved after a first-phase enquiry. 
The decisions in the NSD and HMG cases indi­
cate the importance which the Commission 
attaches to cases in this sector. These transac­
tions involved significant horizontal and verti­
cal effects, with new companies being created 
which would restrict access to TV networks — 
terrestrial, satellite or cable — in the future. In 
1994, the Commission had prohibited the MSG 
Media Service joint venture, which had been 
proposed by Bertelsmann, Kirch and Deutsche 
Telekom with a view to providing services for 
pay-TV in Germany. In its prohibition of the 
NSD operation, the Commission invited the 
parties to present new proposals which could be 
considered compatible with the common mar­
ket. This emphasizes the Commission's willing­
ness to see new companies being set up in this 
sector, provided that they do not create or 
strengthen a dominant position. 
establishment of NSD in its proposed form 
would have led to a concentration of the activi­
ties of its parents, creating a vertically inte­
grated operation extending from production of 
TV programmes to retail distribution services 
for pay-TV channels. 
NSD's parents are strong media players in the 
Nordic area. Norsk Telekom A/S is the largest 
cable operator in Norway, has pay-TV distribu­
tion activities in Norway and also controls satel­
lite capacity suitable for Nordic viewers. 
TeleDanmark A/S (TD) is the dominant cable 
TV operator in Denmark. In addition, TD, with 
Kinnevik, controls most of the remaining satel­
lite capacity suitable for Nordic viewers. Kin­
nevik, a Swedish conglomerate, is the most 
important provider of Nordic satellite TV pro­
grammes and a major pay-TV distributor in the 
Nordic countries and has an important stake in 
cable and advertising-financed TV in Sweden. 
The Commission found that NSD would have 
resulted in the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position on three markets: 
(i) the provision of satellite TV transponder 
capacity to the Nordic region (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland); 
(ii) the Danish market for operation of cable 
TV networks; 
(iii) the market for distribution of satellite pay-
TV and other encrypted TV channels to 
direct-to-home households. 
The vertically integrated nature of the operation 
would have meant that the parties would have 
been able to foreclose the Nordic satellite TV 
market to competitors and obtain a 'gatekeeper' 
function for the Nordic market for satellite TV 
broadcasting. As the affected markets are cur­
rently in a transitional phase the Commission 
acted to ensure that these future markets would 
not be foreclosed. 
Nordic Satellite Distribution  RTLA/eronica/Endemol 
54 
133. NSD was designed to transmit satellite TV 
programmes to cable TV operators and house­
holds receiving satellite TV via their own dish. 
However, the Commission concluded that the 
134. The Commission began an examination of 
the RTLWeronica/Endemol case following a 
request from the Dutch Government under Arti­
cle 22 of the Merger Regulation. This Article — MERGER CONTROL 
allows a Member State to refer a case to the 
Commission even if it does not have a Commu-
nity dimension, provided there is an effect on 
trade between Member States. Although the 
Commission took the view that the relevant 
geographic market was the Netherlands, it con-
cluded that the concentration affected trade 
between Member States because it would influ-
ence conditions for new entrants on the Dutch 
TV broadcasting market and would have an 
impact on the acquisition of foreign-language 
programmes and because the joint venture itself 
is based in Luxembourg, where two of its chan-
nels are 'licensed' by the Grand Duchy of Lux-
embourg. The examination followed the normal 
procedure except that the usual suspension pro-
visions did not apply. Therefore, in this case, the 
parties were able to complete the operation 
despite the Commission's decision that the joint 
venture would result in a dominant position for 
the parties. 
The case concerned a joint venture, Holland 
Media Groep (HMG), between RTL, Veronica 
and Endemol. RTL transferred its broadcasting 
activities in the Netherlands to HMG, in partic-
ular the two commercial TV channels RTL4 and 
RTL5. A third commercial channel was intro-
duced through Veronica, which left the public 
broadcasting system in the Netherlands to par-
ticipate in the joint venture. The other main par-
ent, Endemol, is the largest independent pro-
ducer of TV programmes in the Netherlands. 
Following its investigation, the Commission 
concluded that the new company would have at 
least 40% of the market for free access TV 
broadcasting in the Netherlands and more than 
60% of the TV advertising. In addition, Ende-
mol's position as the largest independent TV 
producer in the Netherlands would be strength-
ened by its participation in HMG. The Commis-
sion adopted a prohibition decision and invited 
the parties to propose measures to restore effec-
tive competition on the Dutch TV advertising 
and production markets within three months. 
The Commission's decision has been challenged 
before the Court of First Instance. 
mately declared compatible with the common 
market. Siemens/Italtel, a joint venture in the 
telecommunications equipment industry in 
Italy, and Mercedes Benz/Kässbohrer, the acqui-
sition by Mercedes of one of the other German 
bus and coach manufacturers, were both cleared 
unconditionally. In each case, however, the par-
ties made certain statements which were includ-
ed in the decision concerning their future busi-
ness conduct. However, these statements were 
not an integral part of the Commission's compe-
tition analysis but were offered by the parties. 
For example, STET, the parent company of Ital-
tel, undertook not to influence the purchasing 
policy of Telecom Italia in favour of the joint 
venture; Mercedes announced that it would sup-
ply engines at competitive prices to third-party 
manufacturers who lacked their own engine 
production capability. 
136. In Siemens/Italtel, Siemens and STET, the 
holding company for the Italian telecommuni-
cations operators, including Italtel, intended to 
contribute their respective telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing subsidiaries to a joint 
venture. The operation raised both horizontal 
and vertical issues. Horizontally, the joint ven-
ture's highest market share occurred in switch-
ing equipment where the parties' combined 
share was 50-60% of the Italian market and 
around 30% of overall EU sales (combined 
shares in transmission equipment were lower). 
Vertically, the joint venture would be partially 
owned by its largest customer. 
In concluding that the proposed joint venture 
was compatible with the common market, the 
Commission took into account: 
(i) the potential effects of new technologies 
which are likely to alter the telecommuni-
cations markets significantly; 
(ii) the effects of standardization and public 
procurement directives in opening up 
national markets; 
2. Other in-depth investigations 
755. The remaining operations in which in-
depth investigations were opened were all ulti-
(iii) the further liberalization of telecommunica-
tions services and, in particular, of telecom-
munications infrastructure, which will lead 
to world markets for telecommunications 
equipment.  55 757. In the Mercedes Benz/Kässbohrer case, 
although the bus market throughout Europe 
would be affected, the Commission considered 
that the German bus market in particular 
required in-depth investigation. Three markets 
were identified with the parties combined share 
reaching 44% in city buses, 54% in tourist 
coaches and 74% in intercity buses. With a 
share of 57% of the entire bus market in Ger-
many, however, the Commission concluded that 
there would be adequate constraints on Mer-
cedes' freedom of action on the German market 
because there were two German competitors as 
well as potential entrants from elsewhere in 
Europe. According to customers, these potential 
entrants could be expected to provide addition-
al leverage to German bus operators. Lastly the 
Commission found that public procurement 
Directives, which make Community-wide ten-
dering compulsory for the main part of the mar-
ket for city and intercity buses, were also lead-
ing to the development of a wider European 
market. 
trains. Kiepe is an established and successful 
supplier and played an important role in open-
ing up the German market through its coopera-
tion with the Canadian firm Bombardier. 
The transaction was the subject of a request for 
referral by the German authorities under Article 
9 of the Merger Regulation. Although the com-
petition problems were concentrated on two 
product markets in Germany, the proposed 
operation — which created the largest supplier 
of railway equipment in the world — had sig-
nificant effects throughout Europe. The request 
for referral was thus refused. 
140. In Orkla/Volvo, the acquisition was 
approved subject to the divestiture of Orkla's 
brewing company Hansa. The parties would 
otherwise have had a 75% share of the Norwe-
gian beer market and neither the retail nor the 
hotel and catering industries were considered 
capable of deploying any countervailing pur-
chasing power. 
75S. In the other cases, the Commission's clear-
ance of the respective operations was condition-
al on undertakings given by the parties in the 
course of the proceedings. 
759. In ABB/Daimler Benz, the Commission 
considered that the market for local trains had 
remained national in Germany although, in oth-
er Member States, the lack of major national rail 
transportation industries had already led to 
wider geographic markets. The proposed opera-
tion would have led to the creation of a domi-
nant duopoly in the German market for local 
trains. The concentration would also have 
impeded market entry by foreign suppliers by 
eliminating independent German suppliers of 
electrical components. No competitive issues 
were identified in relation to other relevant 
product markets. 
In order to alleviate the Commission's concerns, 
the parties agreed to the sale of Kiepe Elektrik 
GmbH, a Daimler-Benz subsidiary specializing 
in electrical supplies for local trains. As a result 
of this divestiture, a competent producer of 
electrical components that was independent of 
the parties would remain on the German market 
and would be able to supply or cooperate with 
suppliers of the mechanical components of local 
141. In Crown Cork and Seal/Carnaud Metal-
Box, following a detailed second-phase analysis 
of both the horizontal and vertical issues raised, 
the Commission determined that the only mar-
ket in which the proposed concentration threat-
ened to create a dominant position was the mar-
ket for tinplate aerosol cans. In the European 
Economic Area (EEA), both parties produce 
and sell tinplate aerosol cans and food cans, as 
well as certain closures for beverage cans and 
bottles, including beverage can ends, metal 
crowns, and plastic and aluminium caps. Con-
sequently, the Commission concluded that 
Crown's commitment to divest a specified 
group of tinplate aerosol can operations would 
be sufficient to overcome its competition con-
cerns. 
The parties agreed to divest substantial manu-
facturing activities for tinplate aerosol cans in 
five different Member States; these activities 
accounted for almost 22% of the EEA tinplate 
aerosol can market. Without the divestiture, the 
combined European market shares of the two 
parties would have been more than 60%, with 
the next largest competitor having a 15-20% 
market share and with the major share of the 
excess capacity in this market being held by the 
parties. 
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C — Other major cases 
142. A number of major operations were 
cleared without in-depth investigations within 
one month of their notification. They included 
several in the pharmaceutical sector, among 
which were Glaxo/Wellcome, Behring-
werke/Armour Pharmaceutical, Hoechst/ 
Marion Merrell Dow, Rhone Poulenc 
Rohrer/Fisons and Upjohn/Pharmacia. In order 
to remove any possible doubts as to compatibil-
ity, Glaxo agreed to grant to a third party an 
exclusive licence for one of the anti-migraine 
compounds currently under development by 
either Glaxo or Wellcome. It appears that recent 
mergers in the pharmaceutical industry are 
intended to increase the range of products 
offered by companies, thereby making them 
more competitive as suppliers to the whole-
salers, hospitals and pharmacy chains. As a 
result, the operations to date have been largely 
complementary in nature and have not in gener-
al led to any competition problems. 
143. In Swissair/Sabena, the Commission 
secured remedies for resolving the competition 
problems raised by the operation which consist-
ed of Swissair acquiring a 49.5% stake in 
Sabena. The transaction would have led to a 
monopoly in air transport between Switzerland 
and Belgium. Moreover, Swissair was a partici-
pant in the European Quality Alliance with SAS 
and Austrian Airlines, while SAS had proposed 
a cooperation agreement with Lufthansa. The 
operation, taken together with these arrange-
ments, would have enabled the participating air-
lines to create an extensive route network carry-
ing about 35% of passenger traffic within 
Europe, twice as much as the next largest carri-
er. In order to clear the operation, the Commis-
sion secured undertakings from the two airlines 
and from the Belgian and Swiss Governments 
that they would make available the necessary 
traffic rights and airport slots to enable com-
petitors to operate flights between Belgium and 
Switzerland. Swissair and Sabena were also 
required to provide competitors with interlining 
arrangements and with the opportunity to par-
ticipate in frequent flyer programmes. Lastly, 
Swissair was required to sever its previous links 
with SAS through the European Quality 
Alliance. This transaction was notified twice, 
on the second occasion following modifications 
to the operation. At that time, it was fully eval-
uated (including consultations with the Member 
States) without it being necessary to initiate a 
second phase procedure. 
144. The Commission approved an operation 
by which the Finnish companies Repola Corpo-
ration and Kymmene Corporation entered into a 
full merger. Repola and Kymmene are large 
international companies active in the fields of 
printing paper and packaging materials. The 
operation involved, among other products, the 
markets for newsprint, magazine paper and 
paper sacks. 
As regards paper sacks, the Commission's 
investigation led to the conclusion that there is 
a separate Finnish market for this product and 
that the concentration would lead to the creation 
of a dominant position on that market. The new 
company would be virtually the sole supplier of 
paper sacks to Finnish customers. The parties 
have given commitments involving the divesti-
ture of some of their paper sack capacity on the 
Finnish market. 
The markets for newsprint and magazine paper 
are at least Western European in scope and 
Repola/Kymmene, like all the other major 
European paper producers, transport and market 
their products in almost all Member States. As a 
result of the operation,the new company will be 
the major European player in newsprint and 
magazine paper. However, the combined market 
shares will not exceed some 20% in either of the 
two product markets; what is more, several 
competitors have strong market positions. 
Along with five other Finnish paper producers, 
Repola is a member of Finnpap Marketing 
Association, a joint sales organization which 
markets the paper products of the members on a 
worldwide basis. Kymmene has its own sales 
network and is not a member of Finnpap. The 
parties have undertaken not to sell paper prod-
ucts through the Finnpap joint sales agency. 
57 D — Legitimate interests of 
Member States 
145. On 6 March, the United Kingdom author-
ities made, in the context of the proposed acqui-
sition of Northumbrian Water by Lyonnaise des 
Eaux, the first application under Article 21(3) of 
the Merger Regulation for the recognition of a 
legitimate interest. The application concerned 
legislation which regulates the water supply 
industry in the United Kingdom. This legisla-
tion has specific merger provisions which are 
designed to enable the regulatory system to 
achieve its objective of safeguarding the provi-
sion of a vital service and protecting the con-
sumer. Accordingly, whenever a merger takes 
place or is expected to take place, the case is 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Com-
mission (MMC) for it to decide whether it 
would be expected to operate against the public 
interest. The criteria for the public interest test 
for water industry mergers include the number 
of independently controlled water companies 
among which the water regulator could make 
comparisons for the purpose of calculating the 
price regulatory formula. The United King-
dom's application covered these provisions as 
the reference to the MMC is automatic and not 
discretionary. 
The Commission, in acknowledging the United 
Kingdom's legitimate interest, set specific limits 
to the MMC investigations in these circum-
stances. Its decision of 29 March 1995 acknowl-
edged that the MMC could assess potential 
mergers on the basis of the public interest test 
but that the public interest in those cases was 
limited to those issues which were directly 
related to the operation of the water regulatory 
legislation. The United Kingdom authorities 
were required to inform the Commission of any 
measure taken under the decision so that the 
Commission could check that the measure was 
appropriate. 
Soon after the Commission's decision, the Unit-
ed Kingdom authorities referred the proposed 
takeover bid to the MMC. Following the MMC 
report, which found the merger to be against the 
public interest unless substantial price reduc-
tions for consumers were achieved, OFWAT 
consulted Lyonnaise and Northumbrian and 
proposed a measure which included a price 
reduction formula with which Lyonnaise subse-
quently formally agreed. As required by the 
decision, the Commission was informed of 
the proposed measure by the United Kingdom 
Government and had no observations to make 
on it. 
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E — Mergers in the COal and Steel owned: the acquisition by the RIVA group of 
industries Ilva's flat products operation; a joint venture 
between Usinor Sacilor and Hoogovens to take 
146. During the year, the Commission took over the Portuguese flat products company SN-
seven decisions on concentrations under Article Pianos; and another joint venture between 
66 of the ECSC Treaty. Three of these cases RIVA and Freire involving the takeover of SN-
involved the sale to the private sector of steel Longos, 
companies that had previously been State-
59 F — Perrier 
147. On 27 April, the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) ruled on two cases, one brought by the 
employees of Perrier and the other by the 
employees of Vittel and Pierval against the 
Commission's decision of 22 July 1992 in the 
case Nestlé/Perrier. The Commission had 
approved the concentration with conditions and 
obligations. The principal points of the judg-
ments were as follows: 
(i) while recognizing that the Merger Regula-
tion is concerned primarily with questions 
of competition, the CFI concluded that this 
does not preclude the Commission from 
taking into account the social effects of a 
concentration if these affect the level or 
conditions of employment at the level of the 
European Community or a substantial part 
of it; 
(ii) the fact that a third party has not directly 
intervened in the course of the administra-
tive procedure does not in all cases exclude 
that third party from being entitled to chal-
lenge the decision; 
(iii) the representatives of the workers of a com-
pany are not, in principle, directly con-
cerned by a merger procedure and so are 
not entitled to request the annulment of a 
decision, except to protect their procedural 
rights; 
(iv) third parties do not have the right to be 
treated in the same way as the parties to the 
concentration in the administrative proce-
dure. 
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G — Statistical overview 
Graph 4 
Number of final decisions adopted each year since 1990 
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Graph 5 
Breakdown for 1995 by type of operation 














61 Graph 6 
Country of origin of the enterprise involved in the operations in 1995 
Breakdown of enterprises by country of origin 
(for 1995; in cases where a final decision was taken) 
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62 IV — STATE AID 
A — General policy 
148. In July, the Commission published its 
fourth survey on State aid in the Community' 
covering 1991 and 1992. The survey is an essen-
tial quantitative instrument in defining aid pol-
icy. The trend recorded in the period 1981-90 
showing a slow but steady fall in total aid has 
continued, despite the high costs of German 
unification, recession and stronger international 
competition. However, total aid granted remains 
high, with an average of ECU 94 billion a year 
for the Community as a whole or 1.9% of its 
GDP and ECU 704 per person employed. In 
November, the Industry Council met and 
approved the Commission's analysis indicating 
that, while taking account of other Community 
objectives, it was necessary to continue to 
reduce aid levels by strengthening control 
mechanisms and improving their transparency. 
149. The obligation to notify aid imposed by 
the Treaty is central to aid transparency. In a 
communication adopted in May, the Commis-
sion stated that it intended to use all the powers 
it had under the Treaty to compel Member 
States to comply with that obligation. By pub-
lishing a communication on cooperation 
between the Commission and national courts, it 
demonstrated its will to assist national courts 
in their role of protecting the rights of firms 
affected by illegal aid that has been granted to 
competitors. 
150. The publication of guidelines and commu-
nications defining the criteria applied by the 
Commission in assessing the compatibility of 
State aid with the common market is another 
important feature of the Commission's policy of 
transparency and simplification. All instruments 
in force at 31 December 1994, including the 
manual of procedures and a list of Court of Jus-
tice judgments, have been collected in a single 
volume entitled 'Competition law in the Euro-
pean Communities. Volume II: Rules applicable 
to State aid'. However, as the rules have accu-
mulated over the years, it would be desirable to 
consolidate certain instruments and revise oth-
ers. Those on regional aid are therefore being 
consolidated, and the Commission has adopted 
a new framework on research and development 
aid, which was discussed at a multilateral meet-
ing between the Commission and Member 
States' experts in April. At that meeting, there 
was also a discussion on the criteria for distin-
guishing between State aid and the 'general' 
measures not covered by Article 92(1), and the 
problems of aid granted in connection with the 
sale of publicly-owned land and in the form of 
loan guarantees. A detailed questionnaire on 
State guarantees was sent to all Member States. 
757. Two other multilateral meetings were held 
in 1995. In July, Member States' experts re-
viewed the de minimis rule and the guidelines 
on State aid for small and medium-sized enter-
prises, as well as draft guidelines on State aid to 
the arts and cultural activities, especially the 
audiovisual sector. In December, they examined 
the future control of aid to the synthetic fibres 
industry and a first draft for a horizontal frame-
work on regional aid for major investment plans 
and the problems of defining and collecting the 
reference and discount rates that are crucial to 
calculating aid. 
752. Over the year, the Commission took a 
record number of State aid decisions, partly 
because of the accession of three new Member 
States. Much of the aid examined was intended 
to offset the social consequences of restructur-
ing in certain sectors. The Commission is also 
endeavouring to increase control of aid in sec-
tors that have traditionally been protected from 
international competition and less obvious 
forms of aid that have often escaped checks in 
the past. Because firms are increasingly sensi-
tive to aid granted to their competitors and are 
better informed about the opportunities for fair 
competition afforded them by the Community 
competition rules has resulted in their submit-
ting more and more complaints to the Commis-
sion and more appeals to the Court of First 
Instance against Commission decisions to 
approve aid to their competitors. 
New measures to enforce compliance 
with the notification requirement 
153. The Commission continued its efforts to 
enforce compliance with the requirement that 
Member States notify all plans to grant State 
Fourth Commission Survey on State aid in the European Union 
in the manufacturing and certain other sectors, COM(95) 365 
final.  63 aid. Experience has shown that this obligation, 
provided for in Article 93(3), must, if it is to be 
effective, be accompanied by a package of 
incentives or, if necessary, penalties. 
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1. Recovery of illegal aid 
154. Again the Commission emphasized the 
importance it attaches to the system of prior 
control of aid plans and the concrete expression 
of the system, i.e. the rule that prior notification 
must be given. Thus, in May, it adopted a com-
munication' that details the principles it intends 
to apply in ensuring compliance with its policy 
on the recovery of aid granted in breach of that 
obligation. 
The communication forms part of a wider 
movement aimed firstly at ensuring that Mem-
ber States comply more strictly with Article 
93(3) of the EC Treaty and, secondly, at encour-
aging economic operators to be more vigilant 
about the lawfulness of the aid granted to them. 
The Commission had already tackled the matter 
before when it sought the recovery of incom-
patible and unlawful aid,
2 a position upheld and 
indeed strengthened by the Court of Justice.' 
More recently, the Court of First Instance again 
upheld Commission policy in this area. In its 
judgment of 13 September in joined cases 
T-244/93 and T-486/93, Textilwerke Deggen-
dorf GmbH ν Commission, the CFI upheld the 
Commission's decision to make its authoriza-
tion of a new aid package subject to a suspen-
sion of the payment of that aid, until a prior aid 
to the same company which had been declared 
incompatible had been recovered, because it 
was clear from the Commission's decision that 
the cumulation of the incompatible aid and the 
new aid package would render the totality of the 
aid incompatible. 
However, in terms of its effectiveness, such 
temporary suspension was of limited usefulness 
inasmuch as it would not have any immediate 
effect on the part (or all) of the aid already paid. 
These means were therefore not sufficient to 
tackle and settle the problem of potential distor-
tion of competition, the effects of which could 
continue until the final Commission decision. 
Even if they repay the aid eventually, firms 
benefitting from illegal aid nevertheless con-
tinue to have an edge over their competitors, 
either in financial terms or by having a longer 
period of solvency in the case of firms in crisis. 
This is the problem the Commission communi-
cation seeks to tackle. It stipulates that, in cer-
tain cases, the Commission reserves the right, 
after having given the Member State concerned 
notice to submit its views and to consider rescue 
aid instead, to require the Member State by 
means of a temporary order to recover all or part 
of the aid granted in breach of the Treaty. 
Recovery must comply with the provisions of 
domestic law and interest must be charged from 
the time the aid was paid. Another new point is 
that interest is calculated not on the basis of the 
legal rate but according to the commercial rate, 
i.e. the reference rate used by the Commission 
in connection with regional aid.
4 If a Member 
State failed to comply with such an order, the 
Commission might apply to the Court of Justice 
for interim measures by a procedure similar to 
that provided for in the second subparagraph of 
Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty. 
2. Cooperation between the Commis-
sion and national courts 
755. In October, with the same aim of increas-
ing observance of legality in the Community, 
the Commission adopted a notice on coopera-
tion between national courts and the Commis-
sion in the State aid field.
5 It is not binding or 
limiting but seeks to give fresh impetus to rela-
tions between the Community executive and 
national courts and to draw courts' attention to 
the important role that they can play in the 
prompt safeguarding of the rights of third par-
ties and securing compliance by Member States 
with certain procedural obligations. The notice 
thus clearly forms part of the general trend 
described in the preceding point. 
The notice points out that, while the Commis-
sion is the Community body responsible for 
OJC 156, 27.6.1995, p. 5. 
Commission communication on aids granted illegally (OJ C 318, 
24.11.1983). 
Judgment of 21 March 1990, in Case C 142/87 Royaume de Bel-
gique ν Commission (Tubemeuse) [1990] ECR 1-959. Judgment 
of 14 February 1990, in Case C 301/87 République française ν 
Commission (Boussac) [1990] ECR 1-307. 
See Commission communication to the Member Stales, letter 
SG(95) D/1971 of 22.2.1995. The Court of First Instance very 
recently confirmed that the Commission could seek the payment 
of interest on sums recovered: Judgment of 8 June 1995, in Case 
Τ 459/93 Siemens SA, [ 1995] ECR 11-1675. 
OJC 312, 23.11.1995, p. 8. IV — STATE AID 
implementing and developing competition poli-
cy in the Community's public interest, national 
courts do no more than preserve, until the final 
decision of the Commission, the rights of indi-
viduals faced with a possible breach by State 
authorities of the prohibition laid down by the 
last sentence of Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty.' 
To that end, national courts are invited to use all 
appropriate devices and remedies and apply all 
relevant provisions of national law and, in par-
ticular, to grant interim relief, by ordering the 
freezing or returning of monies illegally paid, or 
awarding damages to parties whose interests are 
harmed. 
In order to attain these objectives more effi-
ciently, the Commission intends to assist nation-
al courts by instituting closer cooperation, 
notably by: 
(i) pursuing and improving its policy of trans-
parency by publishing information on State 
aid; 
(ii) supplying information of a procedural 
nature on pending cases; 
(iii) supplying factual, statistical and analytical 
information. 
Judgment of 21 November 1991, Case C 354/90 Fédération 
nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires et 
Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon 
contre Etat français, [1991] ECR 1-5527, paragraph 14.  65 66 
Β — Concept of aid 
756. Interpreting the concept of aid as set out in 
the Treaties is often the most difficult part of the 
Commission's assessment of aid measures. The 
criteria for determining the presence of aid in 
measures taken by the Member States with 
regard to their enterprises are of particular 
importance not only to the administrative 
authorities of the Member States responsible for 
notifying them but also to the national courts 
which may have to determine whether a con-
tested measure should have been notified. Sev-
eral Commission decisions taken in 1995 help 
to define the concept of aid provided for in the 
competition rules. 
757. (a) For Article 92( 1 ) to apply, the measure 
must have provided a firm with an economic 
advantage which it would not have received in 
the normal course of business. The Commission 
considers that this condition would be met if a 
company were to acquire publicly-owned land 
or a publicly-owned industrial site at a price 
lower than the market price. It therefore decid-
ed to initiate the Article 93(2) procedure in 
respect of the acquisition by the company 
Siemens Nixdorf AG/Mainz of a publicly-
owned site at a price estimated to be between 
DM 5.5 million and 21.5 million lower than the 
market price. The same reasoning would apply 
if the State were to acquire land from a comp-
any at a price higher than the market price. As 
the Commission had doubts whether the price 
for the land sold by the Spanish steel company 
Tubacex to the public authorities corresponded 
to the market value, it decided to initiate the 
Article 93(2) procedure. 
75& Public financing of costs inherent in the 
preparation of a building/industrial site and in 
providing connections to various (public) utility 
services does not fall under Article 92(1 ) if the 
company pays for the use of the infrastructure 
through direct or indirect charges. Since prepa-
ration of the site in Villey, Meurthe-et-Moselle, 
for setting-up a new production plant by the 
paper company Kimberly-Clark benefited this 
company alone, in particular because it is the 
owner and sole user of the installations put in 
place, the partial public financing provided con-
stituted an aid to that company. In this context, 
the Commission also took into consideration 
that a private market investor would not have 
carried out this preparation since the selling 
price for the site did not even cover partial 
financing of it. 
759. Public funds provided to a (public) under-
taking on terms more favourable than those on 
which a private investor operating under normal 
market conditions would provide them to a pri-
vate firm in a comparable financial and compet-
itive position constitute State aid. In cases 
where the State's acquisition of a holding in a 
company may be combined with other types of 
public intervention which need to be notified to 
the Commission pursuant to Article 93(3), there 
is a presumption that State aid may be involved. 
In accordance with its communication on the 
application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC 
Treaty to public authorities' holdings,' the Com-
mission asked the Spanish Government to 
inform it in advance of any acquisition made by 
the Institute for the Development of Andalusia. 
Because the intended capital injection by the 
Land of Bavaria to cover the accumulated losses 
of the steel undertakings Neue Maxhütte 
Stahlwerke GmbH and Lech-Stahlwerke GmbH 
would coincide with the sale of its shares in 
these companies, thereby removing any 
prospect of profitability from the provision of 
these funds even in the long term, the Commis-
sion decided that these capital injections consti-
tuted State aid. For similar reasons, it decided 
that the capital injections made by the Italian 
State through its industrial holding company 
ENI into the fertilizer company Enichem Agri-
cultura S.p.A. in the period 1991-94 constituted 
State aid, as the capital injections were made 
before a restructuring plan had been set up sole-
ly to prevent the company from going bankrupt 
and thus without any prospect of a reasonable 
return. Moreover, the Commission considered 
that, under the circumstances, the period during 
which the company had suffered heavy losses, 
i.e. five years, was too long to have been accept-
able to a private market investor who would 
have liquidated or thoroughly restructured the 
company much earlier. The capital injections to 
be made in the context of a restructuring plan 
set up at a later stage therefore also constituted 
State aid and the Commission considered the 
positive results expected from implementation 
See Commission communication of 1983. Bulletin EC 9-1984, 
points 3.4 and 4.4. IV — STATE AID 
of the plan to be too low compared with the total 
injection of new capital. 
However, if a capital injection by the State into 
a company is accompagnied by an injection of 
capital by a private investor on equal terms and 
if the private investor's holding in the company 
has real economic significance, the Commis-
sion considers that no aid is involved in the pub-
lic intervention. It therefore decided that the 
capital injection and loans provided by the 
authorities of Wallonia (Belgium) to the textile 
company EM-Filature were based on normal 
commercial considerations and did not consti-
tute State aid since this intervention went hand-
in-hand with an injection of capital by private 
shareholders making them majority sharehold-
ers in the company and since private sharehold-
ers offered loans on similar terms. For similar 
reasons, the Commission considered that the 
injection of capital by the Portuguese State into 
the ship repair company Lisnave in connection 
with a restructuring of the company did not 
involve State aid under Article 92(1). 
liquidation in Germany. Similarly, it took the 
view that the suspension of debt repayments in 
favour of the Spanish steel company Tubacex 
did not, in itself, constitute State aid, but a gen-
eral measure taken within the framework of 
Spanish insolvency legislation generally applic-
able to all companies. However, it also follows 
from the above criteria that, if the effect of the 
objective requirements under a scheme open to 
all firms is that only certain undertakings may 
benefit from the measure, the Commission con-
siders State aid to be involved. 
If a measure is applicable to all undertakings 
but confers discretionary power on the authori-
ties administering the measure, State aid may 
also be involved. Therefore, the Commission 
considered that a Finnish employment aid 
scheme available to all firms in every sector of 
the industry and every region of the country 
nevertheless involved State aid since the labour 
market authorities had discretion as to the level 
of aid and the length of the subsidized period for 
each unemployed person taken on by a firm. 
760. (b) Under Article 92(1) aid must be 
granted to certain undertakings (or the produc-
tion of certain goods) to constitute State aid. 
General measures of economic, tax or social 
policy do not fall within Article 92(1) and com-
petitive advantages for firms in one Member 
State arising from differences in such general 
policy measures must be addressed, if neces-
sary, under the appropriate procedure laid down 
in Articles 101 and 102. 
Therefore, Article 92(1) does not apply to gen-
eral measures applicable to all undertakings in a 
Member State and satisfying objective and non-
discriminatory requirements. In the light of 
these considerations, the Commission consid-
ered that aid granted by the German Govern-
ment to employees of the firm Maschinenfabrik 
Sangerhausen GmbH to cover social security 
obligations in connection with the liquidation of 
the firm did not constitute State aid, since the 
aid is automatically available to any firm in 
767. (c) The financial benefit to certain under-
takings must be granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in order to constitute 
State aid under Article 92(1), which applies to 
aid granted by any central, regional or local 
authority and any public or private body estab-
lished or appointed by the State to administer 
the aid.' Even if an aid is not granted through a 
body established or appointed by the State, State 
aid may be involved if the financial contribution 
to the recipient firm(s) is made by the State. 
762. (d) The aid must be capable of affecting 
trade perceptibly between Member States. The 
Commission considered this condition to be met 
in respect of aid to the German company Leuna-
Werke GmbH even though the company does 
not export goods to other Member States, since 
the aid may enable it to increase its production 
for the domestic market and thus reduce the 
potential market there for goods imported from 
other Member States. 
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 78/76 Sleinike und 
Weinlig ν Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1977] 
ECR 575.  67 68 
C — Assessment of compatibility of 
aid with the common market 
1. Sectoral aid 
1.1. Sectors subject to specific rules 
1.1.1. Aid to shipbuilding 
765. On 21 December, the Council adopted 
Regulation (EC) No 3094/95' implementing an 
OECD agreement with respect to normal com-
petitive conditions in commercial shipbuilding 
and ship repair, including the elimination of 
production subsidies. The new regulation will 
apply as from the entry into force of the OECD 
agreement. This was scheduled for 1 January 
1996 but, although the European Union ratified 
the agreement in December, entry into force 
was unfortunately delayed because of delays in 
ratification by other parties to the agreement. 
The Council therefore decided that the rules of 
the seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding
2 
should continue to apply ad interim but not 
beyond 1 October 1996. If the OECD agree-
ment has still not entered into force by 1 June 
1996, the Commission will put forward appro-
priate proposals to the Council so that it can 
decide future policy before 1 October 1996. 
Against this background, the Commission 
decided to maintain from 1 January 1996 the 
common production aid ceiling at 9% for large 
vessels and 4.5% for vessels costing less than 
ECU 10 million and for conversions. 
1.1.2. Steel 
164. During 1995, the Commission continued 
to be vigilant in applying the steel aid code.' 
This strict enforcement of the aid rules resulted 
in a number of negative decisions being taken, 
including ordering of the recovery of aid il-
legally granted. 
In November and December, respectively, the 
Council gave its unanimous assent to special 
derogations under Article 95 ECSC relating to 
production and closure aid for iron-ore mining 
in Austria and the privatization of the public 
steel company in Ireland. 
Close monitoring of six previous Article 95 
ECSC cases (Ilva in Italy, C57 and Sidenor in 
Spain, EKO Stahl and SEW Freital in Germany, 
and Siderurgia Nacional in Portugal) was main-
tained with half-yearly reports being submitted 
to the Council. 
In March, the Commission proposed that the 
provisions of the steel aid code relating to aid 
for environmental protection should be brought 
into line with the revised Community guidelines 
on State aid for environmental protection under 
the EC Treaty to ensure that the steel industry 
enjoyed equal treatment with other industrial 
sectors. The Council's assent is still awaited. 
1.1.3. Coal 
765. Decision No 3632/93/ECSC
4 of 28 
December 1993 establishes the Community 
rules for State aid to the coal industry covering 
the period from 1994 until 2002. 
On 4 April, the Commission authorized
5 finan-
cial assistance totalling ECU 3 384.2 million 
that had been planned by Germany for 1995 in 
the form of compensation to the electricity gen-
erators under the Third Law on electricity pro-
duced from Community coal, aid for maintain-
ing the underground workforce in mines 
('Bergmannsprämie'), and aid to cover the 
exceptional costs of a number of coal undertak-
ings resulting from inherited liabilities. 
On 19 July, the Commission delivered a posi-
tive opinion on a restructuring plan submitted 
by the French authorities and authorized aid" 
totalling ECU 912.8 million to cover operating 
losses for 1994, aid to cover inherited liabilities 
resulting from the modernization, rationaliza-
tion and restructuring of the coal industry and 
aid for research and development. On the same 
occasion, the Commission approved additional 
German aid totalling ECU 196.9 million for the 
supply of coking coal and coke for the Commu-
nity steel industry.
7 
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On 26 July, the Commission authorized' France 
to grant aid totalling ECU 668.1 million to cov­
er operating losses for 1995, aid to cover inher­
ited liabilities resulting from the modernization, 
rationalization and restructuring of the coal 
industry and aid for research and development. 
The Commission authorization for the United 
Kingdom to grant aid totalling ECU 2 594.4 
million for inherited liabilities in 1995 was con­
tained in the Commission Decision of 
3 November 1994.
2 
Notifications of aid for 1995 have been received 
from the Portuguese and Spanish authorities 
and an additional notification has been received 
from the German authorities. These are all 
being examined by the Commission depart­
ments to determine their compatibility or other­
wise with Decision 3632/93/ECSC. 
1.1.4. Motor vehicle industry 
766. By its judgment of 29 June 1995,
1 the 
Court of Justice ruled in respect of the last Com­
mission's decision extending the EC framework 
on State aid to the motor vehicle industry for an 
unlimited period that it had ceased to apply on 
1 January 1995. To avoid any legal vacuum that 
the judgment might create, the Commission had 
to take extraordinary action and, on 5 July, 
decided to extend the framework retroactively 
from 1 January 1995 and, at the same time, 
proposing to the Member States that the frame­
work be reintroduced for a two-year period 
starting no later than 1 January 1996. 
Subsequently, the Spanish Government ap­
pealed to the Court against the Commission's 
decision to extend the framework retroactively 
and, unlike all other Member States, also 
refused to accept the proposal to reintroduce it 
for a two-year period. Following the refusal, the 
Commission was obliged to initiate the Article 
93(2) procedure in order to examine the com­
patibility of all aid schemes which might bene­
fit the motor vehicle industries in Spain. On 20 
December, it adopted a final decision com­
pelling Spain to comply — in the same way as 
the other Member States — with the require­
ments of the newly reintroduced framework. 
On the basis of its decision of 5 July, the Com­
mission continued to apply the framework dur­
ing 1995. It received nine notifications on the 
basis of approved schemes and two notifica­
tions on the basis of ad hoc schemes. It adopted 
a decision approving notified aid in six cases. It 
also took an interim decision enjoining the Ger­
man Government to provide within a fixed 
deadline all the infonnation necessary to allow 
an assessment of aid to the new projects of VW 
Sachsen, which were not covered by a previous 
1994 decision.
4 
767. In assessing individual awards based on 
regional aid schemes (e.g. FORD Genk), the 
Commission continued to apply its criterion 
whereby regional aid in this sector should be in 
proportion to the actual regional handicaps aris­
ing for an investor. However, it should be noted 
that, on average, it has allowed higher aid inten­
sities for motor vehicle manufacturers carrying 
out investment projects in the least-developed 
regions of the EU. 
768. As regards rescue and restructuring aid, 
the Commission adopted final decisions on the 
cases concerning DAF Belgium, DAF Nether­
lands and SEAT-Volkswagen. These decisions 
implied, pursuant to the existing regulations, a 
recovery of part of the aid in the case of bank­
rupt DAF and a significant reduction of produc­
tion capacity in the case of SEAT. Furthermore, 
the Commission decided to initiate proceedings 
under Article 93(2) against aid granted by the 
Spanish authorities to Santana Motor S.A. 
769. In assessing aid for research and develop­
ment the Commission, while recognizing the 
potential beneficial effects of R&D activity on 
economic development, takes into considera­
tion the risk of distortions of competition and 
ensures that such aid is granted only to projects 
that are genuinely innovative at a European 
level. It also verifies that the maximum intensi­
ties laid down in the Community framework on 
aid for R&D are adhered to. As these conditions 
were fulfilled in the Opel Austria and Ford 
Valencia cases, the Commission approved the 
aid proposed for these projects. 
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point  69 770. Both cases also involved aid for invest-
ment projects to reduce environmental pollu-
tion. In line with the motor vehicle framework 
and the guidelines on State aid for environmen-
tal protection, such aid can be approved only if 
it is to cover extra investment costs necessary to 
reduce or eliminate pollution or to adapt pro-
duction methods in order to protect the environ-
ment and only if the limits of aid intensity speci-
fied, i.e. 15% for projects complying with new 
standards and 30% for projects significantly 
exceeding standards or for voluntary measures, 
are not exceeded. In both the Opel Austria and 
the Ford Valencia cases, as well as in the Ford 
Genk case mentioned earlier, these conditions 
were fulfilled with the result that the Commis-
sion approved the proposed aid. 
777. In several past cases, the Commission has 
required the national authorities to monitor the 
realization of eligible investment and asked the 
Member States to send annual reports on the 
investments carried out and the aid payments 
made. Practice has shown the importance of 
such a follow-up procedure, bearing in mind 
that the execution of large multiannual invest-
ment projects leads to many changes which 
might require modification of the aid payments. 
In the course of 1995, this ex post control was 
exercised in the Ford/VW Setúbal and Fiat Mez-
zogiorno cases as well as in the Chrysler and 
SNF cases in Austria, where the European 
Union had reached agreement on aid reductions 
with the Austrian authorities. In its NedCar 
decision, the Commission required the Dutch 
authorities to notify the rules on the allocation 
of costs between the old and new models, so 
that it could ensure that no aid was granted to 
Volvo and Mitsubishi on the basis of inadequate 
rules.' The analysis of the cost allocation rules 
for 1994 and 1995 showed that they did not con-
tain elements of State aid. Finally, in the case of 
restructuring aid for Rover, which dates from a 
period prior to the establishment of the frame-
work, and in the case of regional aid for Opel 
Eisenach the ex post monitoring was terminated 
after all the conditions of the decisions had been 
fulfilled. 
code on aid to the synthetic fibres industry. In 
April the Commission asked an independent 
consultant to assess the code's effects and, if 
supplementary control were still considered 
necessary, advise what form it should take. The 
consultant reported in October and the Com-
mission will decide what action to take early in 
1996. Also in April, the Commission extended 
the period of validity of the current code
2 for a 
further nine months to 31 March 1996.' 
1.1.6. Transport 
7 73. The year has seen a substantial increase in 
the number of aid cases in the transport sector 
(from 29 to 52). At the same time, cases have 
become increasingly complex and the scope for 
enforcement of Articles 92 and 93 has expand-
ed. As the liberalization of transport markets 
progresses, commercial pressure increases on 
operators across the board. The forthcoming 
completion of civil aviation liberalization will 
include cabotage rights for European carriers 
from March 1997. The recently approved Direc-
tives on infrastructure charges and track access 
in the railway sector follow on from Directive 
91/440, which is also being extended to intra-
State lines in the shipping industry. These are 
but a few examples of the progress being made 
towards a single market for transport services. 
774. As commercial operations move into new 
areas, control of financial support from the 
State must be stepped up to preserve a level 
playing-field for all enterprises, both public and 
private. In transport cases, no advantage that 
reduces the costs normally included in the cost 
structure of an undertaking and stems from a 
State measure should be authorized unless it 
responds to the need for coordination of trans-
port or represents reimbursement for the dis-
charge of public service obligations. In addi-
tion, the development of transport as an eco-
nomic activity or a concrete project of common 
European interest might qualify for exemption. 
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1.1.5. Synthetic fibres industry 
772. Since 1977, aid to this industry has been 
subject to supplementary control through the 
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775. In the course of the year, the Commission 
departments were consulted on several cases 
(Ferrovie dello Stato, fixed Öresund link) by 
Member States in order to clarify whether pub-
lic investment in infrastructure could be consid-
ered State aid. Governments have always used 
financial intervention as an essential tool in 
their policy of infrastructure development. In 
principle, as long as access and usage remain 
public and general, such intervention will not 
constitute aid within the meaning of Article 
92(1) but will be normally regarded as being in 
the public interest. For there to be a distortion 
that might qualify as aid, the infrastructure-
related advantages, should be conferred selec-
tively, with the aim of helping specific firms: 
for example, a purpose-built facility for the sole 
use of one undertaking or discriminatory access 
restrictions. 
In economic terms, public authorities normally 
provide these goods and services because of the 
inability of the price system to do so effective-
ly. Goods such as infrastructures tend to be indi-
visible and collectively consumable by all citi-
zens whether they pay for them or not. Such a 
public good provided by government benefits 
society in a collective manner and is not con-
ferred upon any specific enterprise or industry 
(principle of non excludability). Consequently, 
public support for infrastructure will not nor-
mally constitute aid, but rather a general meas-
ure derived from the State's sovereignty in 
respect of economic policy, land planning and 
development. 
776 Various complaints submitted during the 
year claimed the existence of State support for 
ports. The question arises whether financial 
backing for port activities can be examined in 
the context of Article 92. 
777. In relation to civil aviation, the Commis-
sion based its decisions concerning State aid on 
the principles developed in the new guidelines 
adopted in November 1994.' These take account 
of the increasingly competitive nature of the 
market for air transport services after the entry 
into force of the third liberalization package in 
1993. In 1994, the Commission authorized the 
granting of restructuring aid to be paid in instal-
ments in favour of TAP and Air France. In both 
cases, the Commission's approval was made 
subject to the correct fulfilment of a list of com-
mitments and restructuring plans. Then in 1995, 
with the assistance of independent experts, the 
Commission monitored compliance. In view of 
the satisfactory fulfilment of both elements by 
TAP
2 and Air France' no objections were raised 
to payment of the second tranches of the aid. 
77& Also in 1994, the Commission decided 
that the subscription by the French public entity 
CDC-P to bonds issued by Air France constitut-
ed illegal aid, incompatible with the common 
market, and requested its reimbursement. In 
October 1994, France and Air France chal-
lenged the Commission decision before the 
Court of First Instance. The Commission then 
decided on 4 April 1995
4 to amend its original 
decision, and to request France to ensure that 
the aid and interest on arrears are deposited in a 
blocked bank account until the Court delivers a 
final ruling. The economic rationale of this 
mechanism is to deprive Air France of the use of 
the money corresponding to the aid, pending 
Court proceedings. 
779. On 4 May 1995,
5 the Commission 
analysed the financial transactions involved in 
an agreement between Swissair and Sabena, 
aimed at the acquisition by the former of a 
strategic stake (49.5%) of Sabena. The opera-
tion implied the issue by Sabena of new shares 
for BFR 9.5 billion, BFR 6 billion being sub-
scribed by Swissair and the remaining part by 
Belgium and a group of Belgian investors. The 
Commission recalled that when the public hold-
ing in a company is to be increased, the capital 
injection will not involve State aid provided that 
the public investment goes together with the 
injection of a significant amount of capital by a 
private shareholder. Swissair's subscription of 
new shares at the same price and under the same 
conditions as Belgium and the Belgian investors 
was accepted as evidence that the operation was 
a normal financial transaction and not State aid. 
750. On 10 May 1995, the European Commis-
sion decided not to raise objections to plans by 
the German Government to contribute to pen-
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sion funds in favour of Lufthansa employees as 
part of the company's privatization programme 
initiated in 1992. The measures were linked to 
the charges imposed on Lufthansa following its 
compulsory withdrawal from a supplementary 
pension fund managed by the public entity VBL 
to which, as a public company, it had been 
obliged to belong. The Commission considered 
that a private investor in the same position as 
the German State, obliged to relinquish the con-
trol of Lufthansa, would have acted in the same 
way in order to maximize the final value of its 
stake. 
757. On 19 July 1995, the Commission 
analysed a capital injection of FF 300 million 
into the company AOM by its parent State-
owned company Credit Lyonnais. The Commis-
sion, having analysed the restructuring plan of 
the airline, reached the conclusion that AOM 
was likely to return to profitability in the near 
future and that the net present value of future 
cash-flows was higher than that of the invest-
ment. The operation was considered to amount 
to a normal financial transaction and not State 
aid, since a market economy private investor in 
the same circumstances would have made the 
investment in AOM. 
7¿?2. On 29 November 1995, the Commission 
adopted a final negative decision concerning the 
exceptional mechanism of depreciation of air-
craft registered in Germany and used for inter-
national commercial activities. In certain cir-
cumstances, the scheme allowed for an excep-
tional depreciation of up to 30% of the total 
acquisition cost. The Commission considered 
that the scheme amounted to an aid and that it 
could not fall within the second and third para-
graphs of Article 92. 
755. Likewise, the Commission took a number 
of decisions in cases involving aid to the mar-
itime sector. The Commission's 1989 guidelines 
on the examination of State aid to Community 
shipping companies is currently under review in 
the context of an overall reappraisal of Commu-
nity maritime transport policy. The results of 
this exercise will be presented by the Commis-
sion in a strategy discussion document on which 
the European institutions, the Member States 
and other interested parties will be invited to 
comment. 
754. In particular, the Commission decided that 
an agreement between Spanish regional and 
local authorities in the Basque Country and Fer-
ries Golfo de Viscaya, concerning a ferry ser-
vice between Bilbao and Portsmouth did not 
contain State aid elements. The final decision, 
following the opening of the procedure under 
Article 93.2 of the Treaty, was taken on 6 June 
1995. 
755. Serious doubts were raised about the com-
patibility of aid granted to the French State-
owned shipping company Compagnie Générale 
Maritime (CGM) with the Treaty. The Commis-
sion decided on 31 October 1995, and later on 
20 December 1995, to initiate and extend 
respectively, the Article 93.2 procedure. The 
aid amounts to approximately ECU 330 million. 
756. The Commission also examined several 
cases of State aid in the road transport sector, 
taking particular account of the gradual liberal-
ization of cabotage since 1 January 1995' 
which entails the opening-up of local markets to 
Community competition. 
757. On 18 August, the Commission brought 
an action before the Court of Justice against 
Italy for not having taken the necessary meas-
ures to comply with the Commission Decision 
of 9 June 1993, which declared a tax credit for 
professional road hauliers in Italy incompatible 
with the common market and ordered the Italian 
authorities to recover the sums paid. 
In addition, the scheme, which had been 
deemed to be operating aid and had initially 
been scheduled for the 1992 tax year, was 
extended by the Italian authorities to 1993 and 
1994, with a budget of ECU 558 million. On 4 
October, the Commission decided to initiate 
Article 93(2) proceedings in respect of the 
extensions and called for the immediate suspen-
sion of the aid. 
755. In the area of inland waterways, the struc-
tural reorganization aimed at reducing existing 
overcapacity by scrapping vessels that was 
begun in 1990 on the basis of Council Regula-
1 Council Regulation No 3118/93 (OJ L 279, 12.11.1993). IV — STATE AID 
tion (EEC) No 1101/89 of 27 April 1989 is still 
under way. In view of the amount of excess 
capacity, the Commission presented a proposed 
amendment of the abovementioned Regulation 
to the Council on 23 May, recommending 
extensive scrapping in the period 1996-98, part-
financed by the Community, the Member States 
concerned and the trade. This action is an 
important measure accompanying the gradual 
liberalization of the waterway-transport market 
which was also advocated by the Commission 
in a proposal of 23 May 1995. 
759. In the course of 1995, some operations 
undertaken by railway companies were exam-
ined by the Commission in the light of Articles 
92 and 93. In relation to the UK sale of the rail-
way rolling-stock companies (ROSCOs) the 
Commission decided on 29 November that the 
guarantees provided to the purchasers maxi-
mized the sale profit and therefore do not con-
stitute State aid. 
Similarly, on 18 October 1995, the Commission 
decided that, a State guarantee in favour of Fer-
rovie dello Stato S.p.A., issued by the Italian 
government for a loan of ECU 372 million to 
railway infrastructure investments in the high 
speed train link Brenner-Verona, did not consti-
tute State aid. 
797. Generally speaking, the Commission 
opposes any State aid relating to support meas-
ures that would be liable to upset the Commu-
nity market machinery and which, as operating 
aid, would not have any lasting effect on the 
development of the sector in question. 
792. As regards investment aid in the primary 
production sector and, in particular, pursuant to 
Article 12(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2328/91 on improving the efficiency of agricul-
tural structures' the assessment of Community 
and State aid should, as far as possible, be car-
ried out in conjunction with a parallel assess-
ment of the cases within the periods stipulated 
for State aid; this procedure would make it pos-
sible to send only one letter to the Member State 
concerned, under both Articles 92 and 93 of the 
Treaty and Regulation No 2328/91. 
795. As regards aid to investments in improv-
ing the processing and marketing of agricultural 
products, Community policy is laid down by 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 866/90.
2 This 
Regulation also authorizes Member States to 
establish aid measures, under various condi-
tions, in accordance with Articles 92 and 93 of 
the Treaty. However, this facility is limited by 
the selection criteria provided for in the Regula-
tion, applied by the Commission by analogy to 
the assessment of State aid. 
1.1.7. Agriculture 
790. The accession of three new Member States 
(Austria, Sweden, Finland) brought about some 
change in the situation regarding State aid in 
agriculture. The Act of Accession established a 
specific procedure for each new Member State 
for aid existing at the time of accession and for 
a given transitional period. In accordance with 
the Act of Accession, the new Member States 
informed the Commission by 30 April of all 
existing agricultural aid schemes within the 
meaning of Article 93(1) of the Treaty. On 13 
February, the Commission adopted two deci-
sions approving the Austrian and Finnish pro-
grammes for the implementation of Articles 138 
to 140 of the Act of Accession, which provide 
for the granting of transitional, degressive 
national aid for agricultural products. The deci-
sions were subsequently modified to take 
account of new factors. 
Until 1994, the selection criteria applicable to 
such investments, known as 'sectoral limits', 
were specified in Commission Decision 
90/342/EEC of 7 June 1990.' This was amend-
ed by Commission Decision 94/183/EEC of 22 
March 1994.
4 In 1994, the Commission 
informed Member States that it would continue 
to apply the sectoral State aid limits provided 
for in point 2 of the Annex to the 1990 Deci-
sion.
5 In 1995, the Commission altered its posi-
tion in order to apply the more favourable lim-
its provided for in the 1994 Decision.
6 Follow-
ing preparatory work with the Member States, 
the Commission adopted
7 the principle of the 
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194. The Commission also adopted the princi-
ple of a review of its policy concerning subsi-
dized operating loans in the agricultural sector.' 
1.1.8. Fisheries 
795. In 1995, the Commission registered 37 
new aid schemes and 20 aid schemes that were 
either not notified or were only notified after 
their adoption, as well as three new cases of 
existing aid. It decided not to object to the aid 
in 22 cases, one of which was started in 1994. It 
also decided to initiate the Article 93(2) proce-
dure in respect of two aid measures, one Italian 
and the other German. In the same period, the 
Commission decided to terminate the Article 
93(2) procedure initiated in respect of an aid 
measure implemented in Italy and notified in 
1993. 
1.2. Specific sectors not subject to 
special rules 
196. For some years Europe has been experi-
encing a major shift towards liberalization, pri-
vatization and the adjustment of national 
monopolies. This trend, together with contin-
ued harmonization of rules at Community level, 
prompted the Commission to study methods of 
applying State aid rules to certain sectors such 
as banking or postal services. Although they are 
in principle subject to the same treatment as any 
other sector (especially the principle of a 'pri-
vate investor in a market economy'), they are 
nevertheless sufficiently different to warrant 
being taken into account by the Commission 
when assessing State aid. 
1.2.1. Banking 
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797. This sector has particular characteristics 
that are chiefly social and statutory (protection 
of savers), macroeconomic and financial (nec-
essary stability of the sector, smooth operation 
of the payments system), political and interna-
tional (possible repercussions in the form of 
'panic' in other establishments in the same 
country or other countries due to the consider-
able interdependence existing in this sector, 
especially in the event of a major institution 
failing). That is why specific authorities are in 
charge of monitoring the sector in the various 
Member States. 
After the Banesto case in 1994, the Crédit Lyon-
nais case is an important example of the way in 
which State aid rules should be applied with a 
view to the particular sensitivity of a sector. In 
terms of the amounts involved, this case is the 
largest yet dealt with by the Commission: the 
total volume of aid was FF 45 billion (ECU 7.5 
billion). In addition, at the end of 1993, Crédit 
Lyonnais was the largest European bank in 
terms of total balance, thus providing an exam-
ple of what happens when a major bank fails, 
with all the downstream consequences for the 
entire financial and banking system in France 
and, indeed, Europe. 
The principle adopted by the Commission, after 
consulting a high-level group of experts, was to 
apply to the banking sector substantive and pro-
cedural rules on State aid, taking account of the 
specificities of banking. Compliance with the 
rules also ensures that credit establishments 
enjoying the implicit or explicit support of the 
State, being either public establishments or too 
important to be allowed to go bankrupt, do not 
act in an imprudent manner. Such an attitude 
would require State assistance and hence lead to 
distortions of competition which could have 
been avoided. Even if State intervention were 
considered necessary to prevent undesirable 
effects on other financial establishments and 
markets, the Commission would wish to ensure 
that the solution chosen would produce the least 
possible distortion of competition. Lastly, major 
counter-concessions will have to be offered by a 
defaulting establishment in order to offset the 
negative effects of State assistance on other 
market operators. That is why the Commission 
eventually decided to approve the aid to Crédit 
Lyonnais conditional on the sale of a large part 
of its international network, on a contribution to 
OJC 44, 16.2.1996, p. 2. IV — STATE AID 
the costs of the hiving-off mechanism in the 
form of a better-fortunes clause, on a clear sep-
aration between Credit Lyonnais and the hived-
off structures and on the probable privatization 
of the bank within five years. 
1.2.2. Postal sector 
795. The Commission regards this as an essen-
tial sector owing to its vital function as a vehi-
cle for the social and economic activities of a 
country. However, it must also take account of 
the fact that the Court of Justice specified that 
the competition rules applied to postal services,
1
 
without prejudice to the principle of Article 
90(2) of the EC Treaty. 
Postal services, especially public or semi-public 
services or those granted special and exclusive 
rights, continue to enjoy a special relationship 
with the State. This is reflected in the benefit of 
direct financial support (grants) or indirect sup-
port (tax relief) usually lacking in transparency. 
On the one hand, the Commission Directive on 
the transparency of financial relations between 
Member States and public undertakings is 
applicable in this area,
2 which entails special 
accounting and financial obligations. On the 
other hand, such direct or indirect financial 
assistance constitutes State aid which the Com-
mission has a duty to monitor, both because of 
the obligation on Member States to notify aid 
plans in advance and because of its obligation to 
keep under constant review all existing systems 
of aid in order to take account of the progressive 
development or functioning of the common 
market. 
The case Activités concurrentielles de la Poste 
française is doubly interesting in this respect 
inasmuch as it deals both with the application of 
the State aid rules (Articles 92 and 93) and with 
the provisions on enterprises entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic inter-
est (Article 90(2)). This case constitutes the first 
combined application of these two provisions 
by the Commission. The latter considered that 
the tax advantages enjoyed by the postal ser-
vices did not outweigh the extra costs resulting 
from the constraints imposed on the French post 
office in carrying out its public service task and 
did not benefit the competitive aspects of its 
activities (i.e. the activities not reserved to the 
post office under French law). The Commission 
therefore decided that the tax advantages did 
not constitute aid under Article 92(1) of the EC 
Treaty. 
1.2.3. The audiovisual sector 
799. The Commission recognizes that the 
European film and television industry makes an 
important contribution to the diversified Euro-
pean culture. Thus, the promotion of cultural 
diversity is accepted by the Commission as a 
justification for State aid to the film industry 
and the production of television programmes. 
However, in its assessment of State aid to the 
audiovisual sector, the Commission will ensure 
that the aid does not cause any undue distortions 
of competition and that there is no discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality or any other 
impediment to the free flow of goods, services, 
people and ideas across the European Union. 
The Commission aims to strike a balance 
between the requirements of cultural and her-
itage promotion and the openness of trade and 
competition in the single market. 
To clarify State aid policy in this field, the Com-
mission is currently preparing guidelines on 
State aid for culture, the arts and the audiovisual 
sector. The guidelines were discussed with 
Member States at a multilateral meeting in June 
and met with general support. 
200. In light of complaints from private TV sta-
tions alleging that public broadcasters receive 
State aid which distorts competition on the TV 
market within the EC, the Commission in 1993 
appointed a firm of consultants to undertake a 
study on the situation, paying particular atten-
tion to the public service obligations imposed 
on public broadcasters, how much they cost and 
how much subsidy the public broadcasters 
receive. In October, the Commission received 
the final report and sent it to Member States for 
comments. In respect of the new Member States 
Judgment of 12 February 1992, Joined Cases C-48 and C-66/90 
Nederland en PTT Nederland and PTT Post ν Commission 
[1992] ECR 1-565; Judgment in Case C-320 Paul Corbeau 
[1993] ECR 1-2563. 
Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980, as amend-
ed by Directive 84/413/EEC (OJ L229, 28.8.1985, p. 20).  75 76 
and the EFTA States, signatories to the EEA 
Agreement, it has issued an invitation to tender 
for a similar study. When it receives the com-
ments of Member States on the first study and 
when the second study is completed, the Com-
mission will consider the cases pending and 
encourage a debate on the way forward. 
2. Horizontal aid 
2.1. Research and development 
201. On 20 December, the Commission 
adopted a new Community framework for State 
aid for research and development. 
The framework in force since 1986 was 
amended in the light of the new competition 
environment both in the Community and inter-
nationally. The revised version takes account of 
the recommendations of the White Paper on 
growth, competitiveness and employment and 
of the consequences of the agreements resulting 
from the multilateral negotiations of the 
Uruguay Round. In addition, the text clarifies 
certain unwritten practices developed by the 
Commission since the 1986 framework entered 
into force. 
Although as a general rule the admissible aid 
level is still 25% for pre-competitive develop-
ment projects that are closer to the market, and 
50% for basic industrial research, 'bonuses' are 
possible for projects involving SMEs (+10 
points), assisted regions (+5 or 10 points) and 
projects tagged as priority in the Community 
R&D framework (+15 points). 
Furthermore, the admissible aid intensity will 
also be increased by 10 points for projects meet-
ing at least one of the following criteria: cross-
frontier cooperation between independent 
firms, broad dissemination of research results, 
cooperation between universities and industry. 
An increase of 25 points will be allowed for 
priority projects under the R&D framework 
which also provide for cross-frontier coopera-
tion between enterprises or between enterprises 
and public research bodies, and broad dissemi-
nation of results. 
This system of bonuses will make it possible to 
adjust the amount of aid that is acceptable on 
the basis of the general interest and which must 
in any event comply with the maximum rates of 
the WTO Subsidies Code. 
To take account of competition outside the 
Community and the new possibilities offered by 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, the new framework provides 
that European firms are eligible for the maxi-
mum aid levels approved by the WTO (50% for 
precompetitive research and 75% for basic 
industrial research) in the following cases: 
overlapping State aid and Community support, 
important projects of common European inter-
est (exemption under Article 92(3)(b)), projects 
and programmes for which similar activities are 
carried out by enterprises outside the European 
Union having benefited (in the last three years) 
or being about to benefit from aid having an 
equivalent intensity at a level accepted by the 
WTO for the same two types of research. 
In the new framework, to lessen the bureau-
cratic burden on Member States and itself, the 
Commission believes, on the basis of experi-
ence, that it is no longer necessary to notify 
annual budget increases of less than 100% of 
the original amount and/or extensions of author-
ized schemes, provided that certain conditions 
are met. 
Aid to an individual project under a research 
and development scheme authorized by the 
Commission need not in principle be notified. 
However, the new framework requires notifica-
tion of large aid grants under existing schemes, 
setting the aid threshold at ECU 5 million and 
project costs at ECU 25 million. 
The revised framework also provides for differ-
ent situations in which public financing of R&D 
conducted by establishments of higher educa-
tion or non-profit-making public research 
bodies, either individually oron behalf of enter-
prises or in collaboration with them, does or 
does not cope within the scope of Article 92( 1 ) 
of the EC Treaty. 
The framework also specifies the factors taken 
into account by the Commission to determine 
whether R&D aid proposed by a Member State 
encourages enterprises to carry out supplemen-
tary research and development in addition to IV — STATE AID 
that which they carry out in the course of their 
normal work (incentive effect of R&D aid). 
For SMEs, it will be assumed that the aid is nec-
essary and acts as an incentive, while in the case 
of large undertakings the Commission will pay 
particular attention in aid cases where the 
research is close to the marketplace. 
2.2. Employment aid and general social 
measures 
202. In 1995, the persistently high unemploy-
ment rate within the Community was the funda-
mental economic and social problem facing the 
Community. In an attempt to remedy this grave 
situation, Member States introduced an increas-
ing number of measures to promote employ-
ment and, in its White Paper on growth, com-
petitiveness and employment, the Commission 
set out various ways of promoting employment 
in harmony with Community competition pol-
icy. 
Most measures taken by Member States under 
their labour market policies are general in 
nature and do not involve aid, either because 
they do not favour certain undertakings or do 
not affect trade between Member States within 
the meaning of Article 92( 1 ) of the EC Treaty. 
For example, under the new Danish energy 
package, which imposes on Danish industry 
new or increased energy taxes (CO: and SO2 
emissions), some of the proceeds of these taxes 
will flow back to the industry in the form of a 
general reduction in labour market contribu-
tions paid by the industry. As all companies 
automatically benefit from this reduction on the 
basis of objective criteria, the Commission did 
not consider this reduction to constitute State 
aid under Article 92(1). 
Only measures that selectively reduce labour 
costs of certain firms or in certain sectors with a 
view to encouraging them to increase their 
labour force, to maintain the level of employ-
ment or to recruit certain categories of unem-
ployed persons distort or threaten to distort 
competition because they favour the beneficia-
ries vis-à-vis their competitors. Accordingly, the 
Commission considered that a Swedish employ-
ment aid scheme available only to firms with 
less than 500 employees constituted State aid in 
favour of those firms to the detriment of com-
petitors with more than 500 employees. 
203. Given the considerable number of aid 
measures to promote employment, the Commis-
sion considered it appropriate to clarify State 
aid policy in this field by way of the employ-
ment aid guidelines.' As regards support meas-
ures for training, the issue will be indirectly 
addressed in the more general guidelines on the 
distinction between State aid and general mea-
sures since measures that support training can in 
many cases be defined as general measures. The 
prime objective of the employment aid guide-
lines is to inform Member States and interested 
parties of the principles the Commission will 
apply in determining the existence and compat-
ibility of employment aid measures with the 
common market and in ensuring coherence 
between the competition rules and the employ-
ment policy measures advocated in the Com-
mission's White Paper on growth, competitive-
ness and employment. The guidelines confirm 
the traditionally positive approach the Commis-
sion has taken towards State aid for job cre-
ation, in particular aid granted to SMEs or firms 
located in regions eligible for regional aid, pro-
vided that the aid leads to a net increase in the 
number of jobs in the firm concerned. Similar-
ly, the Commission normally takes a favourable 
view of aid granted to firms that take on unem-
ployed persons who have particular difficulties 
in finding a permanent job, such as the long-
term unemployed or young people. In its assess-
ment the Commission will also take account of 
possible counterparts offered by the firm for aid 
going beyond the employment of the unem-
ployed, such as training. Moreover, in line with 
the general principles underlying State aid poli-
cy, the Commission will always examine 
whether or not the aid is necessary to take on an 
unemployed person and whether or not it is 
temporary. 
However, not all employment aid is viewed 
favourably by the Commission, which consid-
ers that certain employment aid measures, given 
their actual or potential harmful effect on com-
petition within the common market, are con-
trary to the common interest and may be 
approved only in a limited number of cases. 
Thus, the guidelines confirm the Commission's 
1 OJC 334, 12.12.1995, p. 4.  77 unfavourable view on aid to maintain jobs in a 
firm. In fact, such aid constitutes operating aid 
which generally has the effect of frustrating or 
delaying structural changes necessary to render 
a firm/sector economically viable, thereby 
keeping unprofitable businesses artificially 
alive. The Commission considers that, in most 
cases, the negative effects of such aid outweigh 
the possible short-term benefits in terms of 
maintaining a certain level of employment. 
Moreover, it will normally look unfavourably 
on aid for job creation available to only one or 
more sectors that are sensitive, suffer from 
overcapacity or are in a crisis. The negative 
effects such aid might have on competing firms 
in the same sector in other Member States and 
the risk that aid would merely export unem-
ployment to other Member States outweigh the 
positive effects in terms of reduction of the 
unemployment rate in the Member State grant-
ing the aid. The Commission thus decided to 
initiate the procedure provided for in Article 
93(2) in respect of employment aid offered to 
the shoe sector in Italy under a general employ-
ment aid scheme to sectors suffering from an 
employment crisis. 
However, aid to maintain jobs may be approved 
if it is granted to firms located in regions which, 
owing to the serious socio-economic problems 
they are experiencing, are eligible for regional 
aid under Article 92(3)(a) or if it is granted in 
the context of a rescue or restructuring plan.' 
Moreover, sectoral employment aid may be 
approved in regions with serious unemployment 
or if it is granted in subsectors which are experi-
encing economic growth and generating jobs. 
204. In response to the urgent need to deal with 
the current unemployment crisis in the Euro-
pean Union and to support the promotion of 
structural employment policies, in particular by 
means of active labour market measures, the 
Commission is considering adopting an acceler-
ated procedure for the notification of employ-
ment and training aid schemes. Under the accel-
erated procedure, the Commission will decide 
within 20 working days on notified aid meas-
ures. 
2.3. Aid for environmental protection 
should pay for the environmental damage it 
causes. Aid to firms for environmental protec-
tion is, in principle, not compatible with the 
'polluter pays' principle. However, it must be 
recognized that, in certain cases, such aid may 
be necessary either as an incentive for compa-
nies to implement measures for the protection 
of the environment going beyond existing 
mandatory requirements or in order to preserve 
the competitiveness of the industry when 
imposing new environmental requirements. 
Thus, under certain circumstances, aid for envi-
ronmental protection may be justified. How-
ever, it is clear that such aid is capable of dis-
torting competition between companies within 
the common market and is justified only if the 
beneficial effects of the aid on the environment 
outweigh the distortive effects on competition. 
206. The Community guidelines on State aid 
for environmental protection
2 aim to strike a 
balance between the abovementioned competi-
tion policy and environmental policy considera-
tions. Thus, they confirm the 'polluter pays' 
principle but at the same time provide that envi-
ronmental aid may be authorized under certain 
conditions. 
In line with these principles, the guidelines stip-
ulate that, although operating aid is normally 
considered to be incompatible with the common 
market, in exceptional cases the Commission 
may authorize operating aid in the form of relief 
from environmental taxes as well as other com-
pensatory measures, provided that the aid is 
necessary to achieve the environmental objec-
tives set. Thus, the Commission considered that 
the relief from new energy taxes on CO: and 
SO: emissions in favour of energy-intensive 
firms in Denmark and the Netherlands and the 
relief from tax on groundwater and waste in 
favour of certain firms in the Netherlands could 
be approved since they had to be regarded as the 
inevitable price to be paid for being among the 
first countries to introduce a tax beneficial for 
the environment. Without some relief, these 
taxes would so seriously damage the competi-
tiveness of energy-intensive firms in the coun-
tries going ahead with the tax, in this case Den-
mark and the Netherlands, as to be impracti-
78 
205. The Community's environmental policy is 
based on the principle that the polluting firm 
Guidelines on rescuing and restructuring firms in economic dif-
ficulty (OJ C 368. 23.12.1994). 
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cable. However, in order to ensure that these tax 
reliefs do not distort competition unduly and to 
encourage aid recipients to implement measures 
to reduce pollution, the Commission will 
always stipulate that the tax relief must be tem-
porary and, in principle, degressive. 
2.4. Aid to small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) 
207. The Commission continued in 1995 to 
apply the criteria of the Community guidelines 
on State aid for SMEs adopted by the Commis-
sion on 20 May 1992.' The framework provides 
for a review of its application by the Commis-
sion no later than three years after publication. 
The Commission therefore presented experts 
from the Member States, at a multilateral meet-
ing held in July, with the conclusions of the 
review and noted the changes it believed to be 
necessary. The Commission's objective contin-
ues to be to authorize aid which provides impe-
tus and overcomes specific handicaps affecting 
SMEs while limiting distortions of competition 
to a minimum. The discussion chiefly centred 
on clarification and simplification of the rules, 
updating the de minimis rule and the possibility 
of taking account of investment expenditure 
relating to technology transfers. 
2.5. Export aid 
208. Export aid, i.e. aid linked to the quantity
2 
of goods sold in other Member States/EEA 
States or aid closely linked to the marketing and 
sale of goods in those countries (such as aid for 
the setting-up or operation of distribution net-
works or sales agencies for goods and services 
within the Community and the EEA), is clearly 
at odds with the objective of an internal market. 
Such aid does not promote any Community 
objective which can justify its direct distortive 
effects on competition. Thus, the Commission 
will not authorize export aid. However, in line 
with the favourable view it takes of financial 
assistance to SMEs, in particular in view of 
their limited know-how and difficulties in rais-
ing external financing, the Commission may 
authorize soft aid in favour of SMEs related to 
the development of export markets, such as aid 
for consultancy and marketing research, pro-
vided that the aid is a one-off operation and 
limited to the penetration of new markets. It 
may, under the same circumstances, approve aid 
to SMEs for participation in trade fairs. 
209. European companies are not only in com-
petition within the EC/EEA but also compete 
for investment on foreign markets, such as East-
em Europe, Russia and South-East Asia. The 
Commission believes that aid to firms for 
investments on foreign markets may distort 
competition and affect trade within the Commu-
nity and therefore falls under the State aid rules 
of the EC Treaty. It is concerned that such aid 
measures may lead to business relocation and 
be available predominantly in the central and 
most-developed regions of the Community, 
thereby negating the efforts made under the 
Community's cohesion policy to reduce the gap 
between the more prosperous and the less pros-
perous regions of the Community. On the other 
hand, these aid measures may assist countries in 
Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Russia in 
their efforts to convert to a market economy and 
may, therefore, be justified in certain cases. To 
establish a clear policy in this field the Com-
mission decided to open the Article 93(2) pro-
cedure in respect of a number of international-
ization schemes and invited Member States and 
third parties to submit their comments. 
270. The Commission has continued its efforts 
to reach an agreement with Member States on a 
communication on short-term export credit 
insurance, which will require Member States to 
withdraw public support from export credit 
insurance companies in respect of short-term 
commercial risks. The Commission expects that 
the outstanding problems will be resolved in 
the course of 1996 so that the communication 
can then be adopted. 
2.6. Rescue and restructuring aid 
211. The Commission continued to apply the 
new guidelines on rescuing and restructuring 
firms in economic difficulty.
3 Without strict 
control, rescue and restructuring aid may be 
used by Member States to sustain ailing compa-
nies artificially, with the risk that necessary 
OJC 213, 19.8.1992, p. 2. 
The Commission is considering whether to include an explicit 
exemption to this end in the de minimis rule under revision. 
OJC 368. 23.12.1994, p. 12.  79 80 
structural adjustments in the internal market 
will be frustrated or unduly delayed and the bur-
dens of such adjustments shifted onto viable 
companies. However, rescue and restructuring 
aid may be warranted, for instance, on the basis 
of social or regional policy considerations, and 
the main objective of the guidelines is to strike 
a reasonable balance between such considera-
tions and the creation of a common market with 
free and undistorted competition. 
272. The purpose of rescue aid is to maintain a 
firm in operation temporarily while an appro-
priate restructuring plan is drawn up. A rescue 
aid may therefore be granted for only a limited 
period of time, normally no more than six 
months. The Commission considered that the 
guarantee with a duration of 18 months granted 
by the Spanish Government to Gutierrez 
Asunee Corporación (Guascor) for commercial 
loans did not meet the conditions of rescue aid. 
275. Under the guidelines, the Commission 
makes the approval of restructuring aid subject 
to strict conditions. In particular, the aid should 
normally be a one-off operation. It must be 
linked to a restructuring plan capable of restor-
ing the long-term viability of the firm within a 
reasonable period of time and on the basis of 
realistic assumptions as to its future operating 
conditions, so that further aid will not be neces-
sary. The Commission considers this to be a 
sine qua non for the approval of restructuring 
aid.' In view of the fact that certain German 
guarantee and soft-loan schemes for the rescue 
and restructuring of firms in difficulty did not, 
in principle, exclude the repetitive provision of 
aid for such operations in favour of the same 
firm, the Commission reserved its right to 
examine such repetitive aid individually. Simi-
larly, as the restructuring plan for Santana 
Motor S.A., a subsidiary of Suzuki Motor Cor-
poration Group, was vague and unconvincing 
and did not aim to restore the long-term viability 
of the firm, the Commission could not approve 
the aid which the Spanish Government intended 
to grant under that plan and decided to institute 
the investigative procedure of Article 93(2). 
274. In order to offset as far as possible adverse 
effects on competitors, it is a condition for 
authorizing restructuring aid to firms operating 
in sectors suffering from structural overcapacity 
that the recipient firm reduce capacity in a gen-
uine and irreversible way. In its approval of 
restructuring aid to the Italian fertilizer com-
pany Enichem Agricultura S.p.A., the Commis-
sion emphasized the implementation of an irre-
versible reduction in the company's production 
capacity and decided, moreover, that this condi-
tion for approval had to be respected until such 
time as the effects of the aid on the competitive 
situation in the Community were insignificant. 
However, it was unable to approve a State guar-
antee in favour of the Spanish company Guas-
cor since the restructuring plan for the company 
did not seem to provide for reductions in capac-
ity in at least one of its product sectors in which 
there is overcapacity in the EC. 
The Commission cannot itself impose a condi-
tion of privatization on an undertaking that 
receives aid for restructuring purposes. How-
ever, a commitment from a Member State to 
privatize the recipient of aid may be a decisive 
element for the Commission in assessing the 
future viability of the company without the need 
for further aid. Thus, in its decision on the com-
patibility of the restructuring aid to the Italian 
fertilizer company Enichem Agricultura S.p.A., 
the Commission took account of the commit-
ment made by the Italian Government to priva-
tize the company. 
2.7. Treuhandanstalt 
215. In January, the Commission decided on 
the terms applicable for 1995 for privatization 
aid in the new Lander. Such terms had previ-
ously been defined in 1991
2 and 1992.
3 Follow-
ing the dissolution of the Treuhandanstalt, the 
Commission decided that the procedures and 
assessment criteria applying to privatizations in 
1995 should be more in line with those applica-
ble for other Member States. After the transition 
year 1995 no special rules would exist. 
The Commission investigated several individ-
ual cases of aid for the privatization of compa-
nies in the new Lander. By far the most impor-
tant was the privatization of the petrochemical 
See also the Community guidelines on State aid to the aviation 
sector (OJ C 350, 10.12.1994, p. 5). 
XXIst Competition Report, point 249. 
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plants of BSL (Buna, Sächsische Olefinwerke, 
Leuna) to Dow Chemical. In November, the 
Commission took a final decision allowing aid 
of ECU 5 billion (DM 9.5 billion) for the 
restructuring of BSL as an integrated complex. 
3. Regional aid 
276. The Commission continued its review of 
the schemes in force, their arrangements and the 
maps of the regions to be regarded as eligible 
for regional aid (in accordance with the princi-
ples of a reduction in population coverage and 
consistency with the Structural Fund maps). 
Decisions were taken for the Netherlands, Bel-
gium (excluding Hainaut), Spain and Italy. The 
whole review exercise is thus almost over with 
only one country still having to revise its map. 
As regards the three new Member States (Aus-
tria, Sweden, Finland), the Commission 
approved and adopted the maps drawn up by the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority in 1994 in the 
context of the European Economic Area. The 
Commission also continued to examine, under 
Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty, the compatibil-
ity of Structural Fund assistance for various 
Community objectives and initiatives. D — Procedures 
(rights of complainants) 
277. In its judgment of 28 September 1995 in 
Case T-95/94 Sytraval ν Commission, the Court 
of First Instance annulled the Commission's 
decision of 31 December 1993 rejecting a com-
plaint in respect of alleged State aid in favour of 
Sécuripost, a subsidiary of the State-owned 
French postal administration, which operates in 
competitive markets. The CFI considered that 
the Commission had not provided sufficient 
reasoning for the rejection of a series of state-
ments by complainants alleging preferential 
treatment of Sécuripost. 
The significance of this judgment lies in the 
statements made by the CFI in respect of the 
rights of complainants in such procedures. The 
CFI stated that the Commission must examine 
impartially and exhaustively all allegations 
made by complainants and cannot impose on 
the complainant the burden of proof concerning 
the existence and (in)compatibility of State aid. 
Otherwise, complainants would be required to 
obtain information in support of their allega-
tions which in most cases they would not be 
able to collect without the Commission's acting 
as an intermediary. Therefore, the Commission 
cannot justify the lack of sufficient reasoning or 
the failure to examine certain allegations on the 
grounds that the complainant has not provided 
sufficient information. The conclusions in 
Sytraval confirm the CFI's judgment of 18 Sep-
tember 1995 in Case T-49/93 SIDE ν Commis-
sion. 
218. There are two stages in the Commission's 
procedure for the examination of State aid 
measures: the preliminary examination of the 
measure, and the opening of the procedure pro-
vided for in Article 93(2) EC in cases where the 
Commission, following the preliminary exami-
nation, still has doubts as to the compatibility of 
the measure with the common market. Whereas 
the Treaty provides for a procedure whereby 
third parties are invited to submit their com-
ments in the procedure opened under Article 
93(2), this is not the case in respect of the pre-
liminary examination. When the compatibility 
of an aid with the common market can be estab-
lished without further examination, it does not 
appear necessary to alert third parties before the 
decision of the Commission. Therefore, it has 
been the consistent practice of the Commission 
not to grant third parties, including com-
plainants, a right to be heard during the prelim-
inary examination. The European Court of Jus-
tice has supported this position in a number of 
judgments.' However, further to the require-
ment to examine impartially and exhaustively 
all the allegations made by the complainant and 
to state the reasons for its decision in Sytraval, 
the CFI imposes an obligation on the Commis-
sion, under certain circumstances, to initiate a 
contradictory procedure with complainants in 
cases involving difficult questions as to the 
determination of whether or not measures are 
State aid before the Article 93(2) procedure has 
been opened. The judgment seems to impose 
additional obligations on the Commission in its 
examination of complaints in cases giving rise 
to doubts about the existence of aid, and to go 
against the established case-law of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Therefore, the Commis-
sion has appealed against this judgment to the 
ECJ. 
82  See in particular Case 84/82 Germain ν Commission 
ECR 1451. 
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E — Statistics 
279. Over the year, the Commission registered 
680 notifications of new aid measures or 
changes to existing aid measures, and 113 cases 
of unnotified aid.' In the same period, it decid-
ed not to raise objections in 504 cases. In 57 
cases, it decided to initiate the procedure pro-
vided for in Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty or in 
Article 6(4) of Decision 3855/91/ECSC. This 
detailed analysis procedure resulted in 22 posi-
tive final decisions, nine negative final deci-
sions and five conditional final decisions. Last-
ly, the Commission decided to propose appro-
priate measures under Article 93(1) of the EC 
Treaty in respect of six existing aid systems. 
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84 V — INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
A — European Economic Area 
220. After Austria, Finland and Sweden joined 
the European Union on 1 January 1995, Norway 
and Iceland were the only remaining EFTA sig­
natories of the Agreement on the European Eco­
nomic Area (EEA Agreement). On 1 May 1995, 
they were joined by Liechtenstein. 
Cooperation in matters of competition resulting 
from the EEA Agreement, supplemented by 
informal but systematic consultation measures 
established by common accord between the 
Commission and the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority,' was maintained with the three coun­
tries. 
In addition, in accordance with Article 172 of 
the Treaty of Accession of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden to the European Union,
2 the aid cases 
relating to the new Member States that were 
being processed by the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority were forwarded to the Commission 
(some 80 cases under Articles 53 and 54 of the 
EEA Agreement and about 400 aid cases). 
Β — Central and Eastern Europe, Baltic 
States, new independent States 
and Mediterranean countries 
Technical assistance under the PHARE pro­
gramme has so far centred mainly on anti-trust 
law aspects. In 1996, it will focus in particular 
on monopolies, exclusive rights and State aid, 
and will pay particular attention to effective 
enforcement of legislation. 
The Commission's White Paper providing 
guidelines on the integration of the CEECs
4 
underlines the importance of a viable competi­
tion policy for economies in transition and lays 
down four pillars (anti-trust, mergers, State aid 
and State monopolies/exclusive rights) for the 
approximation of legislation which the associ­
ated countries should undertake. Substantial 
progress has been made in this area as regards 
anti-trust; all but one associated country have a 
competition law authority. Upon accession, 
these countries will accept all of the Communi­
ty legislation in force (acquis communautaire) 
and, in the meantime, technical assistance is 
being provided. 
As regards the rules for implementing the 
Europe Agreements, those for applying the 
competition rules to undertakings are in the 
process of being adopted by the Association 
Councils while a proposed set of rules is being 
discussed for State aid. One country has agreed 
to the set of rules and the formal approval 
process is being launched. Another country has 
announced its agreement. 
1. Central and Eastern Europe 
227. As part of the pre-accession strategy for 
the six associated countries of Central and East­
ern Europe (CEECs),
1 the Essen European 
Council of December 1994 stressed the impor­
tance not only of competition policy but also of 
facilitating its enforcement. Among other 
things, it charged the Commission, together 
with the Member States, with setting up a com­
petition policy training programme. The Com­
mission and the Member States' authorities have 
met several times and managed to improve 
coordination of their actions and to launch a sig­
nificant joint action. Officials from the CEECs 
and from the Baltic States attended a two-week 
collective training period at DG IV in Septem­
ber (financed by the PHARE programme) and 
then individually visited a national competition 
authority in the EU. The action was widely 
acclaimed by the participants. 
The Commission has made several efforts to 
publicize competition policy for all economic 
agents in these countries. At the Brno confer­
ence in April, the Director-General for Compe­
tition spoke to a wide audience, including com­
petition officials and business representatives, 
about the international dimension of competi­
tion policy and the importance of cooperation 
between competition authorities. At the Vise-
XXllnd Competition Report, points 85 to 89 and XXIVth Com­
petition Report, point 399. 
OJC 241, 29.8.1994. 
The Europe Agreements with Romania, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic entered into force on 1 Febru­
ary 1995; those with Poland and Hungary entered into force on 
I February 1994, The Agreements' substantive competition rules 
are basically those of the Treaty of Rome; see XXIVth Report on 
Competition Policy, point 401. 
Commission White Paper on the preparation of the associated 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the 
internal market of the Union (May 1995), endorsed by the 
Cannes European Council in June 1995.  85 grad Conference on 19-21 June, heads of the 
competition authorities in the CEECs and DG IV 
officials discussed specific competition prob-
lems of economies in transition and also the 
interaction of anti-trust and State aid policies; a 
joint action programme was agreed upon. It was 
agreed inter alia to establish a network for elec-
tronic data exchange. In the autumn, the Direc-
tor-General for Competition visited Bulgaria 
and discussed issues relating to State aid and 
monopolies. 
2. Baltic States, Slovenia, and new 
independent States 
222. As part of the pre-accession strategy for 
the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia), the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which 
contain the same competition rules as those in 
the Europe Agreements with the CEECs, came 
into force on 1 January 1995. They will soon be 
replaced by the Europe Agreements signed in 
June; these three countries now must fulfil the 
same conditions for inclusion in the pre-acces-
sion strategy which the EU has set for the 
CEECs. The same implementing rules as those 
for the CEECs are proposed for the Baltic 
States. One country has notified its basic agree-
ment both with the rules on undertakings and 
with those on State aid. Negotiations with 
Slovenia for a Europe Agreement are under 
way. 
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Partnership and cooperation agreements have 
been signed with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova; 
although the competition rules agreed upon are 
less stringent than those in the CEEC agree-
ments, the agreements also include a clause on 
the approximation of legislation. Cooperation 
has begun, in particular by means of the provi-
sion of technical assistance under the TACIS 
programme. In this context, financing was pro-
vided for an international conference organized 
by the Russian competition authority in the 
autumn in Moscow and attended by the Deputy 
Director-General for Competition. A working 
group with Russia met in May and again in 
December. It reviewed ways of embarking on 
the practical implementation of the partnership 
and cooperation agreement (PCA). 
3. Mediterranean countries and Mercosur 
223. Association agreements have been signed 
with Tunisia, Morocco and Israel and similar 
agreements are currently being negotiated with 
Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. These contain or 
are expected to contain competition rules as 
provided in the Europe Agreements. The agree-
ment for establishing a customs union with 
Turkey, which has been signed and is in the 
process of ratification, contains extremely strin-
gent obligations relating to the approximation 
of legislation, particularly competition law, 
which must be fulfilled within specified peri-
ods. 
It is to be noted that all these bilateral agree-
ments have triggered important moves in the 
direction of policy harmonization. This is com-
patible with the recommendations of the group 
of experts on competition policy in the new 
trade order (see below). 
Negotiations with Mercosur are under way and 
will extend to some aspects of competition. 
C — North America 
224. The Agreement between the European 
Community and the United States on the appli-
cation of their competition laws was approved 
by the European Council on 10 April. At the 
same time, the Council approved the text of a 
letter addressed to the United States clarifying 
the European Community's interpretation of 
certain provisions of the Agreement.' 
This letter, reflecting the text of Commission 
statements made to the Council, clarified two 
issues. 
Firstly, information covered by Article 20 of 
Regulation No 17 or by equivalent provisions of 
other regulations in the field of competition 
may not be communicated by the Commission 
to the US anti-trust authorities save with the 
express agreement of the source concerned. 
Secondly, each party ensures the confidentiality 
of all information provided in confidence by the 
other party and will use all the legal means at its 
disposal to oppose the disclosure of such infor-
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mation. The Commission, after notifying the 
US competition authorities, will inform the 
Member State(s) whose interests are affected of 
notifications sent to the Commission by the US 
anti-trust authorities and, after consulting them 
will also inform the Member State(s) concerned 
of any cooperation or coordination of enforce-
ment activities. In the latter regard, however, the 
Commission will respect a request by the US 
authorities not to disclose the information 
which they provide in cases where this is neces-
sary to ensure confidentiality. 
The approval of the Agreement by the Member 
States has imparted the political impetus and 
created the legal certainty necessary for a 
redoubling of cooperation efforts between the 
EC and the US. 
Notifications from the US to the EC under the 
Agreement have continued regularly through 
the year with a total of 35 altogether (21 from 
the Department of Justice and 14 from the Fed-
eral Trade Commission), 21 of which were in 
merger cases. The notifications from the EC to 
the US resumed after 10 April, following the 
short interruption due to uncertainty about the 
legal position of the Agreement under Commu-
nity law.' The EC notified the US on 43 occa-
sions in 1995, of which 30 involved merger 
cases. 
The biannual high-level meetings between the 
Commission and the US anti-trust authorities 
resumed on 13 November after a break of two 
years. The discussions concentrated on the 
effectiveness of current bilateral cooperation 
and a number of areas were identified for fur-
ther study. Future bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation was also discussed in the context of 
the report of the group of experts on competi-
tion policy in the new trade order and of the 
adoption by the United States of the Interna-
tional Anti-trust Enforcement Assistance Act of 
1994. A significant part of the meeting was also 
given over to innovation markets and their rela-
tionship with competition policy. 
On 23 January, the Council authorized the Com-
mission to open negotiations with Canada on a 
bilateral cooperation agreement in the area of 
competition.
2 A first round of negotiations under 
this authorization was held on 27 January, when 
good progress was made in defining the shape 
of a draft agreement. The draft agreement was 
discussed by the Council Group on Economic 
Questions on 6 March. It is expected that the 
negotiations will be concluded in the first part 
of 1996. 
An informal meeting between the Commission 
and the Canadian Bureau of Competition Policy 
was held on 14 November to exchange views on 
recent developments in competition policy in 
the EU and Canada. 
D — Japan 
225. Relations between DG IV and the Japa-
nese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) remained 
close during the year under review. 
On 22 November, the third seminar held jointly 
by the two competition authorities took place in 
Tokyo. The seminar topics concerned the role 
of competition policy in a globalized economy 
and the scope of competition policy. 
The annual bilateral meeting between DG IV 
and the JFTC was held on 24 November. The 
two competition authorities discussed bilateral 
relations and subjects of common interest such 
as the liberalization and internationalization of 
the competition rules. They also reported on the 
main legislative developments in their respec-
tive areas and on the implementation of the 
competition rules. 
Both formal and informal contacts with the 
Japanese authorities were intensified in 1995. 
DG IV was thus able, under the deregulation 
plan adopted in May by the Japanese Govern-
ment, to put forward its requests to that Gov-
ernment for a broader and more rigorous appli-
cation of the competition rules, the abolition of 
virtually all the exceptions to those rules and the 
strengthening of the competition authority 
(JFTC). 
E — Australia and New Zealand 
226. Bilateral contacts with Australia were pur-
sued on a number of occasions during 1995. 
Topics discussed during these informal meet-
ings included recent policy developments in the 
XXIVth Competition Report, point 413. 
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deregulation, and the reform of the Australian 
Competition Act. 
F — Multinational organizations and 
other international issues 
1.0ECD 
227. DG IV played an active part in the work of 
the OECD on competition matters. The main 
areas of discussion were the convergence of 
laws, international cooperation and the relation-
ship between competition policy and interna-
tional commercial policy, in the context of the 
liberalization of trade. Other topics included 
the application of the competition rules to the 
liberalized sectors (telecommunications and 
maritime transport); lastly, particular attention 
was paid to certain individual or sectoral 
aspects of competition policy (failing firm and 
efficiency claims, vertical integration in the cin-
ema industry, competition policy and environ-
mental policy). 
DG IV represents the Commission in the OECD 
Industry Committee's Working Party on Public 
Support Measures. By way of its expertise, it 
continued to contribute to the ongoing OECD 
survey on public support in the manufacturing 
sector. 
2. World Trade Organization 
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228. Negotiations in the sectors where agree-
ment could not be reached by the end of the 
Uruguay Round were actively pursued, espe-
cially as regards basic telecommunications ser-
vices. The European Union, within the frame-
work of the negotiations, put forward a proposal 
which places emphasis in particular on a 
timetable for external liberalization that is com-
patible with liberalization within the European 
Union, as well as guarantees in terms of the 
independence of regulators. 
In the State aids field, all Member States agreed 
to the Commission's proposal for a joint notifi-
cation and reporting procedure to the Commis-
sion and the World Trade Organization, thereby 
modifying the existing standardized system of 
notification and annual reporting of State aid.' 
As a result of this modification, the notification 
of subsidies as required by the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and 
the above annual reporting is carried out in one 
step. The Commission is confident that this new 
procedure will alleviate the administrative bur-
den on Member States and ensure a high level 
of transparency. 
3. Unctad 
229. DG IV continued to play an active part in 
the work of Unctad on restrictive trade prac-
tices. In particular, it took part in the third 
United Nations Conference which reviewed all 
the principles and rules agreed by Unctad in this 
area. 
4. International cooperation 
230. The group of experts convened by Mr Van 
Miert in 1994 to discuss the prospects for closer 
cooperation between competition authorities 
presented its report in July 1995.
2 It made a 
number of recommendations. Having briefly 
examined the possibility of establishing an 
international competition authority and a world-
wide competition code, it put this to one side as 
not being realistic in the short or medium term. 
Instead it felt that one should commence with 
the introduction of an adequate set of competi-
tion rules by those countries not yet having one. 
In this regard the group recommended that 
assistance should be provided by those coun-
tries which have already acquired experience in 
this area. 
The group proposed a dual approach. First, it 
recommended a strengthening of bilateral co-
operation between competition authorities with, 
as a priority, a deepening of existing coopera-
tion with the United States and an extension of 
bilateral cooperation to other partner countries. 
The second but principal recommendation of 
the group was the elaboration of a plurilateral 
Commission letter D/20500 dated 2 August 1995 replacing letter 
SG(94) D/2484 dated 22 February 1994. 
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cooperation framework as the group believes 
that, even if it is strengthened, bilateral cooper-
ation cannot resolve all the problems facing 
competition authorities or create effective 
momentum for enforcing competition rules in 
third-country markets. A plurilateral agreement 
would include all the elements already incorpo-
rated in bilateral agreements, to which would be 
added a set of minimum competition rules, a 
binding positive comity instrument and an 
effective and progressive dispute-settlement 
mechanism. 
On 17 July, the Commission authorized the pre-
sentation of the report to the Council and to Par-
liament with a view to launching discussions 
with the Union's main partners and within the 
international organizations concerned. 
At a meeting of the Directors-General of the 
Member States' competition authorities on 
17 October, it was agreed that a working group 
should be established to consider the technical 
aspects of some of the group's recommenda-
tions. 
This report has also been presented to the Euro-
pean Parliament, to the Council's Article 113 
Committee and to the Community's OECD part-
ners. The initial reaction has been positive. 
89 VI — INFORMATION POLICY 
237. During 1995, the Commission continued 
its active public information campaign on com­
petition policy. As in the past, press releases on 
competition-related issues accounted for almost 
one third of the total number of Commission 
press releases. With its limited resources, 
DG IV's Information Service replied during the 
past year to more than 1 000 questions from the 
public, forwarding relevant documentation or 
providing useful advice. Owing to a lack of 
resources, most information enquiries have in 
recent months been answered by way of stan­
dard letters containing an updated list of Com­
munity publications on competition available to 
the public' (including studies and speeches by 
DG IV officials). DG IV, in collaboration with 
the Office for Official Publications, published 
during 1995 several reference books on compe­
tition law, while the EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter, issued three times per year and with 
a print-run of 17 000 copies, has established 
itself as a leading source of information in the 
field. For 1996, several new publications are 
under preparation and DG IV plans to introduce 
data on Europa, the European institutions' host 
on the World Wide Web.
2 
For more information and to obtain the latest list of Community 
Publications on competition available to the public, contact 
DG IV's Cellule Information, CI50 00/158, rue de la Loi 200, 
Β-1049 Brussels, tel. (+32-2) 295 76 20, fax (+32-2) 295 54 37. 
Electronic mail: X400: c = BE;a=RTT; p=CEC; o=DG4; 
s = INF04. Internet: Info4@dg4.cec.be 
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1. Articles 85 and 86 and Article 90 
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2. Merger control 
Case 
ABB/Daimler Benz 
Crown Cork and Seal/Carnaud 
MetalBox 
Glaxo/Wellcome 
Lyonnaise des Eaux/Northumbrian Water 
Mercedes Benz/Kässbohrer 





















3. State aid 
Case 
Air France 
Andalusian Development Agency 
AOM 







Danish energy package 
EM-Filature 
Employment aid scheme in Sweden 
Energy taxes in the Netherlands 
Enichem Agricultura S.p.A. 
Ferries Golfo De Viscaya 
Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A. 
Fiat Mezzogiorno 
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SEAT-Volkswagen 




















































93 European Commission 
European Community competition policy— 1995 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
1996 — 93 pp. — 21.0 χ 29.7 cm 
ISBN 92-827-6747-7 Venta · Salg · Verkauf · Πωλήσεις · Sales · Vente · Vendita · Verkoop · Venda · Myynti · Försäljning 
BELGIQUE/BELGIË  IRELAND  NORGE  ISRAEL 
Moniteur belge/ 
Belgisch Staatsblad 
Rue de Louvain 42/Leuvenseweg 42 
B-1000 Bruxelles/B-1000 Brussel 
Tél. (02)512 00 26 
Fax (02) 511 01 84 
Jean De Lannoy 
Avenue du Roi 202/Koningslaan 202 
B-1060 Bruxelles/B-1060 Brussel 
Tél. (02) 538 51 69 





Rue de la Loi 244/Wetstraat 244 
B-1040 Bruxelles/B-1040 Brussel 
Tél. (02) 231 04 35 
Fax (02) 735 08 60 
Document delivery: 
Credoc 
Rue de la Montagne 34/Bergstraat 34 
Bolle 11/Bus 11 
B-1000 Bruxelles/B-1000 Brussel 
Tél. (02)511 69 41 
Fax(02)513 31 95 
DANMARK 
J. H. Schultz Information A/S 
Herstedvang 10-12 
DK-2620 Albertslund 
Tlf. 43 63 23 00 
Fax (Sales) 43 63 19 69 
Fax (Management) 43 63 19 49 
DEUTSCHLAND 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
Postfach 10 05 34 
D-50445 Köln 
Tel.(02 21)20 29-0 
Fax (02 21) 2 02 92 78 
GREECE/ΕΛΛΑΔΑ 
G.C. Eleftheroudakis SA 
International Bookstore 
Nikis Street 4 
GR-10563 Athens 
Tel. (01)322 63 23 
Fax 323 98 21 
ESPANA 
Mundl-Prensa Libros, SA 
Castello, 37 
E-28001 Madrid 
Tel. (91)431 33 99 (Libros) 
431 32 22 (Suscripciones) 
435 36 37 (Dirección) 
Fax (91) 575 39 98 
Boletín Oficial del Estado 
Trafalgar, 27-29 
E-28071 Madrid 
Tel. (91)538 22 95 
Fax (91 (538 23 49 
Sucursal: 
Librería Internacional AEDOS 
Consejo de Ciento, 391 
E-08009 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 488 34 92 
Fax (93) 487 76 59 
Librería de la Generalität 
de Catalunya 
Rambla deis Estudis, 
E-08002 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 302 68 35 
Tel. (93) 302 64 62 




Service des publications 
des Communautés européennes 
Government Supplies Agency 
4-5 Harcourt Road 
Dublin 2 
Tel. (1)66 13 111 
Fax (1)47 52 760 
ITALIA 
Licosa SpA 
Via Duca di Calabria 1/1 
Casella postale 552 
1-50125 Firenze 
Tel. (055)64 54 15 
Fax 64 12 57 
26, rue Desaix 
F-75727 Paris Cedex 15 
Tél. (1)40 58 77 01/31 
Fax (1)40 58 77 00 
GRAND-DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG 
Messageries du livre 
5, rue Raiffeisen 
L-2411 Luxembourg 
Tél. 40 10 20 
Fax 49 06 61 
NEDERLAND 
SDU Servicecentrum Uitgeverijen 
Postbus 20014 
2500 EA 's-Gravenhage 
Tel. (070) 37 89 880 






Tel. (1)531 610 
Fax (1)531 61-181 
Document delivery: 




Fax (0222) 50206-297 
PORTUGAL 
Imprensa Nacional — Casa da Moeda, EP 
Rua Marquês Sá da Bandeira, 16-A 
P-1099 Lisboa Codex 
Tel. (01)353 03 99 
Fax (01) 353 02 94/384 01 32 
Distribuidora de Livros 
Bertrand, Ld." 
Grupo Bertrand, SA 
Rua das Terras dos Vales, 4-A 
Apartado 37 
P-2700 Amadora Codex 
Tel. (01) 49 59 050 




Pohjoisesplanadi 39 / Norra esplanaden 39 
PL /PB 128 
FIN-00101 Helsinki / Helsingfors 
Tel. (90) 121 4322 





S-221 00 Lund 
Tel. (046) 18 00 00 
Fax (046) 18 01 25 
UNITED KINGDOM 
HMSO Books (Agency section) 
HMSO Publications Centre 
51 Nine Elms Lane 
London SW8 5DR 
Tel.(0171)873 9090 






Tel. 551 56 50 
Fax 552 55 60 
NIC Info a/s 
Boks 6512 Etterstad 
0606 Oslo 
Tel. (22) 57 33 34 





Tel. (01)365 54 49 
Fax(01)365 54 11 
BALGARIJA 
Europress Klassica B K Ltd 
66, bd Vitosha 
BG-1463 Sofia 





Tel./Fax (2) 24 22 94 33 
HRVATSKA 
Mediatrade 
P. Hatza 1 
HR-4100 Zagreb 






Tel./Fax (1)111 6061,(1)111 62 16 
POLSKA 
Business Foundation 
ul. Krucza 38/42 
PL-00-512 Warszawa 
Tel. (2) 621 99 93, 628 28 82 
International Fax&Phone (0-39) 12 00 77 
ROMANIA 
Euromedia 
65, Strada Dionisie Lupu 
RO-70184 Bucuresti 
Tel./Fax 1-31 29 646 
RUSSIA 
CCEC 
9,60-letiya Oktyabrya Avenue 
117312 Moscow 




Nam. slobody 19 
SLO-812 23 Bratislava 1 
Tel. (7) 52 204 52 
Fax (7) 52 957 85 
CYPRUS 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
Chamber Building 
38 Grivas Dhigenis Ave 
3 Deligiorgis Street 
PO Box 1455 
Nicosia 
Tel. (2)44 95 00,46 23 12 
Fax (2) 36 10 44 
MALTA 
Miller Distributors Ltd 
PO Box 25 
Malta International Airport LQA 05 Malta 
Tel. 66 44 88 




Tel. (1)251 91 90/251 96 96 
Fax (1)251 91 97 
Roy International 
17, Shimon Halarssi Street 
P.O.B. 13056 
61130 Tel Aviv 
Tel. (3)546 14 23 
Fax (3) 546 14 42 
Sub-agent for the Palestinian Authority: 
INDEX Information Services 
PO Box 19502 
Jerusalem 
Tel. (2) 27 16 34 
Fax(2)27 12 19 
EGYPT/ 
MIDDLE EAST 
Middle East Observer 
41 Sherif St. 
Cairo 
Tel/Fax (2) 393 97 32 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/ 
CANADA 
UNIPUB 
4611 -F Assembly Drive 
Lanham. MD 20706-4391 
Tel. Toll Free (800) 274 48 88 




Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd 
1294 Algoma Road 
Ottawa. Ontario K1 B 3W8 
Tel. (613) 741 43 33 
Fax (613) 741 54 39 
AUSTRALIA 
Hunter Publications 
58A Gipps Street 
Collingwood 
Victoria 3066 
Tel. (3)9417 53 61 
Fax (3) 9419 71 54 
JAPAN 
Procurement Services Int. (PSI-Japan) 
Kyoku Dome Postal Code 102 
Tokyo Kojimachi Post Office 
Tel. (03) 32 34 69 21 
Fax (03) 32 34 69 15 
Sub-agent: 
Kinokuniya Company Ltd 
Journal Department 
PO Box 55 Chitóse 
Tokyo 156 
Tel. (03)34 39-0124 
SOUTH and EAST ASIA 
Legal Library Services Ltd 
Orchard 
PO Box 0523 
Singapore 9123 
Tel. 243 24 98 
Fax 243 24 79 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Safto 
5th Floor. Export House 
Cnr Maude S West Streets 
Sandton 2146 
Tel.(011)883-3737 




Office des publications officielles 
des Communautés européennes 
2, rue Mercier 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Tél. 29 29-1 
Télex PUBOF LU 1324 b 















■k EUR "k 
* OP * 
• —'— • 
*•* 
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
ISBN T5-027-b7M7-7 
789282"767474 > 